tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-48666710882204392122024-03-04T23:20:57.259-08:00The Christian AgnosticOmnia autem probate quod bonum est tenete Steven Jakehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04753917037685188540noreply@blogger.comBlogger100125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4866671088220439212.post-24381070758645862792017-05-12T13:33:00.000-07:002017-05-12T13:33:28.331-07:00Contra Scott Clifton on the Principle of Causality<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">It’s
been quite a while since I last posted an article on my blog; in fact, I pretty
much told myself I was done blogging. And yet here I am…blogging again – “Just
when I thought I was out, they pull me back in.” But, instead of explaining my
absence, or promising that I will blog in the future, I think I’ll just jump
right into my post. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgBwdEkQJMgoxGSb35Kiv0mRsWHAYRuUzFau5gWHWgw0HMoUc5psj0YhI949Q8_7w1LA5iUQuKuTSzXYS0mDl1tKCpKLbOVYqjL_nkGfLa0PIg6hbH61EyexWdvqGBMrKaEW5vifgiNYwFK/s1600/SC.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="200" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgBwdEkQJMgoxGSb35Kiv0mRsWHAYRuUzFau5gWHWgw0HMoUc5psj0YhI949Q8_7w1LA5iUQuKuTSzXYS0mDl1tKCpKLbOVYqjL_nkGfLa0PIg6hbH61EyexWdvqGBMrKaEW5vifgiNYwFK/s200/SC.jpg" width="200" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">I’ve
looked up to Scott Clifton (also known on YouTube as <a href="https://www.youtube.com/user/TheoreticalBullshit">Theoretical Bullshit</a>) for
a long time now, ever since I first watched him in my favorite soap opera The
Bold and the Beautiful. Ok not really, I’ve never watched him in a soap opera. I
<i>really</i> looked up to him because of
his videos on YouTube. I began watching Scott’s videos around 2010, when I was
still a naive Christian apologist, and even though I disagreed with him more
often than I agreed—though now that’s changed—I always took him very seriously intellectually,
and I still do—in fact, his argument from nonbelief has helped shape my present
beliefs. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Recently,
to my pleasant surprise, I discovered that Scott has a blog on <a href="http://www.scottclifton.com/">his website</a>, and
already has a lot of great articles. And it’s one article in particular that I
have felt the need to address: an article entitled <i><a href="http://www.scottclifton.com/beginning-to-exist-a-critique-of-kalams-first-premise/">Beginning to Exist: A Critique of Kalam’s First Premise</a></i>—please make
sure and read Scott’s article before following along with my critique.<i> </i>Now, hopefully my readers (however many
of them are left) know that I am not a William Lane Craig fan, in fact I
disagree with him on virtually everything—and I certainly am not a fan of the
Kalam Cosmological Argument (KCA). However, I do in fact endorse the first
premise of the KCA, and I do believe it to be true, and thus I disagree with
Scott in this regard. Hence my motivation is manifest for the writing of this
post. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">So, before
we jump into Scott’s criticism, I believe most of my readers are aware of the
first premise of the KCA: (P1) everything which begins to exist has a cause.
This is a basic form of the principle of causality (which I have defended <a href="http://christian-agnostic.blogspot.com/2015/01/the-principle-of-causality.html">here</a>)
and, obviously, in order for the KCA to be sound, this premise needs to be
true. This is where WLC attempts to justify said premise, and Scott lists
Craig’s justifications as follows:</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; text-indent: -0.25in;"> </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; text-indent: -0.25in;"> 1)<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; text-indent: -0.25in;">Something
cannot come from nothing. </span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -.25in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; text-indent: -0.25in;"> 2)<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; text-indent: -0.25in;">If
something can come into being from nothing, it becomes inexplicable why just
anything or everything doesn’t come into being from nothing.</span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -.25in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; text-indent: -0.25in;"> 3)<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; text-indent: -0.25in;"> Common experience and scientific evidence
confirm the truth of [P1].</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Scott
then begins with his criticism of (1): <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">It’s
odd that Craig ever refers to this [sic] an “argument”. It’s not an
argument; it’s a claim. And why should <i>I</i>, his intended
audience, <i>believe</i> this claim? Craig’s answer is that this is a
“metaphysical intuition” we all share. But what is an intuition? As an evolved
primate whose cognitive abilities were naturally selected for survival and
mating, why should I—an atheist for whom the Kalam Cosmological Argument is
intended—take this seriously as an epistemic tool for determining the ultimate
metaphysical nature of reality? What should I understand my intuitions to be,
exactly, if they are not ultimately reducible to induction? How could this
“metaphysical intuition” (which I don’t share, by the way) be anything other
than an inference—conscious or subconscious—derived from my empirical knowledge
of temporal, spatial, <i>ex materia</i> causality in the physical
world? Isn’t (1) really just (3) in ‘metaphysical clothing’?</span></blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">There’s
a lot to unpack here. First, I agree that if one of Craig’s arguments for (P1)
is simply to assert (1) as a mere intuition, then he has much work ahead of
him. That being said, I don’t share Scott’s skepticism towards this principle,
for reasons I will explicate shortly. Now, while I <i>do</i> agree that principles like (1) are abstracted from the
spatiotemporal world, I don’t see that this hinders one from pronouncing (1) as
a necessary proposition that we can be certain of. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Take,
for instance, the cornerstone of logic and epistemology, the laws of logic. As
I’ve argued in the past, we can be absolutely certain of these principles. Is <i>P</i> identical to <i>P</i>? Certainly. Is it the case that an existent cannot be both <i>P</i> and not-</span><!--[if gte msEquation 12]><m:oMath><i
style='mso-bidi-font-style:normal'><span style='font-family:"Cambria Math","serif";
mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"'><m:r>~</m:r></span></i></m:oMath><![endif]--><!--[if !msEquation]--><span style="font-family: "Calibri","sans-serif"; font-size: 11.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-text-raise: -4.5pt; position: relative; top: 4.5pt;"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shapetype
id="_x0000_t75" coordsize="21600,21600" o:spt="75" o:preferrelative="t"
path="m@4@5l@4@11@9@11@9@5xe" filled="f" stroked="f">
<v:stroke joinstyle="miter"/>
<v:formulas>
<v:f eqn="if lineDrawn pixelLineWidth 0"/>
<v:f eqn="sum @0 1 0"/>
<v:f eqn="sum 0 0 @1"/>
<v:f eqn="prod @2 1 2"/>
<v:f eqn="prod @3 21600 pixelWidth"/>
<v:f eqn="prod @3 21600 pixelHeight"/>
<v:f eqn="sum @0 0 1"/>
<v:f eqn="prod @6 1 2"/>
<v:f eqn="prod @7 21600 pixelWidth"/>
<v:f eqn="sum @8 21600 0"/>
<v:f eqn="prod @7 21600 pixelHeight"/>
<v:f eqn="sum @10 21600 0"/>
</v:formulas>
<v:path o:extrusionok="f" gradientshapeok="t" o:connecttype="rect"/>
<o:lock v:ext="edit" aspectratio="t"/>
</v:shapetype><v:shape id="_x0000_i1025" type="#_x0000_t75" style='width:7.8pt;
height:15pt'>
<v:imagedata src="file:///C:\Users\PROFES~1\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image001.png"
o:title="" chromakey="white"/>
</v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><!--[endif]--></span><!--[endif]--><i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;">P </span></i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;"> at
the same time and in the same respect? Absolutely, etc. etc. Again, these
logical laws are seen to be (by most logicians) logically necessary truths which
would hold in any conceivable world—spatiotemporal or not—and it certainly is
not a problem that these principles are abstracted from the world we observe.
Now, is Scott skeptical of the efficacy of the laws of logic the same way he’s
skeptical of (1)? I can’t say. But, if he <i>is</i>
then I fail to see how this wouldn’t poke major holes in his epistemology. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;">More
to the point, all that would need to be demonstrated in order to equate the
efficacy of (1) with the efficacy of the laws of logic is to demonstrate that
the former, like the latter, is a necessary truth. And this is not difficult to
argue—though, in order to be as exhaustive as I can to argue this point, I will
be using more Aristotelian-Thomistic jargon than analytical jargon [insert
eye-roll here]. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;">The
phrase “something coming from” indicates that at one time this “something”, or
whatever made up this “something”, only had the <i>potential</i> to do this, and thus when it did in fact come from
whatever it came from, it was reduced from potency to act. Just like in order
for water to come from ice, the ice had to, at some point, have only had the
potential to become water, and subsequently when it did become water, this
potency became actual. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;">Furthermore,
“nothing” in A-T terms just means non-actual. But, non-actuality cannot move
something from potency to act because you need something <i>actual</i> to reduce something from potency to act in the first place,
like a lighter in the case of the ice—note that the mere potency cannot move
itself since potency is only potential, not actual. Since that which is
non-actual literally cannot <i>do</i>
anything, it therefore cannot possibly be that which reduces the existent from
potency to act. Therefore, there is no possible world in which something can be
reduced from potency to act by something not already in act. Thus, there is no
possible world in which something can come from nothing, which is the very
definition of what makes something a necessary truth. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;">Along
with claiming that (1) is not a metaphysical principle we can be certain of,
Scott maintains that there are other linguistic problems with this principle:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Further,
there’s some very tricky language being employed here, and it causes other
problems. Ask yourself if (1) is logically equivalent to:</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"> </span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif;">(1′)
Something cannot </span><i style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif;">not</i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif;"> come from anything.</span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif;">Well if
“nothing” means “not-anything”, then yes, the two statements (1) and (1′) are indeed
logically equivalent. However, this presents a problem, since God by definition
“didn’t come from anything”. So if God exists, then this proposition is false,
and vice versa. Meaning the (logically equivalent) proposition, “Something
cannot come from nothing” is also false, or else theism is false.</span></blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">This
seems to me to be blatantly false. (1) is not logically equivalent to (1’) and
we can prove such simply by explicating the corollaries of logical equivalence.
One corollary of two statements being logically equivalent is that the relation
of consequence holds in both directions between them, which, in other words,
means that the two statements are necessary and sufficient conditions of one
another. So, let’s demonstrate that (1) and (1’) are not logically equivalent
by demonstrating that one is either not sufficient or necessary for the other,
and this is easier to see if strip the statements of particulars and restate
(1) and (1’) as follows: <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><br /></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"> P</span></i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">: <i>X</i> cannot come from <i>Y<o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"> Q</span></i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">: <i>X </i>cannot not come from not-</span><i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;">Y</span></i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;">. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;">Now,
consider the following conditional statements:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;"> (C1):
If <i>P, </i>then <i>Q.<o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;"> (C2):
If <i>Q</i>, then <i>P. <o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;">When
put in this form it should be clear (based on C1) that <i>P</i> is not a necessary condition for <i>Q</i> to obtain. Likewise, based on C2, <i>Q</i> is neither a sufficient nor necessary condition for <i>P</i>. Thus, <i>P </i>and<i> Q</i>, and therefore
(1) and (1’), cannot be logically equivalent, contra Scott’s claim. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;">Not so fast though because Scott anticipates this objection:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">“Perhaps
[Craig] would grant that the terms “nothing” and “not-anything” are logically
equivalent, but reject that the two statements (1 and 1′) are logically
equivalent. He might say—and I’m just spitballing, here—that the true logically
equivalent proposition to (1) would be:</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"> </span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif;">(1″)
Something cannot come from not-anything.</span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Meaning
we must turn our focus to the phrase “come from”. God, you may argue, didn’t
“come from” anything at all, whereas an uncaused universe would have “come
from” not-anything, and that’s the difference. But is that even coherent, let
alone true? I think not! Why think the phrase “came from” applies to the
universe any more than it applies to God? If the earliest moment of the
universe was the first moment of time itself, it is incoherent to speak as if
the universe did any “coming from” at all. It would simply be the case that the
universe exists at all points in time, and that there exists no moment prior to
its existence… just like God.”</span></blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">First, Scott
asks a pertinent question here, namely, why suppose that the phrase “come from”
applies to the universe any more than it applies to God? The answer is that <a href="http://christian-agnostic.blogspot.com/2015/01/the-argument-from-contingency.html">the universe is not necessary</a>, whereas God, if he exists, would indeed be
necessary. And if the universe is not necessary, then either it has a cause or
it’s a brute fact—I’ve argued against the latter <a href="http://christian-agnostic.blogspot.com/2016/07/a-treatise-on-brute-facts.html">here</a>. And if the universe has a
cause, then this opens the door for the phrase “coming from” to at least have a
<i>possible</i> metaphysical application to
the universe, whereas God would not have this possibility.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Second, is
it true that if the universe did not have a first moment, then it is incoherent
to speak of it “coming from” anything? Indeed it seems to be, and I actually
agree with Scott here; principle (1) would not apply to the universe, if it did
not have a beginning, just like it wouldn’t apply to God. Thus, I agree with
Scott when he says that, “(1) could be true yet have no implications for the
universe.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">However, does this actually mean that the
universe, therefore, didn’t have a cause? Not necessarily, for, as I’ve argued
in the past (<a href="http://christian-agnostic.blogspot.com/2015/11/are-space-and-time-necessary.html">here</a>), there are cases of efficient and material causation which are
non-temporal. If this is correct, then the universe can still have a cause
without temporally coming into existence, and therefore it would still be
contingent. However, let us note that, in his post, Scott did not survey
whether or not the universe is contingent because it is outside of the subject
matter dealt with in said post, so he can’t be faulted for not considering
these responses. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">At this
point Scott delves into Craig’s justification for (1) based on an <i>A</i>-theory of time, and at this point I
have no hard opinions on what he articulates. Subsequently, Scott then
addresses Craig’s second (2) and third (3) argument for (P1), yet, in agreement
with Scott, I don’t find (2) or (3) very persuasive, so I have little to say
here. However, let it be known that in his discussion of Craig’s arguments for
(3), Scott makes many comments regarding the nature of temporal causality that
I would not agree with, but I feel as if the comments I’ve made above, and the
articles I’ve linked to regarding causality, suffice to provide an answer to
said comments. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">That
being said, keep in mind that Scott has not dealt with (P1) directly in his
article—though he has elsewhere—but only Craig’s arguments <i>for</i> said premise. So, in the end, we have an interesting mashup of
arguments. Most of Craig’s arguments for (P1) were poor and unpersuasive, and
yet Scott’s arguments against (1)—the only “argument” of Craig’s I find tenable—I
likewise found to logically invalid and unpersuasive. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
Steven Jakehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04753917037685188540noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4866671088220439212.post-51259092178677945602016-10-10T14:15:00.001-07:002016-10-10T14:15:33.272-07:00Why I went vegan, and why you should as wellI've eaten a standard Western American diet for all twenty-six years of my life. Eggs, dairy, meat? You betcha, all day every day. But a couple of months ago in mid July I decided to go vegan cold-turkey (no pun intended)--that is, no more eggs, dairy, or meat. My reasons for this life-altering decision will be articulated below, but let the reader be aware that this is not something I had ever considered--it's not something that I mulled over in my mind and went back and forth on. A vegan lifestyle was the furthest thing from my mind. In fact, the words "vegan" and "vegetarian" always elicited pejorative reactions from me. These lifestyles were always seen by me to to be less masculine and unnecessary. In fact, I bet many of you, upon reading the title, prematurely rolled your eyes and muttered something under your breath--I was that guy too. But, I was wrong.<br />
<br />
So, why did I go vegan? Well, to be honest, I really just watched one documentary. That's it, just one. It wasn't <i><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=opj0_3L1l88">Earthlings</a>, </i>though everyone should watch it. And it wasn't <i><a href="http://www.forksoverknives.com/">Forks over Knives</a></i>, though everyone should watch it as well--if they care at all about their health. No, the documentary I watched was <i><a href="http://www.cowspiracy.com/">Cowspiracy</a>, </i>which, sorry to be redundant, you should definitely watch. I watched <i>Cowspiracy </i>and walked away a vegan, it's as simple as that.<br />
<br />
Moreover, as I subsequently began to research more and more about veganism, it wasn't the statistics in <i>Cowspiracy</i> that kept me motivated and drew me towards a vegan diet, it was the <i>health benefits</i>. So <i>now</i> my main reason for being vegan is that I want to live as healthy a life as possible while simultaneously doing all I can to help the environment. And to be honest, nothing has been so easy. Despite what you might think, it is not hard to go vegan, and no, I don't at all miss meat, cheese, milk or eggs.<br />
<br />
So, that's why I went vegan--nothing too interesting. The more pertinent question, though, is why <i>you</i> should go vegan.<br />
<br />
<b>Health, Wealth, and Prosperity</b><br />
When I used to picture a vegan, antecedent to going vegan, I would picture a scrawny, wimpy, pale little weakling who was most likely nutrient deficient. That couldn't be farther from the truth. It turns out that a vegan lifestyle is the healthiest lifestyle for a human being. According to <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3967195/">this study</a> from the National Institutes of Health, which studied the nutritional quality of vegan, vegetarian, and different varieties of omnivorous diets, the results, "indicated consistently the vegan diet as the most healthy one."<br />
<br />
Also, the demographics with the highest life expectancies (called <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_Zone">blue zones</a>) tend to be societies where meat and animal products are rarely consumed. For example, in 1949 the people of Okinawa, Japan--the historical demographic with one of the highest number of centenarians--ate virtually no meat. Their greatest consumption of meat was fish, yet their dietary intake of fish constituted only one percent of their overall dietary intake, and their overall consumption of animal products constituted less than four percent their total dietary intake (see <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mryzkO5QWWY">here</a>) [1]. Currently, the demographic with the highest life expectancy are the Adventist vegetarians in Loma Linda, California. Being vegetarians, they obviously don't consume meat and yet they have the greatest longevity of any demographic recorded to date.<br />
<br />
So, if populations that eat little to no animal products have better health and longevity, does this imply that the more animal products you eat the less healthy you are? Well, that's what the data show. Populations that eat a westernized diet tend to have more incidences of cancer and circulatory diseases, than those that don't.<br />
<br />
But, why is this the case? Well, it's because many of the contents in animal products are carcinogenic, and the dietary cholesterol--only found in animal products--and trans fatty acids contribute to atherosclerosis--the number one killer in America. The latter should be uncontroversial, so let's survey the former.<br />
<br />
Scientific studies have found many things that feed cancer, and many of these these are either found exclusively in animal products, or are found in the highest amount in said products.First, it was recently discovered that cancer cells feed off of cholesterol (see <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22867847">here</a> and <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21422422">here</a>). High LDL cholesterol levels are produced from high dietary cholesterol intake, which only comes from animal products--our bodies already produce all the cholesterol we need, and we actually have no need for dietary cholesterol. Second, cancer also feeds off of the amino acid methionine. This has actually <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC388177/?page=1">been known</a> since the 1970's. See, methionine is actually necessary for humans, but large quantities of methionine can actually feed cancer cells and help them metastasize. And what foods tend to have the highest levels of methionine? Animal products. Third, estrogen has been found to be carcinogenic, and has been linked to <a href="http://www.cumc.columbia.edu/publications/in-vivo/Vol2_Iss10_may26_03/">breast</a> and <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1477605/">prostate cancer</a>. In fact, the <a href="http://www.cancer.org/cancer/cancercauses/othercarcinogens/generalinformationaboutcarcinogens/known-and-probable-human-carcinogens">American Cancer Society has labeled</a> estrogen a type I carcinogen--which means it's <i>known</i> to cause cancer. Obviously, cow's milk contains incredible amount of estrogen, but <a href="http://nutritionfacts.org/video/estrogen-in-meat-dairy-and-eggs/">it turns out</a> that there's also excess estrogen in meat and eggs. [2] Fourth, high levels of a growth factor in our bodies called IGF-1 are also responsible, and necessary, for helping cancer metastasize and spread. And where can these dangerously high levels of IGF-1 come from? Well, not only is IGF-1 present in animal products, but consuming animal protein causes our liver to secrete a bunch of IGF-1(see <a href="http://nutritionfacts.org/video/protein-intake-and-igf-1-production/">here</a> and <a href="https://www.drfuhrman.com/learn/library/articles/2/animal-protein-is-linked-to-increased-risk-of-cancer">here</a>).<br />
<br />
So the point here is that eating animal products makes you much, much more susceptible to cancer and other diseases. This is why the more plant-based a population's diet is the less their incidence of cancer and circulatory diseases. (Heck, even going vegan for only two weeks can significantly reduce and reverse cancer cell growth, see <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0VX_oZBMSd4">here</a>.) And this is why <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23169929">this study</a> states that, "vegan diets seem to confer lower risk for overall and female-specific cancer than other dietary patterns." Thus, it seems that if one desires to be healthy and flourish, then going vegan is the way to go.<br />
<br />
<b>Eating meat is destroying the environment</b><br />
The other main reason that should persuade the rational individual to go vegan is regarding how animal agriculture is negatively affecting the environment. To list a few figures:<br />
<br />
<ul>
<li>Animal agriculture is responsible for 18 percent of greenhouse gas emissions, which is more than the exhaust emissions from all human transportation combined, which is 13 percent (see <a href="http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/a0701e/a0701e00.HTM">here</a>). </li>
<li>Animal agriculture is responsible for at least 80 percent of US water consumption (see <a href="http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-practices-management/irrigation-water-use/background.aspx">here</a>). </li>
<li>2,500 gallons of water are needed to produce one pound of beef (see <a href="http://bioscience.oxfordjournals.org/content/54/10/909.full">here</a>, <a href="http://www2.worldwater.org/data20082009/Table19.pdf">here</a> and <a href="https://www.animalsciencepublications.org/publications/jas/abstracts/71/4/818?search-result=1">here</a>). </li>
<li>Animal agriculture is the leading cause of species extinction, ocean dead zones, water pollution, and habitat destruction (see <a href="http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/a0701e/a0701e00.HTM">here</a>, <a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/ocean-dead-zones/">here</a> and <a href="https://comfortablyunaware.wordpress.com/">here</a>). </li>
<li>A farm with 2,500 dairy cows generates as much waste as a city of 411,000 people (see <a href="https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyNET.exe/901V0100.TXT?ZyActionD=ZyDocument&Client=EPA&Index=2000+Thru+2005&Docs=&Query=&Time=&EndTime=&SearchMethod=1&TocRestrict=n&Toc=&TocEntry=&QField=&QFieldYear=&QFieldMonth=&QFieldDay=&IntQFieldOp=0&ExtQFieldOp=0&XmlQuery=&File=D%3A%5Czyfiles%5CIndex%20Data%5C00thru05%5CTxt%5C00000011%5C901V0100.txt&User=ANONYMOUS&Password=anonymous&SortMethod=h%7C-&MaximumDocuments=1&FuzzyDegree=0&ImageQuality=r75g8/r75g8/x150y150g16/i425&Display=hpfr&DefSeekPage=x&SearchBack=ZyActionL&Back=ZyActionS&BackDesc=Results%20page&MaximumPages=1&ZyEntry=1&SeekPage=x&ZyPURL">here</a>). </li>
<li>We could see fishless oceans by 2048 due to overfishing (see <a href="http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2006/11/061102-seafood-threat.html">here</a>). </li>
<li>For every pound of fish caught, up to five pounds of unintended marine species are caught and killed as by-kill (see <a href="http://www.fao.org/docrep/W6602E/w6602E09.htm">here</a>). </li>
<li>Animal agriculture is responsible for up to 91 percent of rainforest deforestation (see <a href="http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/758171468768828889/pdf/277150PAPER0wbwp0no1022.pdf">here</a>).</li>
<li>One to two acres of rainforest are cleared every second (see <a href="http://www.rainforestrelief.org/What_to_Avoid_and_Alternatives/Rainforest_Wood.html">here</a>). </li>
<li>Each day a person who eats vegan saves 1,100 gallons of water, 45 pounds of grain, 30 square feet of forested land, the equivalent of 20 pounds of CO2, and one animals life (see <a href="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10584-014-1169-1/fulltext.html">here</a> and <a href="http://static.ewg.org/reports/2011/meateaters/pdf/methodology_ewg_meat_eaters_guide_to_health_and_climate_2011.pdf">here</a>).</li>
</ul>
There are many other daunting statistics that could be listed here. The point is that eating meat and consuming animal products is literally destroying the environment we live in, and you can't call yourself an environmentalist and consume animal products at the same time. You can literally make an impact on the environment <i>right now</i> by going vegan.<br />
<br />
<b>"But, like, where do you get your protein, dude?"</b><br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgeiVYUdCuBRF0r0cI2dBE-dvYYDSEthleNcwkmP2sJ9-2ZQrx26_LkdJCxs0sMNQftXKMyd9zbAtTOYOUDlDX0vgA1CeHrmdaDZNTjKrsj1ZCYlxU7Xo5uosXnXvwaN5vEOgPr2qRkmEx9/s1600/torre_header2.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="120" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgeiVYUdCuBRF0r0cI2dBE-dvYYDSEthleNcwkmP2sJ9-2ZQrx26_LkdJCxs0sMNQftXKMyd9zbAtTOYOUDlDX0vgA1CeHrmdaDZNTjKrsj1ZCYlxU7Xo5uosXnXvwaN5vEOgPr2qRkmEx9/s200/torre_header2.jpg" width="200" /></a></div>
When people think about vegans, or going vegan, usually their first thought centers around nutrient deficiencies, such as protein. However, <a href="http://nutritionfacts.org/video/do-vegetarians-get-enough-protein/">it turns out</a> that vegans and vegetarians have about the same amount of protein intake as omnivores. <a href="http://www.webmd.com/diet/healthy-kitchen-11/how-much-protein">It's said that</a> male adults (like myself, I think) only need around 60 grams of protein per day. Speaking from experience, I get in about 110 grams of protein without even trying to. It's really not that hard--plant protein is everywhere--just ask vegan Torre Washington (left).<br /><br />
_________________________________________<br />
[1] In fact, since 1949 Okinawa has begun to eat more of a westernized diet--i.e. more animal products--and as a result their longevity has decreased and their circulatory diseases have increased.<br />
[2] This might be one reason why, on average, <a href="http://markitonutrition.com/vegans-have-more-testosterone/">vegan men have higher testosterone levels</a> than omnivores.<br />
<br />
<br />Steven Jakehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04753917037685188540noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4866671088220439212.post-87657258486285459232016-07-26T22:41:00.001-07:002016-07-26T22:41:05.918-07:00A treatise on brute factsTwo years ago<a href="http://christian-agnostic.blogspot.com/2014/07/brute-facts-and-naturalism.html"> I wrote a post</a> geared towards a refutation of the existence of brute facts and what this entailed for naturalism. Since this time I have engaged in many discussions with naturalists regarding this very topic, and as a result of those discussions I have (slightly) altered and polished my argument. And because of this I have, for a while now, wanted to write up another, more systematic, post which attempted to demonstrate the impossibility of brute facts. So, here goes. <br />
<br />
The <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/index.html">Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</a> defines a brute fact as synonymous with an unexplainable fact. [1] In the same vein, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brute_fact">Wikipedia states</a>, "a brute fact is a fact that has no explanation. More narrowly, brute facts may instead be defined as those facts which cannot be explained (as opposed to simply having no explanation). " Right away we see that we can distinguish between two types of brute facts--those in practice (extrinsic), and those in principle (intrinsic). An extrinsic brute fact is a fact that we currently do not have an explanation for. An example of this would be the origin of life. We believe that the fact of life's origination has an explanation, we simply do not know currently what that explanation is. On the other hand, an intrinsic brute fact is a fact that has no explanation, at all, in principle. Considering an intrinsic brute fact, it's not that we <em>don't</em> <em>know</em> the explanation for X, but that X doesn't have an explanation to be known in the first place. <br />
<br />
Now, nobody disputes the existence of extrinsic brute facts; we all agree that there are things we don't know. The point of contention, and our domain of focus in our discussion of brute facts, is whether or not intrinsic brute facts actually exist or whether they are even possible. This is what is to be considered presently. <br />
<br />
What should be noteworthy at this point is the notion of a brute fact is defined in terms of <em>explanation</em>. And, as we'll see below, the concept of explanation, and what it entails, is crucial in determining whether or not brute facts are possible. So, what constitutes an explanation? Well, the problem with defining this term is that an explanation can be given in many different domains and contexts. Take these different cases of explanations: the teacher explains the lesson; Susan explains what she meant; the nail explains why the tire is flat; the nonzero net force explains the change in velocity; the premises explain the conclusion etc. Notice that in each of these cases the presence of something--e.g. someone doing the explaining, an object, a force, an abstract concept or proposition--is the reason for, and clarifies, that which, in the absence of that something, would be unclear--the lesson, the meaning, the flat tire, the change in velocity, the conclusion. <br />
<br />
The important concepts just utilized are <em>reasons</em> and <em>intelligibility</em>. When some fact is explained, there is a reason, account, or justification--which can be grounded in many things, from an object to an abstract proposition, as we saw above--which imparts some form of clarity and intelligibility to the thing that was heretofore unclear. Therefore, I maintain that the proper definition of "explanation" that should be utilized is "a reason whereby something is rendered intelligible." [2]<br />
<br />
Now, from this definition is entailed a crucial inference: something being explained is not the same thing as something actually having an explanation. The former is an action, dependent on minds doing the explaining, while the latter is not. Return to a couple of my examples above--namely, the teacher explaining the lesson, and the premises explaining the conclusion. The teacher explaining the lesson is an example of something actually being explained, and we could call this a case of explanation in <em>practice </em>(extrinsic). The premises explaining the conclusion is an example of something, the conclusion, having an explanation while not necessarily being explained to anyone currently, and we could call this a case of explanation in <em>principle </em>(intrinsic). (Note at this point that there is an identical differentiation here between the different types of explanation and brute facts.) <br />
<br />
Not only are intrinsic explanations not equivalent to extrinsic explanations, but the latter actually presuppose the former.<em> Intrinsic explanations are a necessary condition for extrinsic explanations</em>. That is to say, in order for one to be able to explain something, there has to be an objective explanation available in the first place. It is incoherent to claim that something was explained that had no explanation. The teacher cannot give reasons that render a lesson intelligible if the lesson doesn't have a reason for its intelligibility. This is important because many of my interlocutors have claimed that explanation should only be focused on explanation in practice, yet this is nonsense, since, to reiterate my point, explanation in practice presupposes harboring an explanation in principle. <br />
<br />
Another concept that is embedded in the notion of explanation is that of intelligibility, and just like explanation and brute facts, it comes in practice and in principle. For something to actually be <em>made</em> intelligible in practice means that someone has actually comprehended it. For something to be intelligible in principle means that it's <em>possible</em> that it could be comprehended, even if it never actually is. For example, the mechanism of gravity was unintelligible in practice for many decades, even though it was always intelligible in principle--that is, there always <em>was</em> an account for the mechanism of gravity. And once again, just like explanation, intelligibility in principle is a necessary condition for intelligibility in practice. For in order for someone to comprehend X, it is a necessity that its possible that X be comprehended in the first place.<br />
<br />
Now, since we're currently interested in intrinsic brute facts, and not extrinsic brute facts, this entails that we are likewise interested in the nature of intrinsic explanation and intrinsic intelligibility, and not extrinsic explanation and extrinsic intelligibility. For since we're attempting to determine whether facts can be unexplainable in principle, we need to examine the nature of explanation in principle and see if this is something that can be done away with whilst a fact remains intelligible in itself. We will not go the way of the PSR and merely dogmatically assert that all things must have an explanation, rather we need only delve deeper into the nature of explanation and infer its entailments. <br />
<br />
To begin, let us consider an example, similar to the example I utilized in my original post, of explanation in principle. In physics acceleration represents the rate of change of velocity with respect to time. Now, if we are curious as to the explanation of acceleration in principle, we can find this in the concept of velocity, since acceleration is literally defined in terms of velocity. And if we go further and ask for the explanation of velocity, we find this in the concept of the rate of change of position. Therefore, acceleration is explained by velocity which is in turn explained by position. What this means is that acceleration is granted intelligibility by the concept of velocity, which is granted intelligibility by position, so on and so forth. <br />
<br />
This entails something very important: acceleration is ultimately explained by position. In the specific explanatory chain that we are considering, all the concepts that lead up to position are only ultimately imparted their intelligibility by position itself. If position is dropped, then so are all the subsequent concepts--if position is rendered unintelligible, then so is acceleration. <br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjAxKC-BRgxJr6qWUv1LKS-MMk4oPvTStK1Haz-j5b9VNLImsoG_rf-7Dj4jZ9ywKFDycNoJvFqjxK_5aT4KNSKiFnKhG8CPfbB6qqH-bd6UwNohYKnz9RqmCNAN9rvZYS0CrVfvOs9vAgJ/s1600/Dominoes.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjAxKC-BRgxJr6qWUv1LKS-MMk4oPvTStK1Haz-j5b9VNLImsoG_rf-7Dj4jZ9ywKFDycNoJvFqjxK_5aT4KNSKiFnKhG8CPfbB6qqH-bd6UwNohYKnz9RqmCNAN9rvZYS0CrVfvOs9vAgJ/s1600/Dominoes.jpg" /></a></div>
All of this entails something else that's even more important: explanatory chains are <em>essentially ordered series</em>. An essentially ordered series is a series wherein each member derives whatever efficacy it has from higher members--unless it is the highest member--such that if a member is lost, all the lower members will also be lost. This obviously fits like a glove with the example of position and acceleration above. <br />
<br />
In any event, the notion that should be highlighted here when speaking of essentially ordered series is that of derivation or of "being imparted". That is, when A explains B, this means, per our definitions, that B is rendered or <em>imparted</em> intelligibility by A, that B would be unintelligible were it not for A. To return to our example, acceleration would be unintelligible were it not for velocity and thus acceleration <em>derives</em> its intelligibility from velocity. But, again, this is the case for <em>any</em> subsequent members of an explanatory chain with regards to a specific member. That is to say, if A explains B which explains C which explains D, then D ultimately derives its intelligibility from A, and only proximately derives its intelligibility from B and C. <br />
<br />
What this likewise entails is that if A does <em>not</em> impart intelligibility to B, then B does not impart any to C, and likewise for D. And this is where consideration of brute facts come in. For where would a brute fact fit in such a chain of explanation? Surely it cannot be the highest member of an explanatory chain, because since a brute fact has no explanation then, by definition, it has no reason whereby it is rendered intelligible, and thus it would be <em>un</em>intelligible. But a reason needs to be intelligible itself if it is to render something else intelligible. (Again, consider acceleration and velocity, the latter has to be intelligible if it is to impart any intelligibility to acceleration.) Therefore, A being intelligible is a necessary condition for A to be an explanation for any B. Logically, this means that if A is unintelligible then it cannot be an explanation for any subsequent fact B. Thus, a brute fact cannot be the first member in an explanatory chain, for it would not explain anything while being itself unexplained. [3]<br />
<br />
However, while a brute fact might not be the highest member in an explanatory chain, is it possible that it be a member somewhere in the middle? That is, can we have a chain A, B, C, D...wherein C is a brute fact? I don't see how, since, to reiterate the above point, C would not be able to explain D, and C could not be subsequent to B since B would then <em>have</em> to explain C--otherwise C wouldn't be in the chain to begin with--which would contradict our original premise for the nature of C--namely, its having no explanation. What we see, then, is that there is no place in an explanatory chain for a brute fact, and if there is no place in an explanatory chain for a brute fact then it would seem that <em>brute facts are impossible</em>. <br />
<br />
In addition to dispelling the notion of brute facts participating in the nature of explanation, we can add another argument--call it the argument from intelligibility. The argument can be formulated as follows: If a member F of an explanatory chain M is intelligible, then no members antecedent to F in M can be brute facts. Why can we deduce this? Well, if F is intelligible then it has a reason whereby it is rendered intelligible--otherwise it wouldn't be part of an explanatory chain, since it wouldn't have an explanation. And since intelligibility is imparted down through the members of explanatory chains, we can say that for F to be intelligible, every member of M must also be intelligible--otherwise intelligibility is not imparted at some point in the chain. But if every member is intelligible, then every member must have a reason whereby it is rendered intelligible--again, otherwise it wouldn't have an explanation. And this means that every member does in fact have an explanation and cannot be a brute fact. Based on this line of argumentation, we can reach an interesting conclusion:<em> if a fact is intelligible, then it cannot in any sense be linked to a brute fact, </em>and thus we cannot posit a brute fact from anything that exists. <br />
<br />
Now, attentive readers may have noticed something that it seems I have forgotten: namely, that there can be <em>multiple</em> explanations for something, and that these multiple explanations can form multiple explanatory chains that are interconnected, and thus, it would seem, my account of explanation and explanatory chains is too simplistic. I do agree that something can have multiple explanations and that there can be multiple interconnected explanatory chains that stretch across different domains. However, I maintain there is nothing about multiple explanatory chains that changes the nature of an explanatory chain in itself--and thus there is nothing that calls my conclusions into question. <br />
<br />
To illustrate this, consider a case of combustion, perhaps a candle that is lit. What is the explanation for this lit candle? Well, we can think of a couple. One explanation is the fact that somebody actually lit the candle, from. Another explanation is an oxidizing agent and a chemical reaction. These are both genuine explanations since they are both reasons wherein the lit candle is rendered intelligible. And here we also have two explanatory chains that converge on a single state of affairs. So, we have a situation where one explanatory chain (...A, B, <strong>C</strong>) converges with another chain (...X, Y, <strong>C</strong>) at the fact of <strong>C</strong>--the lit candle.<br />
<br />
The question that should be considered presently is whether or not the existence of <strong>C </strong>changes the nature of explanation considered above. It's difficult to see how it <em>would</em> change everything we've considered, since we still have something (<strong>C</strong>) which derives its intelligibility from antecedent members, such that, in the absence of such members, it would be rendered unintelligible. The only "new" notions that need be introduced are partial intelligibility and partial explanations. For if <strong>C</strong> is missing one explanation, out of two, then it is only partially intelligible, and thus the explanation it has is only a partial explanation. But notice that none of this changes the nature of explanation itself. It is still the case that in order for <strong>C</strong> to be intelligible <em>in any sense</em>, it needs to have <em>at least</em> one reason whereby it derives its intelligibility--even if this is only a partial intelligibility. And, more importantly, the fact that <strong>C</strong> derives its intelligibility from something else means it has to, at least, be a member of an essentially ordered explanatory series, which means that all our conclusions from above still hold true. <br />
<br />
To substantiate this even further, consider the question at the forefront of this post: can a brute fact be part of a convergence of multiple explanatory chains? This doesn't seem possible since, again, a brute fact cannot have an explanation, by definition, and therefore it cannot have antecedent explanatory members. That is to say, a brute fact cannot be reliant upon another fact for its intelligibility, much less multiple facts. Furthermore, based on our intelligibility argument above, what we can also say is that if <strong>C</strong> is intelligible, then, even if it is part of multiple interwoven explanatory chains, we can safely say that none of the antecedent members in these chains contains a brute fact. <br />
<br />
In summarization we've concluded many things. First, because of the nature of explanation itself, as well as essentially ordered explanatory series, brute facts are simply impossible. There is, logically, nowhere they can fit in chains of explanation, and a chain of explanation is the only place they would go if they <em>were</em> possible, since brute facts are defined in terms of explanation. Second, because of the nature of explanatory chains, if a fact or state of affairs is intelligible, then it follows that it cannot be associated with a brute fact. Third, no matter how interconnected and interwoven multiple explanatory chains are, they still retain their nature as essentially ordered series and our notion of explanation--with which the whole post is founded on--and our conclusions regarding the impossibility of brute facts remain intact. <br />
______________________________________________<br />
[1] See the <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sufficient-reason/">article</a> on the Principle of Sufficient Reason<br />
[2] Let it be noted that this is one of the most crucial points in my argument. For everything from here on out follows from, and is entailed by, this definition. <br />
[3] Note that neither can a brute fact be the lowest member in an explanatory chain, since in order to be the lowest member, some member would come before it and this member would have to explain it, which would contradict the definition of a brute fact. Yet I don't think anybody would entertain this idea since usually a brute fact is seen to occur at the beginning of a long line of explanations, and not at the end. Steven Jakehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04753917037685188540noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4866671088220439212.post-66729948399813519492016-07-10T21:56:00.000-07:002016-07-12T15:49:10.945-07:00A review of Sean Carroll's The Big Picture: Part III<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiV79X0f5HeFihh47H3WPBEuiwqDkRuYQR_7q9HN7Xk6XHBOswZYl7uvagOGEQ83MNJbr_xPotNMwx50dGglxV45A0YW_0t6iZxcvg4J4AQtAfAl-iee6xxCP-LzCOG3-bAPgykNT_Qep3b/s1600/BigPicture.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="200" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiV79X0f5HeFihh47H3WPBEuiwqDkRuYQR_7q9HN7Xk6XHBOswZYl7uvagOGEQ83MNJbr_xPotNMwx50dGglxV45A0YW_0t6iZxcvg4J4AQtAfAl-iee6xxCP-LzCOG3-bAPgykNT_Qep3b/s200/BigPicture.jpg" width="132" /></a></div>
Let us continue our review of physicist Sean Carroll's book <i>The Big Picture. </i>In this installment of the review I will be focusing mostly on the section of the book labeled <i>Essence, </i>however, let it be noted that I will also be surveying material from other sections as they seem to fit with many of the topics under discussion presently -- also some material from this section in the book will be held-over and reviewed in the subsequent installment -- mostly that which deals with the philosophy of mind.<br />
<br />
In this section of the book Carroll delves into how he believes the world works according to Core Theory and quantum mechanics. He uses these determinations as a springboard into discussing why the universe exists, and how God fits into this picture, or doesn't, as well as the discussion regarding whether there is a soul, and whether or not life will continue after death.<br />
<br />
<b><i>Abducting or deducting God?</i></b><br />
Carroll begins to consider worldviews that would oppose his "poetic naturalism" -- one such worldview being that of theism. And what happens when we are confronted with two opposing ontologies that are situated on the same domain? Well, for Carroll it's the method of Bayesian reasoning and abductive logic all the way:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
[F]or purposes of this discussion let's imagine that the prior credences for theism and atheism are about equal. Then all the heavy lifting will be done by the likelihoods -- how well the two ideas do in accounting for the world we actually see. (p. 146)</blockquote>
So Carroll's plan is to look at the world and attempt to determine which ontology provides the best explanation for what we see, or don't see. We see evil in the world, then that scores points for atheism. We see consciousness in the world, chalk up a point for theism. Etc.<br />
<br />
This might seem a good way to go about inferring which worldview is most reasonable to assume, but I maintain that's it's completely wrongheaded in this instance. First, as I mentioned in one of the previous reviews, abductive (Bayesian) reasoning is not the only kind of reasoning, and more importantly it's not the best kind of reasoning that should be utilized in this discussion. In everyday life and scientific reasoning, abduction is your best friend. If you're a scientist and you find that the liquid in a test tube has changed color, you use inference to the best explanation, plain and simple. But if you're attempting to determine whether the square root of two is a rational or an irrational number, abduction is the wrong tool to use -- you need <i>deduction</i>.<br />
<br />
So, why then, should we use deduction when determining whether theism or atheism is true, and not pure abduction, as Carroll would have us do? Well, it comes down to who has the burden of proof: the theist. The theist is saying that there is in fact some positive reality that exists, and it is their burden to prove this. And how do they usually go about attempting to prove it? Through (mostly)logical deduction -- at least that's how the classical theists did it before Paley. [1] Thus, when weighing theism vs atheism, one needs to take the arguments that are being given by theists, which are deductive in nature, and determine whether they hold any merit. Appealing purely to abduction won't do any good, just like appealing to abduction to argue that the square root of two is rational will not be entertained by any mathematician. Contrary to Carroll, the heavy lifting is not done by likelihoods, but by deduction.<br />
<br />
The point is that <i>if</i> theistic deductions are valid and sound then no amount of abductive inference will call this into question. And thus what needs to be determined is precisely the matter of <i>if</i> theistic deductions are indeed valid and sound or not -- which, again, is a job of deductive inference.<br />
<br />
The more important point is that there are simply some beliefs that are so fundamental and metaphysical that a pragmatic method simply cannot comment on. Like it or not, abduction won't solve the realism/skepticism debate. It won't solve the free will/determinism debate. And it certainly will not solve the theism/atheism debate. Carroll wants to use a screwdriver for every job, when some jobs require a sledgehammer.<br />
<br />
<b><i>Whence the universe?</i></b><br />
Carroll commits a whole chapter to exploring the question of why the universe exists, and why there is something rather than nothing. He begins by contemplating the answer of a necessary being in that of God but quickly casts it aside:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Poetic naturalists don't like to talk about necessities when it comes to the universe. They prefer to lay all the options out on the table, then try to figure out what our credences should be in each of them. (p. 196)</blockquote>
First, it's irrelevant that poetic naturalists like Carroll "don't like" to talk about necessities when it comes to the universe. The relevant question is whether talk of necessity is appropriate when it comes to questions of fundamental metaphysics -- of which existential questions like "why is there something rather than nothing?" are a subset -- and surely it is. So, the fact that Carroll is allergic to necessity/contingency talk is not sufficient to cast that talk aside as if it were irrelevant -- and neither has Carroll given any warrant for doing so.<br />
<br />
Second, and more importantly, the question being dealt with here is, again, of a significant <i>metaphysical</i> stature, and I don't see that abduction is the right tool to use here. When asking why there is something rather than nothing, what's really being asked is why existence should ontologically precede a complete lack of existence, and this is a deeply metaphysical question in nature, which most likely will have to yield to some type of existential necessity or brute fact -- if you believe in such nonsense. And the fact of the matter is that delving into the nature of existence is commonly a <i>deductive</i>, and not an abductive, endeavor. Thus, the poetic naturalist way of going about answering this detective story is already wrong-headed to begin with.<br />
<br />
Nevertheless, let's see the blueprints that Carroll lays out to proceed in answering this question:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Let's start with the relatively straightforward, science-oriented question: could the universe exist all by itself, or does it need something to bring it into existence? [...] All we want to know is "Is the existence of the universe compatible with unbroken laws of nature, or do we need to look beyond those laws in order to account for it?" (p. 196-197)</blockquote>
These are very relevant and important questions to our current inquiry. Carroll attempts to answer these questions by turning to science to settle the debate regarding whether or not the universe had a beginning -- his answer eventually terminating in a modest "we don't know."<br />
<br />
The problem here, though, again stems from the fact that Carroll is ignorant to the fact that these are simply not the questions that science can answer in the first place -- "these" questions being the original questions he posed. For even if we could mathematically describe our universe as self-sustaining or existing by itself, this wouldn't actually make any progress in answering the existential question. For science only describes the <i>behavior </i>of that which already naturally exists, and it cannot tell you <i>why</i> the universe behaves in that way in the first place, or why it behaves this way as opposed to another way. To put it in a different vein, in order to have a behavior to describe you first need something which exists and does the behaving, and this means that existence is ontologically prior to behavior. Therefore, no description of behavior (which is all that science is) is sufficient to explain the existence of what does the behaving, and thus, science cannot in principle answer the question of why there is something rather than nothing. Sorry Carroll.<br />
<br />
What this also entails, once again, is that Carroll is looking for an answer to the existential question utilizing the wrong tools. Since science cannot aid us in determining why something exists rather than nothing then it is irrelevant, to say the least, when it comes to this particular question -- sorry Lawrence Krauss.<br />
<br />
However, Carroll is prepared (or so he thinks) to take on this line of thought:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
For questions like this, however, the scientific answer doesn't always satisfy everyone. "Okay," they might say, "we understand that there can be a physical theory that describes a self-contained universe, without any external agent bringing it about or sustaining it. But that doesn't explain <i>why it actually does exist</i>. For that, we have to look outside science." (p. 201)</blockquote>
Yes, this is exactly what I would say. Let's see how Carroll is going to set me straight:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Sometimes this angle of attack appeals to fundamental metaphysical principles, which are purportedly more foundational even than the laws of physics, and cannot be sensibly denied. In particular, the pre-Socratic Greek philosopher Parmenides put forward the famous maxim <i>ex nihilo, nihil fit</i> -- "out of nothing, nothing comes." [...] According to this line of thought, it doesn't matter if physicists can cook up self-contained theories in which the cosmos has a first moment of time; those theories must necessarily be incomplete since they violate this cherished principle. </blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
This is perhaps the most egregious example of begging the question in the history of the universe. We are asking whether the universe could come into existence without anything causing it. The response is "No, because nothing comes into existence without being caused." How do we know that? It can't be because we have never seen it happen; the universe is different from the various things inside the universe that we have actually experienced in our lives. And it can't be because we can't imagine it happening or because it's impossible to construct sensible models in which it happens, since both the imagining and the construction of models have manifestly happened. (p. 201-202)</blockquote>
Alright, there's a lot to unpack here. First, notice that Carroll has actually side-stepped the original point that he was claiming to address -- namely, that talk of scientific models doesn't actually address the question of why something exists in the first place. (Note that he does later on say that we may never know why the universe exists, and that its existence might simply be a brute fact. You know what <a href="https://christian-agnostic.blogspot.com/2014/07/brute-facts-and-naturalism.html">my response</a> is.)<br />
<br />
Second, to appeal to fundamental metaphysical principles to call scientific models into question, or to highlight their incompleteness, is not to beg the question. For these principles are seen, by those promulgating them, as necessary conditions of reality; that is, they're seen as conditions that hold in any possible world and are the things that even make science possible in the first place. Thus, to claim that a scientific model cannot overthrow them is not to beg the question. It <i>would</i> beg the question if the individual promulgating said principles had no justification for their necessity. But this would have to be demonstrated by the likes of Carroll, which, to give him credit, he does attempt to do, which brings me to my next, and third, point.<br />
<br />
Carroll asks a good question: how does one know that metaphysical principles like the law of causality are immutable? The answer is that we know this because those very propositions are formed through relations of concepts that we abstract from reality, which, as we saw in the last post, we <i>must</i> have objective knowledge of -- on pain of contradiction. Another way to put it is that our knowledge is <i>dictated by reality</i>, and not the other way around, and thus the reason why we know that principles like the law of causality are immutable is because these principles are themselves grounded in the objective nature of reality. [2]<br />
<br />
Fourth, it is actually Carroll who begs the question here, though he does it so well that it's hard to catch. To revisit my first point above, he claims that to address the fact that scientific models don't answer the "Why?" of existence, individuals sometimes resort to metaphysical principles. But how does he argue against these principles? By appealing to the very physical models of the universe he already utilized and was questioned on! That is to say, based off of Carroll's argumentation, we could construct the following conversation:<br />
<br />
Carroll: We can easily construct physical models of the universe which are self-sustaining.<br />
<br />
Me: But those models are purely descriptive and incomplete, and don't answer <i>why</i> something exists in the first place.<br />
<br />
Carroll: Where are we to look for this "Why?"<br />
<br />
Me: To metaphysical principles like "that which is moved from potency to act is moved by that which is already actual."<br />
<br />
Carroll: But this principle is false, since we have already constructed physical models which are self-sustaining.<br />
<br />
Round and round we go. Hopefully the attentive reader notices that Carroll would simply keep begging the question regarding his self-sustaining physical models.<br />
<br />
Furthermore, the more crucial point is that since science is only quantitatively based, it does not, in its equations, capture notions of causality -- something Carroll has articulated multiple times in the book. Therefore, even though we might be able to construct a model of reality that is self-sustaining, and self-contained, as far as physics is concerned, this does not actually equate to forming a model of the universe that is not contingent upon, and not caused by, anything else. Thus, Carroll's self-sustained models are actually completely irrelevant to the current discussion.<br />
<br />
Carroll then briefly returns to the notion of God as an answer to the existential question:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Theists think they have a better answer: God exists, and the reason why the universe exists in this particular way is because that's how God wanted it to be. Naturalists tend to find this unpersuasive: Why does God exist? But there's an answer to that, or at least an attempted one, which we already alluded to at the beginning of this chapter. The universe, according to this line of reasoning, is contingent; it didn't have to exist, and it could have been otherwise, so its existence demands an explanation. But God is a <i>necessary</i> being; there is no optionality about his existence, so no further explanation is required. </blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Except that God isn't a necessary being, because there are no such things as necessary beings. All sorts of versions of reality are possible, some of which have entities one would reasonably identify with God, and some of which don't. We can't short-circuit the difficult task of figuring out what kind of universe we live in by relying on a priori principles. (p. 203)</blockquote>
Again, there's a lot to unpack here. First, I want to focus on Carroll's comments on God as a necessary being, for he's only begging the question here. He literally gives absolutely no justification or substantiation for the claim that no necessary beings exist. He hasn't even come close to attempting to do the philosophical leg-work that would warrant him in making such an audacious claim.<br />
<br />
Second, the only semblance of an argument Carroll <i>does</i> give in favor of God not being a necessary being is that of the fact that we can conceive of other possible worlds where there no such God. But again, Carroll hasn't done the leg-work to demonstrate this. For <i>if</i> we arrive at a logical deduction of what God <i>is</i>, as classical theists claim we can, then by "God" we literally mean "that whose essence is to exist," which means that by definition God cannot <i>not</i> exist. But this entails that there actually is no world of which we can conceive where God does not exist [3], and thus Carroll is wrong.<br />
<br />
Third, Carroll actually refutes himself here when dismissing talk of a priori principles. Remember that Carroll is big on empiricism, and believes that the only way we can have genuine knowledge is to actually look at reality -- thus, a priori philosophy is moot in his eyes. However, Carroll's point in his latter paragraph is predicated on "all sorts of versions of reality" being ontologically possible -- that is, he's employing the notion of modal logic, an <i>a priori</i> endeavor. How does Carroll know that reality enjoys various ontological "possibilities"? He might say, "because of the fact we can imagine them" -- he seems to say as much on page 203. But that immediately commits one to the idea that possibility is grounded in the imagination; yet how would Carroll ground <i>that</i> idea? That is, why does Carroll believe that our imagination is capable of telling us anything true about the nature of reality? The point here that I'm trying to make is that any answers to these questions will necessarily be founded on a priori principles, the very thing Carroll is allergic to and vehemently opposes, as we saw last review. But, were he to give his beliefs a little more thought, he'd see that he ends up falling on his own sword, as it were.<br />
<br />
In any event, Carroll conjures up no answer to the existential question of why the universe exists in the first place; though he should not be faulted for this. What he <i>is</i> to be faulted for is his sloppy logic utilized to throw opposing answers, like that of theism, under the bus. And thus it doesn't seem like his poetic naturalism is properly justified.<br />
<br />
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
[1] Don't get me wrong. I know that many theists have attempted to persuade individuals that God exists by telling them to look at the stars, or the beauty that we perceive in the world etc., and this no doubt is done in the vein of abduction. But this is usually not done to satisfy one's burden of proof, at least in the sense of what we mean by "proof".<br />
<br />
[2]Carroll also visits this idea earlier in his book on page 116 wherein he claims that "[beliefs] aren't (try as we may) founded on unimpeachable principles that can't be questioned." But this is false. If you push back on the justifications for propositions of knowledge further and further, you will arrive at a foundation of first principles that are axiomatic and, contrary to Carroll, cannot be questioned.<br />
<br />
[3] Note that to imagine is not to conceive, in that I can conceive of something without imagining it and vice versa. Carroll constantly conflates the two throughout his book.Steven Jakehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04753917037685188540noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4866671088220439212.post-82445291939856472872016-07-09T21:23:00.002-07:002016-07-09T21:23:54.571-07:00Where have I been?My posting has been sparse as of late, to say the least, and this is due to a multitude of reasons. First, my mother-in-law was diagnosed with cancer a few weeks ago, and my wife has been taking it pretty hard, as would be expected. The good news is that her prognosis is extremely favorable, and most likely in a few weeks she'll be completely cancer free. The Lord is good, in his own analogous way.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjc0lVmySo69wz31gDAwhD0og98NIo84ZuuxP2rgS7LVjqFSCxOXRzgltjgaDm9dfy8IwcSuQ7GYq1ZEa3NW28_MJMcNP3rvb4oHalOgcEVsuwGvny21LNPyELwkDZoti66sa89Qn18UJyg/s1600/IMG_54341.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjc0lVmySo69wz31gDAwhD0og98NIo84ZuuxP2rgS7LVjqFSCxOXRzgltjgaDm9dfy8IwcSuQ7GYq1ZEa3NW28_MJMcNP3rvb4oHalOgcEVsuwGvny21LNPyELwkDZoti66sa89Qn18UJyg/s320/IMG_54341.jpg" width="240" /></a></div>
Second, my wife and I have been doing some major landscaping to our house. We decided to install sod in our 2000 square foot backyard by ourselves, or should I say by myself. Anyway, the job was extremely stressful because our backyard soil needed to be tilled and sifted because of all the rock and debris due to the fact that we live by the mountains -- this is all incredibly fascinating, I know. And the sod had a deadline of when it was to be shipped so I needed to have it ready by that deadline -- no pressure. Oh yeah, and did I mention I was working in the 105 degree heat, to prepare said soil?Yay El Paso! But, the sod was delivered and installed this past week, and I'm freaking glad that's done with.<br />
<br />
Third, I was barely informed a few weeks ago that I will also be teaching physics this upcoming year, which I was stoked about. However, that means that I have to prepare lessons, and labs, before school starts -- because I'm a good teacher, dammit.<br />
<br />
Anyway, there's been plenty on my plate as of late, but I promise that I will start blogging more. In fact, I have the next installment of my review of Carroll's book coming out in just a few days, so stay tuned.Steven Jakehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04753917037685188540noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4866671088220439212.post-22942017346674367412016-06-15T09:43:00.001-07:002016-06-15T09:43:30.131-07:00I'm one step away from being an atheistReaders of this blog know that I believe in God, and am, obviously, a theist. And most know that I also believe that God's existence can be rationally justified -- as I have attempted to demonstrate on this blog -- even if not everyone finds such justification to be overwhelmingly persuasive. I, thus, believe that my belief in God is rationally grounded.<br />
<br />
So how, then, can it be the case that I am "one step away from being an atheist"? Is this an exaggeration? Well kind of, but...not exactly. Let me explain.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhlvFyj__jN8DROyx9NGe_BDKUx6KvD5oSQWxkZtPLqY6Yy2H2ZDqXUR4UU-aujXMzjraL-WTtai8mVA46XTT55QbPR3F1Vm0DBs1KT5leCSMmH89TkVelJJ5DLqEdVdjKABd16jZU6C-s5/s1600/IMG_6472.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="200" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhlvFyj__jN8DROyx9NGe_BDKUx6KvD5oSQWxkZtPLqY6Yy2H2ZDqXUR4UU-aujXMzjraL-WTtai8mVA46XTT55QbPR3F1Vm0DBs1KT5leCSMmH89TkVelJJ5DLqEdVdjKABd16jZU6C-s5/s200/IMG_6472.jpg" width="132" /></a></div>
My daughter Norah is currently sixteen months old. She's the light of my life, and that which puts everything in perspective. She gives my life more meaning and joy than I ever thought was possible. My first twenty-four years of existence without her pales in comparison to the life that I now enjoy with her and my wife. The love that protrudes from my heart to her being is transcendent and unparalleled. She <i>is</i> my life.<br />
<br />
And, unfortunately, as a normal parent, I constantly hear stories of the tragedies that befall parents with children. Heck, my wife works as a neonatal intensive care nurse, and comes home with horrific stories of infants dying and suffering every week, it seems. When I hear of these stories I am always grieved, and I immediately wonder what I would do in those situations. I mean, seriously, what would I do if something happened to my daughter?<br />
<br />
Well, many things would happen, and none of them good, I can tell you that. But one action that I genuinely think would be a strong possibility is that I would abandon all belief in a God. To lose the most precious thing I have ever laid eyes on, and have completely given my heart to, would destroy me, and it would annihilate any belief in a God that has even an ounce of love. If something happened to my daughter I would curse God forever, and lose any heart that any such maximally loving being existed at all. That's it, I would be an atheist at heart.<br />
<br />
However, there's an inconsistency here that many attentive readers may have picked up on. As I just said, and as anyone would acknowledge, these events happen constantly every day -- children are dying needlessly every minute. How, then, can I sit here and say that one child's potential death would be a sufficient condition for my non-belief, and yet this potential is being realized in thousands of other families every day? That is, how can I consistently say that one turn of events is enough to convert me to atheism, when these very events are ubiquitous in the world we inhabit, and yet nevertheless continue to believe in God?<br />
<br />
I think that the answer here is to be found in <i>emotion</i>. No matter how rationally justified and reasonably held our beliefs are, they are still, most likely, predicated on emotion, more than reason. In fact, this is already something that psychologists have inferred. So, even though I believe that the existence of God is rationally justified, it <i>is</i> the case that a flood of emotions so significant and so powerful can overthrow this belief. And it's important to note that this is the case with anyone -- emotion can easily overthrow anyone's reasonably held beliefs, especially if one does not realize that this is occurring. What this also means is that my reasons for believing in God are not purely rational either. They are most likely rooted in just as much emotion as they are reason. In fact, it means that most of our reasonably held beliefs are probably predicated more in emotion than in reason. <br />
<br />
So, even though I do in fact have rational justifications for why a "good" God would allow suffering and evil, when this suffering and evil lands on my front door, my emotion is enough to supersede such justification. This isn't always a good thing, but it's the condition of human nature and thought nonetheless. However, though it might not always be a good thing -- when considered from a purely rational perspective -- this sway of emotion is a form of justification in itself, and by that I mean that if one's child unfortunately dies, they are indeed warranted in entailing atheism from this event. I mean, how can they <i>not</i> be warranted? Because they should know William Lane Craig's logical arguments against the problem of suffering? Come on. If God made us, then he made us with a rational faculty that is just as sensitive to emotion as it is to reason -- in fact, it may be even <i>more</i> sensitive to emotion. Therefore, I don't see how God can be upset that an individual infers atheism from tragic and sorrowful circumstances, since God's the one who arranged our cognitive faculties to be swayed in this way to begin with! But, I digress. <br />
<br />
To come back to me personally, I'm not even sure if what I've said is correct. That is, I don't know for sure that if the aforementioned circumstances obtained, that I would abandon theism on emotional grounds. I say this because I used to think the same regarding my father. Three years ago my father was killed crossing the street in a residential area by an idiot going fifteen over the speed limit. I always thought that if something like this happened, then, it would drive me away from God. But, here's the thing, it actually brought me <i>closer to </i>God. Contrary to my thoughts, the pendulum swung the other way. So maybe I'm not as close to atheism as I thought. Who knows? <br />
<br />
What I think is important here is that we need to be aware of how powerful our emotions are, and how fragile our "rationally justified" believes are. We tend to think that we're straight-shooting logicians, unaffected by the throws of emotion and sentiment, but chances are we're always a few emotional steps away from whatever belief we most oppose. <br />
<br />
<br />Steven Jakehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04753917037685188540noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4866671088220439212.post-70613107286971500182016-05-24T21:32:00.000-07:002016-07-19T09:01:33.566-07:00A review of Sean Carroll's The Big Picture: Part II<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiwx7Y0DWQfgM6YeY99CNF6MOHH9ahFlQ8GboGvjIO1oDnln_1LkQRMgHwTgE2LVUAZHvvlsXQoT0g2Qfwoj0uZkIFzkOGMQZRD993rXWl0RwdDY9icjxkDvMligyTSNjtE70GrsDwf1UcM/s1600/BigPicture.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="200" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiwx7Y0DWQfgM6YeY99CNF6MOHH9ahFlQ8GboGvjIO1oDnln_1LkQRMgHwTgE2LVUAZHvvlsXQoT0g2Qfwoj0uZkIFzkOGMQZRD993rXWl0RwdDY9icjxkDvMligyTSNjtE70GrsDwf1UcM/s200/BigPicture.jpg" width="131" /></a></div>
We are continuing our survey of physicist Sean Carroll's book <i><a href="http://www.amazon.com/Big-Picture-Origins-Meaning-Universe/dp/0525954821/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1464150543&sr=1-1&keywords=sean+carroll">The Big Picture</a> </i>(Part I <a href="https://christian-agnostic.blogspot.com/2016/05/a-review-of-sean-carrolls-big-picture.html">here</a>) by moving on to his second section of the book entitled <i>Understanding</i>.<br />
<br />
This part of the book is where Carroll puts forward his epistemology, which he calls "poetic naturalism." He does a great job of articulating his case, and is very thorough and covers many topics while not sacrificing depth. In fact, there were many times where I thought to myself "but what about X?" and, sure enough, that would be the very next topic Carroll addressed. Also, Carroll's first chapter in this section is a great primer on Bayesian Reasoning for laymen -- he explains it beautifully with simple and common-sense examples.<br />
<br />
Contrary to what many might think, I actually agreed with Carroll on many aspects of his epistemology -- he does make some correct predications. But obviously I do not agree with it all, since it is, after all, a form of naturalism.<br />
<br />
That being said, let us dive into the material and see what Carroll has to say.<br />
<br />
<b><i>Bayesian reasoning</i></b><br />
Bayesian reasoning, based on Bayes' Theorem, is foundational to abductive reasoning. It gives you, in principle, a very logical and matter-of- fact way of forming beliefs and updating them in light of new observations and information. It is a way of making inferences to the best explanation -- the very type of inferences science is interested in.<br />
<br />
I have no qualms about Bayesian reasoning itself, only about when it can, and cannot, be applied. Bayesian reasoning is useful for (and really <i>is</i>) abductive reasoning, however, it is irrelevant to <i>deductive</i> reasoning. For if a deductive argument is sound, then the truth of the conclusion is guaranteed, whereas nothing guarantees an inference predicated on abductive reasoning. On the contrary, abductive reasoning deals with probabilities, and this should make sense since Bayes' Theorem is itself a theorem dealing in probability.<br />
<br />
Why is it important to contrast Bayesian inference with deduction here? Well, because Carroll seems to pay little attention to deduction and focuses mainly on abduction (for reasons we'll survey below). This isn't a problem in itself, but it becomes one when one realizes that many arguments that attempt to demonstrate the falsity of naturalism are deductive in nature.<br />
<br />
In any event, Carroll also claims the following:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Each of us comes equipped with a rich variety of beliefs, for or against all sorts of proportions. Bayes teaches us (1) never to assign perfect certainty to any such belief; (2) always be prepared to update our credences when new evidence comes along; and (3) how exactly such evidence alters the credences we assign. It's a road map for coming closer and closer to the truth. (p. 82-83)</blockquote>
<br />
On first glance this seems like a great point, and I would, in most cases agree. Bayesian reasoning is indeed a fantastic "road map for coming closer and closer to truth." However, contrary to Carroll's claims here, there are beliefs that are (to borrow a phrase from the presuppositionalist camp) preconditions of intelligibility. That is to say, there are beliefs and propositions that are necessary conditions for <i>any</i> sort of intelligible epistemology, and because of this it follows that such beliefs <i>must</i> be certain and cannot be "updated" or revised pending any new evidence (again, see below). One such proposition is the law of noncontradiction. This is a belief that we can be absolutely certain about, especially since any denial of it, even in principle, requires that it be true.<br />
<br />
<b><i>Poetic naturalism</i></b><br />
I briefly expounded PN in the last post, yet there wasn't much space devoted to it. That's because the current section is where Carroll largely unpacks this epistemology.<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
[O]ur best approach to describing the universe is not a single, unified story but an interconnected series of models appropriate at different levels. Each model has a domain in which it is applicable, and the ideas that appear as essential parts of each story have every right to be thought of as "real." Our task is to assemble an interlocking set of descriptions, based on some fundamental ideas, that fit together to form a stable planet of belief. (p. 4) </blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
This brings us to the "poetic" part of poetic naturalism. While there is one world, there are many ways of talking about it. We refer to those ways as "models" or "theories" or "stories"; it doesn't matter. (p. 94) </blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
[S]omething is "real" if it plays an essential role in some particular story of reality that, as far as we can tell, provides an accurate description of the world within its domain of applicability. (p. 111)</blockquote>
Again, on first glance there isn't much to quibble with here. It is true that certain models and theories regarding parts of reality, with their respective vocabularies, only need to be utilized in their respective domains of inquiry. Talking about free will and volition on the macroscopic scale of human experience utilizes a different model, and different vocabulary, than the models utilized when inquiring into the nature of atoms, electrons, and other subatomic particles.<br />
<br />
However, the pertinent questions that need to be posed regarding this epistemology are the following: (1) Carroll places a lot of weight on models being "useful," and this utility being the litmus test for labeling something as "real," but what determines whether a specific model is useful, and why is utility important for our epistemology in the first place? Also, why should the fact that it is useful to describe reality using different models at different levels dictate what the actual nature of reality is, in principle? (2) Are there other ways of talking about or modeling the world, besides PN?<br />
<br />
Note that Carroll attempts to answer (almost) all of these questions. So, it's not as if he hasn't thought this through, and he probably wouldn't at all be fazed by any of them. However, that doesn't mean that his answers are convincing.<br />
<br />
(1) is a question, or set of questions, that Carroll attempts to answer:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
The question, however, is whether a particular way of talking about the world is <i>useful</i>. And usefulness is always relative to some purpose [...] "useful" means "providing an accurate model of some aspect of reality." (p. 143)</blockquote>
It is important that our models are accurate representations of some aspect of reality, however, this is not the traditional <i>meaning</i> of usefulness. Something is not useful if it accurately reflects a part of reality, rather something is useful if it can serve a practical purpose. Now, it is true that models that accurately reflect reality tend to be more useful than models that do not, but this doesn't mean that the latter is defined in terms of the former. This might seem like a minor quibble, but one problem with Carroll's PN is that throughout the section he constantly equivocates between both of these definitions. Sometimes "useful" is used as "serving a practical purpose" and other times it's used as "provides an accurate model of a part of reality."<br />
<br />
What's the problem though (as if equivocation is not bad enough)? The problem is that the two definitions utilized by Carroll are sometimes <i>mutually exclusive -- </i>that is, there are times when a "model" or "story" can be useful even though it fails to accurately reflect reality. Carroll actually demonstrates such with his own example: he highlights the phenomena of transgender individuals -- people whose gender identity is different than the gender they were assigned at birth. Carroll says that if someone born male identifies as a female, then if this identification is "useful and meaningful" (p. 142) then why not identify them as a female? The problem here is that no matter how "useful" it is to identify someone as a female, this doesn't entail the fact that they are, in reality, a female.<br />
<br />
Carroll doesn't see this as problem since he believes that classifications like male, female, and even human, are "human inventions." (p. 142) He claims these categorizations are not illusions because they are useful and meaningful in the contexts that we apply them. But again, something being useful does not necessitate that it accurately reflects an aspect of reality, and therefore it is possible that something be useful, yet be illusory.<br />
<br />
And even worse for Carroll, the claim that a classification like "human" is a human invention is actually self-defeating. For to say that something is a cognitive construct of the human mind, one needs a <i>nature</i> of "humanity" to objectively obtain. That is to say, for one to assert that something is a <i>human</i> invention necessitates that "human" be an objective referent, and not just a construct. So the proposition that the concept <i>human</i> is a <i>human</i> invention literally contradicts itself.<br />
<br />
While Carroll doesn't comment on question (2) directly, he does make the following comment:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Poetic naturalism is at least consistent with its own standards: it tries to provide the most useful way of talking about the world we have. (p. 112)</blockquote>
Carroll is correct that PN is <i>prima facie</i> consistent with itself, but what about when we delve a bit deeper and consider the implications of question (2)? That is, is PN the <i>only</i>, or even the most useful, model, or story, of reality? Well, surely it's not the <i>only</i> model of reality: there are a multitude of different ontologies. Ok. So then how do we determine which model is most useful? Well again, it depends on how Carroll is using the word useful.<br />
<br />
If by "useful" Carroll means "serves a practical purpose," then it's not clear that PN is the most useful way of talking about the world. Moreover, how, on PN, do we even determine the most useful, or practical, way of talking about reality? It seems that we would need some idea regarding the fundamental nature of reality to be able to say model X is more useful than model Y. But then, is this "idea" about the fundamental nature of reality itself merely another "story" or "way of talking about the world" on some narrow domain? If so, then we're right back to the problem at hand wherein we need to determine how we know that this "model" or idea is "useful." What this means is that you can't have an ontology founded on nothing but "stories" and "ways of talking about the world." At some point you need a concrete ontology that describes how nature <i>objectively operates</i>, and this entails that you can't have an ontology that is purely "poetic", as Carroll uses the term here.<br />
<br />
Moreover, if by "useful" Carroll instead means "providing an accurate model of some aspect of reality," then we run into the same problems. For, again, in order to know that a model is an accurate model of reality, we need to know something objective about the behavior and nature of reality that is not just another "way of talking about it" -- otherwise we go round and round in a circle again.<br />
<br />
<b><i>Emergence</i></b><br />
Carroll then promulgates an emergentist ontology to make sense of different models of the world at different levels:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
One pivotal word enables [the] reconciliation between all the different stories: <i>emergence </i>[...] A property of a system is "emergent" if it is not part of a detailed "fundamental" description of the system, but it becomes useful or even inevitable when we look at the system more broadly. (p. 94)</blockquote>
I do agree with Carroll that there are "emergent" phenomena. There are many such examples one could give of such phenomena, and Carroll gives a good explication using his own examples. But how does emergentism help PN? Carroll explains:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
[E]mergence is about different theories speaking different languages, but offering compatible descriptions of the same underlying phenomena in their respective domain of applicability. (p. 100)</blockquote>
So emergence is a way to continue talking about the world at different levels, wherein the higher levels usually "emerge" from the lower levels. This is all well and good, and so far I have no bone to pick with Carroll here, in principle. Where I might begin to disagree is if Carroll, later on in the book, tries to explain away something like consciousness as merely a "model" or "way of talking about" human experience that only applies at higher levels. (I haven't read the whole book yet, so if he does argue this then we can cross that bridge when we get there. )<br />
<br />
<i><b>Rationalism vs. empiricism</b></i><br />
Since Carroll's epistemology is heavy on science and Bayesian reasoning, it should come as no surprise that he advocates a form of <i>empiricism</i>. That is, he believes that we can only know things about reality by looking at it and observing it. He contrasts this with <i>rationalism</i> wherein it is believed that knowledge comes intuitively without any need for empirical observation.<br />
<br />
Carroll surveys the case usually given in justification of rationalism wherein the proponents appeal to the domains of mathematics and logic. Carroll argues against such an appeal by claiming that in both math and logic we simply derive consequences from differing axioms. This is, in a sense, correct, at least for math. For example, Euclidean consequences follow from Euclidean axioms, and non-Euclidean consequences follow from non-Euclidean axioms. But we need to actually look at the world to be able to determine whether it can be described by Euclidean or non-Euclidean geometry. No problem there.<br />
<br />
However, there are those, like myself, who claim that there are axioms and necessary truths that <i>must</i> hold in any possible world at all. One example of this, as was already mentioned above, is the law of noncontradiction. This is not an axiom that might only hold in certain worlds, but might possibly fail to hold in others -- as in the case of Euclidean geometry. Rather, it is a necessary feature of having any kind of a reality at all. There is no axiom of non-contradiction and axiom of non-noncontradiction; there is only the former.<br />
<br />
There are other propositions that are also claimed to be axiomatic and necessary -- e.g. law of identity, PSR, principle of causality etc. -- but I need not defend them presently. The point is that there are indeed things that we can know <i>a priori</i>, that is, without having to actually look at the world to justify them.<br />
<br />
Carroll considers this point (briefly), and claims the following:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
If we were thinking deductively, like a mathematician or logician, we would say that no collection of particular facts suffices to derive a general principle, since the very next fact might contradict the principle. (p. 135)</blockquote>
This seems to be quite absurd. For according to Carroll's reasoning, for instance, we cannot say the law of identity is an immutable principle, because we might one day come across something which is not identical to itself. This seems silly, and it should, because we already know intuitively that identity is a precondition of intelligibility of <i>any </i>thing that will ever exist. And so it goes with all other necessary truths. Now, there may not be <i>many</i> necessary truths with which we can know a priori, but there are a few, and they are a very crucial aspect of one's metaphysic.<br />
<br />
All of this is important because it goes against Carroll's PN, as well as his form of empiricism. For if there are propositions that are necessary truths, then these truths aren't merely "models", "stories", or "ways of talking about reality." Rather, they are immutable principles that hold throughout any domain and any level, and cannot be shoved aside by the thought that one day we could discover them false. This is like saying that one day we might find someone who is successfully married <i>and</i> a bachelor.<br />
<br />
<a href="https://christian-agnostic.blogspot.com/2016/07/a-review-of-sean-carrolls-big-picture.html">Part III</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />Steven Jakehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04753917037685188540noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4866671088220439212.post-36285016829888732552016-05-14T12:31:00.000-07:002016-07-19T09:00:31.133-07:00A review of Sean Carroll's The Big Picture: Part I<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhh3M8T-Lzel50nB-NTRWjCh1Pq7dw0al90Byw1yhT4RtpX1GdoywjrRj9Y7lsS0VCFR_YNXHKhfvyV6DYLkChxIgpu5QBpfqrOsqNKe82sV_kFrYFKsovdTjNYQWBkymjWHfYUOuaKUGM5/s1600/BigPicture.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="200" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhh3M8T-Lzel50nB-NTRWjCh1Pq7dw0al90Byw1yhT4RtpX1GdoywjrRj9Y7lsS0VCFR_YNXHKhfvyV6DYLkChxIgpu5QBpfqrOsqNKe82sV_kFrYFKsovdTjNYQWBkymjWHfYUOuaKUGM5/s200/BigPicture.jpg" width="131" /></a></div>
Physicist Sean Carroll's new book <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Big-Picture-Origins-Meaning-Universe/dp/0525954821/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1463254295&sr=8-1&keywords=sean+carroll"><i>The Big Picture: On the Origins of Life, Meaning, and the Universe Itself</i> </a>was released this past Tuesday (yay!). I, as well as many others, have been greatly anticipating the release of this book ever since Carroll announced it himself, and it's a pleasure to finally have it in my possession, and to be reviewing it.<br />
<br />
I pretty much figured, before the book was released, that I would take up the task of writing a review. I felt this way because Carroll is an extremely articulate and modest philosophical naturalist and has been securing more of a secular following as of late--especially since he debated William Lane Craig, and, in my opinion, won--and I was very curious as to how he would make a cumulative case for a coherent naturalist metaphysic. And after beginning to read the book I do in fact feel that there are many things to comment on, as I had hoped. Though I obviously disagree with Carroll on many of his positions, Carroll's humble and unboastful attitude coupled with his articulate writing make this a great read.<br />
<br />
So, on with the review, then. Carroll's book is split into six sections: <i>Cosmos, Understanding, Essence, Complexity, Thinking, and Caring. </i>I am, so far, planning to write a review on each section individually, though it might be the case that I don't have many comments to make on a particular section, and thus I might not review all of them. This Part I review will focus on the section labeled <i>Cosmos</i>.<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
_____________________________________________________</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
Carroll begins the book by asking some important questions about the fundamental nature of reality, and stressing the importance of thinking about ontology. It is among this discussion of ontology that he begins advocating for philosophical naturalism. But Carroll's naturalism does not <i>merely</i> claim that all that exists is the natural world exhibiting patterns. Rather, Carroll introduces what he calls <i>poetic naturalism. </i>The "poetic" aspect of poetic naturalism (PN) is constituted by how we talk about, model, and interpret reality. Carroll describes this view:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
[O]ur best approach to describing the universe is not a single, unified story but an interconnected series of models appropriate at different levels. Each model has a domain in which it is applicable, and the ideas that appear as essential parts of each story have every right to be thought of as "real." Our task is to assemble an interlocking set of descriptions, based on some fundamental ideas, that fit together to form a stable planet of belief. (p. 4)</blockquote>
This explication of poetic naturalism is very similar to two theories I've surveyed in the past, namely Model-Dependent Realism, as promulgated by Hawking, and Embodied realism, as promulgated by Lakoff. The key aspects of this philosophy are that we, as humans, talk about and describe different aspects or "levels" of the world using different models and different vocabularies, and that, as long as these models are consistent and coherent, they can overlap and reconcile with one another.<br />
<br />
Unfortunately, Carroll doesn't delve too deep into this philosophy in the first section. Rather, he spends more space expounding this perspective in his second section <i>Understanding</i>--which should make sense since the "poetic" aspect of this philosophy is mostly epistemic. Therefore, I will save my comments on poetic naturalism until the next installment of the review.<br />
<br />
<b><i>Causality</i></b><br />
One way that Carroll attempts to demonstrate the "layered" models of reality we conceptualize, as predicated by PN, is with Aristotle's notions of natures and causes. For Aristotle famously promulgated the principle of causality, which stated that something can only be "moved" if it was caused to do so by something else in motion. (Of course, by "motion" Aristotle really meant change, and by change he really meant something which is being reduced from potency to act.) But Carroll claims that the conservation of momentum has relegated such notions to mere useful macroscopic descriptions and constructions:<br />
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
[T]he whole structure of Aristotle's argument for an unmoved mover rests on his idea that motions require causes. Once we know about conservation of momentum, that idea loses its steam. [...] What matters is that the new physics of Galileo and his friends implied an entirely new ontology, a deep shift in how we thought about the nature of reality. "Causes" didn't have the central role that they once did. The universe doesn't need a push; it can just keep going. [...] Of course, even today, we talk about causes and effects all the time. But if you open the contemporary equivalent of Aristotle's <i>Physics--</i>a textbook on quantum field theory, for example--words like that are nowhere to be found. We, still, with good reason, talk about causes in everyday speech, but they're no longer part of our best fundamental ontology. (p. 28-29)</blockquote>
I have a couple comments at this point. First, the conservation of momentum--which is embedded in Newton's law of inertia--doesn't, at all, call Aristotle's idea of motion into question. For, again, Aristotle said that when something changed, this required something responsible for that change. But uniform inertial motion is seen, as explicated by physicists, as a <i>state </i>in itself, and not a change <i>per se</i>. That is, the state of motion of an object is its velocity, and thus an object with a uniform state of motion is an object that is moving at a constant velocity--as long as it is not being acted upon by an unbalanced force--and thus is <i>not</i> changing, according to physics. Therefore, the conservation of momentum does not at all run counter to Aristotle's metaphysical principle, in fact, it is completely irrelevant to the principle.<br />
<br />
Second, it is simply not true that talk of causality, at least efficient causality, is absent from contemporary scientific textbooks. In fact, it's ironic that Carroll specifically mentions quantum field theory textbooks since in <i><a href="http://www.amazon.com/Introduction-Quantum-Student-Economy-Frontiers/dp/0813350190/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1463254878&sr=8-2&keywords=an+introduction+to+quantum+field+theory">An Introduction to Quantum Field Theory</a> </i>the authors write the following:<i> </i>The necessity of having a multiparticle theory also arises in a less obvious way, from considerations of causality[...] In a relativistic theory, this conclusion would signal a violation of causality. (p. 14)<br />
<br />
These points may seem peripheral, but I believe they are important for a couple of reasons. First, the unmoved mover argument of Aristotle, if valid, would defeat a naturalist ontology, which Carroll holds. Yet, Carroll quickly dismisses Aristotle's unmoved mover argument, in light of the supposed irrelevance of concepts of causality, yet he does so fallaciously. Again, this isn't that big a deal since Carroll's thesis is not predicated on discussing Aristotle's proofs for God. Nevertheless, his fallaciously swift dismissal of the efficacy of causality is still a strike against his case.<br />
<br />
Second, Carroll is trying to score a point for poetic naturalism by claiming that the language of causality is only a folk theory constructed from interactions at the macroscopic level, and isn't part of our "fundamental ontology" and has no utility in the domain of physics. Yet the fact that this has been demonstrated to be false with the quote above (one of many) already begins to poke holes in Carroll's form of naturalism. That is, we see that a concept like causality is not simply a model that only applies in one limited domain. Rather, it in itself <i>should be part</i> of one's fundamental ontology.<br />
<br />
Carroll also makes much of the fact that causality is nowhere to be found in the laws of physics, and claims that such concepts are "emergent":<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
We look at the world around us and describe it in terms of causes and effects, reasons why, purposes and goals. None of those concepts exists as part of the fundamental furniture of reality at its deepest. They emerge as we zoom out from the microscopic level to the level of the everyday. (p. 54)</blockquote>
This is not correct, though. While it is true that causality is not palpable in the mathematical equations of physics and quantum physics--though we shouldn't expect it to be, since causality is not quantitative--this does not mean that causality is not operative and efficacious as it pertains to "reality at its deepest." I maintain that causality is ubiquitous at every turn, in the microscopic and macroscopic levels of reality.<br />
<br />
To see this, consider the famous experiment conducted by physicist Hendrick Casimir in 1948. Casimir placed two metal plates one ten-thousandth of a centimeter apart in a quantum vacuum. As one might logically theorize, these plates would stay put, since the space is empty and thus there are no forces to affect the plates. But they didn't stay put, rather they were driven towards each other! And the first question that should come to one's mind is "Well, what was the <i>cause</i> of this effect?" It turns out that the cause is that there is an imbalance between the quantum fluctuations in between and outside the plates, and this imbalance yields a pressure imbalance, which pushes the plates together.<br />
<br />
The point here is that, contra Carroll, causality is no less efficacious in a quantum vacuum than in our familiar everyday lives, and causality does simply emerge as we "zoom out" from the microscopic to the macroscopic.<br />
<br />
<b><i>Reasons Why</i></b><br />
Carroll also spends a good amount of the first section discussing our constant search for "reasons why" things happen or why facts obtain. He agrees that the search for explanations is extremely rational and makes sense in our everyday lives. Where Carroll draws the line is when one makes this search for explanation a metaphysical principle (e.g. the Principle of Sufficient Reason) that pronounces that <i>everything must</i> admit of explanation, or a "reason why." This is, no doubt, a very modest and logical position to take. Carroll is not committing one way or another to whether all things and facts admit of explanation. He humbly claims that they might or might not, and leaves the door open to the possibility of brute facts.<br />
<br />
However, as one who <i>does</i> in fact believe that all things and facts <i>must</i> necessarily and logically admit of explanation, I do not agree with Carroll here. And I find that his arguments against the PSR to be rather weak. Carroll claims that "[o]ur standards for promoting a commonsensical observation to a 'metaphysical principle' should be very high indeed. "(p. 41) Now, I would agree here, but Carroll really doesn't survey any concrete arguments actually given (besides Leibniz's Principle of the Best) that would attempt to demonstrate why the PSR should be taken as a metaphysical principle. He merely says the following:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
[F]or every fact we notice about the universe: as soon as we apprehend it, we think there must be a reason behind it. This isn't an argument that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is logically incontrovertible; it only implies that we often act as if something like it were true. If we're honest, it's an empirical, evidence-based argument, not an a priori one. (p. 42)</blockquote>
I agree with Carroll that this argument he has articulated is not a priori, and is not logically incontrovertible. The problem is that no (logical) person attempting to establish the PSR as a metaphysical principle would use this argument, especially since it's just an inductive argument which cannot form an immutable principle at all.<br />
<br />
The type of arguments that <i>are</i> given in favor of the PSR (and that are a priori) consider the nature of epistemic chains of explanation themselves. And they argue that explanation forms an instrumental and transitive chain, so that if even <i>one</i> member of a chain is unexplained (i.e. is a brute fact) then the chain as a whole loses efficacy. (Indeed, I have argued that very thing <a href="https://christian-agnostic.blogspot.com/2014/07/brute-facts-and-naturalism.html">here</a>, though I don't expect Carroll to have read my own specific post.) The point is that Carroll has not done the appropriate philosophical leg-work to dismiss the PSR as casually as he has done. And again this is important because the PSR puts a wrench in the works of his poetic naturalism, and also calls into question many other pronouncements he makes in the book, as we'll see in subsequent reviews. <br />
<br />
<b><i>The arrow of time</i></b><br />
More importantly, in Carroll's eyes, the denial of the immutability of causality and explanation, as well as the displacement of their existence as a mere human convention of utility, is ultimately illuminated by the increase in entropy and the arrow of time:<br />
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
"Memories" and "causes" aren't pieces of our fundamental ontology describing our world that we discover through careful research. They are concepts that we invent in order to provide useful descriptions of the macroscopic world. The arrow of time plays a crucial role in how those contexts relate to the underlying time-symmetric laws of physics. (p. 66)</blockquote>
Carroll's point is that we only utilize concepts like causality and explanation because events progress from past to future, due to the arrow of time. This is to say that such concepts are contingent upon the direction of time, which is itself a contingent fact of the universe and could have been otherwise. But the laws of physics, on the other hand, do not have an arrow of time imprinted into them, and thus, as Carroll claims, concepts like causality and explanation are not carving reality at its joints, but are only concepts that humans constructed in order to make sense of the world as we interpret it. For had the arrow of time been in the opposite direction, things would be very different, as would our concepts and models.<br />
<br />
Now, while it is true that if the arrow of time were pointing in the reverse direction, from future to past, events in the world would unfold in a completely counterintuitive and foreign manner, this would still not remove the necessity for concepts like causality and explanation. For explanation and causality are<i> always</i> present wherever things exist and behave, and wherever events and processes occur. And even in a universe where the arrow of time were reversed, you would still have things which exist and events which transpire; and as long as you have that, you have causes and effects, as well as explanations.<br />
<br />
So I maintain that Carroll has not demonstrated how humans "invent" these concepts, and again, this is important, because Carroll's poetic naturalism in founded on the idea that these concepts are human constructs and models, invented through our interaction with the world on the macroscopic level due to utility. However, if these concepts are not cognitive constructs but are immutable principles embedded in the fabric of reality, then Carroll's form of naturalism loses ground.<br />
<br />
<a href="https://christian-agnostic.blogspot.com/2016/05/a-review-of-sean-carrolls-big-picture_24.html">Part II</a>Steven Jakehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04753917037685188540noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4866671088220439212.post-70793912996354685202016-05-02T14:43:00.001-07:002016-05-02T14:43:59.340-07:00Consciousness and emergenceLet me preface this post by articulating the fact that I don't view my following comments as a rigorous philosophical treatise on the topics of consciousness or emergentism. Rather, this post is more in the form of a random collection of my thoughts, which may or may not be right, on said topics.<br />
<br />
Consciousness continues to present problems for any physicalist or materialist philosophy of mind. Theories like eliminative materialism, functionalism, and identity theory seem, by some, to fall short of accounting for the peculiarities of consciousness such as intentionality, qualia, and the "illusion" of free will. Some of these problems and difficulties have caused a preemptive adherence of materialists to another philosophy of mind: that of <i>emergentism</i>.<br />
<br />
Emergentism, as a philosophy of mind, holds that properties, patterns, or realities of consciousness are novel qualities that emerge from the interaction and configuration of their constituents. These qualities are called "novel" because they do not exist--either in the same degree or even in the same kind--at the substrate level of their aggregate parts. An example of this emergence is given by the quality of solidity. That is, the table I'm currently typing at is solid and firm, yet this quality is not found, and least not at all in the same sense, in the particles and atoms that make up this table. In fact, it is said, the atoms are mostly empty space, and "solid" is one of the last adjectives we would use to describe them. Thus, the solidity of the table would seem to emerge upon the configuration of the constituents.<br />
<br />
How does this help physicalism/materialism? Well materialists famously have trouble accounting for how compositions of particles, atoms, and neurons which are not intentional and conscious can produce qualities antithetical to those very parts. However, we see cases all around us, evident in the table example, of component parts generating emergent properties that the parts did not themselves possess. So, it is said, it might very well be the same with regards to the brain and consciousness. For if a set of aggregate parts X1 can produce an emergent quality Q in light of the fact that each element in X1 does not possess Q then it is at least in theory possible that consciousness and the qualities therein can emerge from mere particles and neurons. <br />
<br />
Now while I admit the possibility of emergentism as a philosophy of mind, I don't at all find it to be persuasive, nor do I believe anyone has come close to demonstrating its validity. Let me articulate my reasons for the former. First, we've only discovered two reasons that a quality might emerge from certain constituents: 1) emergence from mere structure, or 2) proto-emergence. In 1) a quality is generated strictly from the arrangement or structural relation of its constituents. An example of structural emergence is a box that has the property of "containment". The pieces that makes up the box do not harbor this property, but when these pieces are arranged a certain way, we see the emergence of the ability to contain--and it is the structural relation that grounds this emergence. In 2) the qualities of the component parts produce the same quality, but to a higher degree, in the emergent property. An example of this proto-emergence is a magnetic field emerging from charged iron atoms. This is proto-emergence, and not structural emergence, since each iron atom is itself a little bit magnetic, and thus all of these magnetic iron atoms together generate a magnetic field.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi7q3O9bYn1IiBNRCTVx1Lvomq7Xawp677fTjYGZUSyJkhIVo6ZAgmJSssI_HLcQw36SOqtaTanHXmFkuRsRpjLo10lNmne557QlerPs18Fib1wYed8jeVGax5H9Hcz4neaqP7y_K0jAdCa/s1600/Dendrite.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="174" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi7q3O9bYn1IiBNRCTVx1Lvomq7Xawp677fTjYGZUSyJkhIVo6ZAgmJSssI_HLcQw36SOqtaTanHXmFkuRsRpjLo10lNmne557QlerPs18Fib1wYed8jeVGax5H9Hcz4neaqP7y_K0jAdCa/s200/Dendrite.jpg" width="200" /></a></div>
So, why is the distinction above important? Well, it seems that if the qualities of consciousness are emergent then they would need to be either structurally emergent, or proto-emergent. But, and here's where the problem arises, we know that consciousness cannot be the result of proto-emergence, since particles, atoms, and neurons are not themselves conscious, or intentional, and do not exhibit qualia, and no amalgam of non-conscious constituents can generate a conscious property through proto-emergence. Thus, proto-emergence is not a possibility for the materialist. But what about structural emergence? This seems to be a dead end as well. For while there are many mysteries yet to be uncovered about the brain, it's structural physical arrangement and components are quite well known. Neurologists know all about the mechanics of neurons, axons, dendrites, synapses, and the like--the building blocks of the brain. And yet, there is nothing about the arrangement, structure, and pathways between these components that would yield the properties of consciousness. <br />
<br />
Again, I don't want to stretch this too far as if what I've said is a knock-down argument against emergentism--it's not. But what we've surveyed so far does paint emergentism in an unfavorable light, and puts a burden on the one who wants to claim that the ontology of emergence can adequately account for the most pervasive human experience--consciousness. I'll end on a note from philosopher James Madden:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
[T]here is absolutely nothing about the chemical processes occurring within neurons with which we are remotely acquainted that in any way explains the fact of consciousness. Of course ignorance of an explanation does not entail that there is no such explanation, but we should ask ourselves how likely such an explanation is given our general understanding of the world. The probability, as far as we can tell, seems to be exceedingly low. </blockquote>
<br />
<br />Steven Jakehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04753917037685188540noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4866671088220439212.post-66970872960240410882016-04-13T09:05:00.001-07:002016-04-13T09:06:54.522-07:00Is John Loftus still relevant?<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgkdGRJRB4T4rTxyEnqL8MU9-3H9SndV3bj4BchCr1PTafUMH2-GSOUkQIizuGaocGiRve7aOrZ2lxa-HbtDOG_RFvLNgVJy9zYRmYWmfeqEmRto7jgELZUkyEjL2Br_FUkLCPGIhyphenhyphenJTJFt/s1600/JC+Penney+Photo+1.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="200" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgkdGRJRB4T4rTxyEnqL8MU9-3H9SndV3bj4BchCr1PTafUMH2-GSOUkQIizuGaocGiRve7aOrZ2lxa-HbtDOG_RFvLNgVJy9zYRmYWmfeqEmRto7jgELZUkyEjL2Br_FUkLCPGIhyphenhyphenJTJFt/s200/JC+Penney+Photo+1.jpg" width="160" /></a></div>
<!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:OfficeDocumentSettings>
<o:AllowPNG/>
</o:OfficeDocumentSettings>
</xml><![endif]-->
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The first book I read that aggressively argued against
Christianity and theism, and made a subsequent case for atheism, was John
Loftus' <i>Why I Became an Atheist</i>. To this day I still believe that it's a
great book, and should be read by any believer (and non-believer) who actually
wants to confront the opposition and survey the case for atheism. It is this
book, along with Loftus' patented Outsider Test for Faith contained therein,
that elevated Loftus to the forefront of the New Atheist movement. And while
Loftus was never considered one of the "Four Horsemen of the apocalypse,"
he was nevertheless one of the most famous up and coming skeptics just a few
years ago. At the height of his relevance he was printing atheist
anthologies left and right, debating the likes of Dinesh D'Souza, and enjoying
a major following on his blog <a href="https://www.blogger.com/"><i><span style="color: windowtext;"><span id="goog_1626813368"></span></span></i></a><i><a href="http://debunkingchristianity.blogspot.com/">Debunking
Christianity.<span id="goog_1626813369"></span></a></i></span></div>
<a href="http://debunkingchristianity.blogspot.com/">
</a><br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<a href="http://debunkingchristianity.blogspot.com/"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">But these days are long gone, and for some reason
Loftus seems, at least to me, to have faded away from being relevant. While
he's still writing and editing many books and anthologies, they don't seem to
be garnering much interest or mention--at least not as much as his first books.
And while he's still debating, his debates, likewise, have failed to gather
much interest from those involved in religion debates. Even more, his blog has
taken a nose dive, and seems to have lost whatever prominence it used to have.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">What are the reasons for Loftus' fall from grace? Well
it seems that there might be a couple reasons. First, Loftus' seems to have
overdone the whole anthology/book thing. That is to say, he's printing too many
books. You see, it was actually quite interesting when Loftus first came out
with <i>The Christian Delusion</i> and <i>The End of Christianity</i>--anthologies
arguing against Christianity from a myriad of perspectives. Yet his continued
push in this vein, with subsequent anthologies and books, appears to have been
too much of a "good" thing. In other words, this constant inflow of
books seems to have actually reduced the value that each book has. Heck, Loftus
already has <i>another</i> anthology set for release later this year, and
is already writing <i>another</i> book about the end of philosophy of
religion. And I think I speak for a lot of skeptics and believers when I say:
who cares?</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Secondly, Loftus is <i>not</i> much of a speaker, and
this has no doubt affected his publicity as a "freethinker". I
remember watching him in his D'Souza debate, and wondering how someone who was
so articulate in print could be so incoherent in person. This train-wreck
reached its culmination when Loftus debated David Wood last year, for the
second time (see <span style="color: #ffd966;"><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=owURacUBpX0">here</a></span>). This was probably the worst I've
ever seen him perform. He was inarticulate, bumbling, his arguments were poor
(even coming from him), and his presentation was simply terrible overall.
Performances like these seem to be a huge contributing factor in explaining
Loftus' descent into irrelevance. (I mean, just think of the publicity Loftus
would have received if, on the contrary, he displayed a performance like that
of physicist Sean Carroll. )</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Thirdly, Loftus' blog, his primary medium, has become
a wasteland relegated to dense, unsubstantiated, arrogant, and unreasonable
dialogue saturated with ridicule--both from him and many of his commenters.
This is why you rarely see theists or Christians comment there, because the
blog is not conducive to fruitful dialogue. Moreover, Loftus' current posts
tend to be low on substance, and continually regurgitate the same notions over
and over.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Moreover, as of late Loftus has been fond of unjustly
and consistently attacking fellow atheists like Jeff Lowder and Keith Parsons,
on various topics, ad nauseum--going so far as calling Parsons ignorant and
arrogant (see <span style="color: #ffe599;"><a href="http://debunkingchristianity.blogspot.com/2016/04/the-arrogance-and-ignorance-of-keith.html">here</a></span>) , and calling Lowder <span style="color: #ffe599;"><a href="http://debunkingchristianity.blogspot.com/2015/08/the-sheer-stupidity-of-jeff-lowder.html">stupid</a></span>, and a <span style="color: #ffe599;"><a href="http://debunkingchristianity.blogspot.com/2015/05/an-expose-of-dishonesty-and-hypocrisy.html">hypocrite</a></span>. The problem is not that Loftus
disagrees with them, for he is surely entitled to his own opinion. Rather, the
problem is with how Loftus <i>goes about</i> engaging in dialogue with his
interlocutors. He's arrogant, uncharitable, obstinate, and downright
petulant--in fact he even banned his own friend and frequent poster Harry
McCall over a minor dispute regarding the scholarship of Bart Ehrman.
Furthermore, when this type of unreasonable behavior is brought to Loftus'
attention, he fails to take heed and only digs himself further in his hole of
close-mindedness and conceit. Just survey these recent comments by Loftus in a <span style="color: #ffe599;"><a href="http://debunkingchristianity.blogspot.com/2015/09/why-do-many-atheists-hate-new-atheists.html">post</a></span> of his:</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I think Coyne's comments [on some atheist's disdain of
the New Atheism] also explain why some small-minded atheists don't like me as
well. This is something that has only recently dawned on me, since I have not
thought of myself as having much fame or being that important. These
misinformed and jealous atheists "perceive" me to have achieved a
certain amount of fame they can only dream of having. So they attack. This
should encourage me, or something.</span></div>
</blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br />
How can one expect to have a fruitful dialogue with Loftus when this kind of
misplaced vanity is rattling around in his head? You can't. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Now, couple all this with the fact that Loftus has
repeatedly made claims to be hanging it up, as it were, though he always
changes his mind and returns. In 2012 he said that, "[i]t’s time to move
on[…]I see no reason to waste large chunks of my time on this delusion
anymore," and yet a couple of months later he was back blogging and writing full-time. And recently he has <span style="color: #ffe599;"><a href="http://debunkingchristianity.blogspot.com/2016/03/my-future-non-plans.html">commented</a></span> in a similar vein. It seems that
Loftus' continued and constant hiatuses might have contributed to many being
indifferent to what he subsequently has to say--at least I know I've felt this
way. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In light of all these factors it seems to me that
Loftus has faded away from relevancy in the secular community. Most theists
don't see the need to address him any longer, and many secularists don't seem
to bother much with what's going on in his little world. Maybe it's time
for Loftus to actually follow through with his own instincts, and hang up his
hat. </span></div>
<!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<w:WordDocument>
<w:View>Normal</w:View>
<w:Zoom>0</w:Zoom>
<w:TrackMoves/>
<w:TrackFormatting/>
<w:PunctuationKerning/>
<w:ValidateAgainstSchemas/>
<w:SaveIfXMLInvalid>false</w:SaveIfXMLInvalid>
<w:IgnoreMixedContent>false</w:IgnoreMixedContent>
<w:AlwaysShowPlaceholderText>false</w:AlwaysShowPlaceholderText>
<w:DoNotPromoteQF/>
<w:LidThemeOther>EN-US</w:LidThemeOther>
<w:LidThemeAsian>X-NONE</w:LidThemeAsian>
<w:LidThemeComplexScript>X-NONE</w:LidThemeComplexScript>
<w:Compatibility>
<w:BreakWrappedTables/>
<w:SnapToGridInCell/>
<w:WrapTextWithPunct/>
<w:UseAsianBreakRules/>
<w:DontGrowAutofit/>
<w:SplitPgBreakAndParaMark/>
<w:EnableOpenTypeKerning/>
<w:DontFlipMirrorIndents/>
<w:OverrideTableStyleHps/>
</w:Compatibility>
<m:mathPr>
<m:mathFont m:val="Cambria Math"/>
<m:brkBin m:val="before"/>
<m:brkBinSub m:val="--"/>
<m:smallFrac m:val="off"/>
<m:dispDef/>
<m:lMargin m:val="0"/>
<m:rMargin m:val="0"/>
<m:defJc m:val="centerGroup"/>
<m:wrapIndent m:val="1440"/>
<m:intLim m:val="subSup"/>
<m:naryLim m:val="undOvr"/>
</m:mathPr></w:WordDocument>
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<w:LatentStyles DefLockedState="false" DefUnhideWhenUsed="true"
DefSemiHidden="true" DefQFormat="false" DefPriority="99"
LatentStyleCount="267">
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="0" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Normal"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="heading 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 7"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 8"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 9"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 7"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 8"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 9"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="35" QFormat="true" Name="caption"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="10" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Title"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="1" Name="Default Paragraph Font"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="11" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Subtitle"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="22" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Strong"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="20" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Emphasis"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="59" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Table Grid"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Placeholder Text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="1" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="No Spacing"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Revision"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="34" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="List Paragraph"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="29" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Quote"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="30" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Intense Quote"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="19" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Subtle Emphasis"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="21" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Intense Emphasis"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="31" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Subtle Reference"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="32" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Intense Reference"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="33" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Book Title"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="37" Name="Bibliography"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" QFormat="true" Name="TOC Heading"/>
</w:LatentStyles>
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 10]>
<style>
/* Style Definitions */
table.MsoNormalTable
{mso-style-name:"Table Normal";
mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0;
mso-tstyle-colband-size:0;
mso-style-noshow:yes;
mso-style-priority:99;
mso-style-parent:"";
mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt;
mso-para-margin-top:0in;
mso-para-margin-right:0in;
mso-para-margin-bottom:10.0pt;
mso-para-margin-left:0in;
line-height:115%;
mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
font-size:11.0pt;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri;
mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin;
mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri;
mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;}
</style>
<![endif]--><br />Steven Jakehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04753917037685188540noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4866671088220439212.post-14249550891644709922016-03-30T12:08:00.000-07:002016-03-30T12:08:13.495-07:00What I believe (and don't)A recent conversation around the blogosphere has left me pondering whether or not my readers actually know my viewpoints regarding much of Christian theology. After all, the name of the blog is <em>The Christian Agnostic,</em> isn't it, and how many of my readers actually know where I stand on key issues of Christian theology? I'm not sure, to be honest.<em> </em>So, then, what exactly <i>are</i> my Christian leanings? That is, what do I really believe regarding the tenets of Christian theology? In light of such questions I have decided to compile a list that briefly surveys said beliefs, and it is this list that follows:<br />
<br />
<ul>
<li><em><strong>The Bible</strong></em>: I don't believe the Bible is perfect, inerrant or infallible. I believe it is a book written by wholly human authors that contains the same imperfections that permeate humanity. However, I agree with the writer of 2 Timothy when he says scripture is, "useful for teaching, reproof, correction, and for instruction righteousness." It is, to me, a medium that does in fact aid us in growing more intimate with God, despite its shortcomings.</li>
<li><i><strong>Biblical Criticism</strong></i>: I generally believe what the consensus of scholars and historians have inferred about the documents that make up the Bible, as well as what they have concluded about the Israelite culture. For example, I believe the Israelites came from Canaan (and not from Egypt), that the book of Isaiah is composed of multiple authors, that the book of Daniel was written years after the events it "predicts" etc. </li>
<li><i><strong>Genesis</strong>:</i> I don't take the opening chapters of Genesis as history--the rest of Genesis is most likely an etiology. I don't believe in Adam and Eve or the story that describes their supposed fall. This, to me, is just another creation myth--albeit the most sophisticated of the ancient Near East--most likely promulgated in contrast to the opposing pagan creation myths of the time. However, I do believe that it communicates an important point: we are fallen creatures who have removed God from the pedestal. </li>
<li><i><strong>Jesus</strong></i>: I don't believe Jesus was God, and it seems pretty clear to me that some of the earliest sources that attest to Jesus--Paul, Mark, and Matthew--have little idea of such a concept. I agree with the majority of scholars that Jesus was most likely a self-proclaimed eschatological prophet who sincerely believed that the end of the world was coming in his follower's lifetime. That being said, none of this turns me away from Jesus. I do believe his words should be heeded--as long as they're interpreted in light of his radical eschatology--despite his mistakes. And I do, especially, believe that Jesus is the best moral prophet to grace mankind, and that he gave us the best example of what a life devoted to God looks like--again, as long as we interpret his life in terms of his extreme apocalyptic worldview. Jesus is, to me, still the best gateway we have to the mind of God, and takes us as close as we can be to the face of God himself. </li>
<li><i><strong>Trinity/Incarnation</strong></i>: Since I don't believe that Jesus was God in the flesh, then I obviously don't believe in the incarnation, or the trinity. Both of these concepts, as I hinted to earlier, seem to not have been promulgated by the earliest Christians. There are only verses here and there, mostly from the <i>later</i> New Testament writings, that even seem to hint at such things. (In fact I believe that if we were to read the Bible from a fresh perspective, with no previous assumptions from outside sources--e.g. the Nicene Creed--we wouldn't close the Bible thinking that there was anything like a trinitarian ontology promulgated.) </li>
<li><i><strong>Atonement</strong></i>: I don't believe Jesus atoned for anyone's sins, and while the Christus Victor theory of atonement appeals to me, it only does so in a metaphorical sense. And I certainly do not hold to the Penal Substitution theory, which seems to make a mockery of any God worthy of worship. </li>
<li><em><strong>Jesus' resurrection</strong>: </em>I believe, or at most <em>hope,</em> that Jesus resurrected from the dead. However, I don't believe that the evidential arguments for his resurrection are without their flaws. And I certainly don't believe that said arguments are overwhelmingly irresistible or undeniable. A reasonable person can very much be skeptical about such things, and, if they don't believe in God, then their skepticism is even more warranted. </li>
<li><i><strong>Heaven/Hell</strong></i>: I definitely believe in an afterlife--for both logical and emotional reasons. But I don't think anybody knows what the nature of such a life will be. Heaven and Hell, to me, are in the same camp as the opening of Genesis: they are myths that we have constructed to make sense of what we deeply take to be true. In any event, if God does exist, and if he is infinitely loving, and if heaven and hell do indeed exist as well, then I can't help but be a universalist. Moreover, on these conditions, I believe that hell is only temporary, and, in some sense, simply a mental anguish created from enmity towards all that is good and just (i.e. God himself).</li>
</ul>
<br /><br />
<ul>
</ul>
Steven Jakehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04753917037685188540noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4866671088220439212.post-56204968525466792502016-03-14T13:11:00.001-07:002016-03-14T13:11:41.854-07:00Sean Carroll and teleology<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjeHWjk0PgaRYrpWGry-gwnXW_5rOel8hOf7fFV1EfN760dDdy4UXjluZA7YAyPGqsscEH2dDNhzzNU5vpP8dZx66gccj43KvdS1Xmg5jUaLp9-Ug4ynXHFCOhug7U9G_ezoTZNKBNo1ix5/s1600/Sean-Carroll-600x342.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="180" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjeHWjk0PgaRYrpWGry-gwnXW_5rOel8hOf7fFV1EfN760dDdy4UXjluZA7YAyPGqsscEH2dDNhzzNU5vpP8dZx66gccj43KvdS1Xmg5jUaLp9-Ug4ynXHFCOhug7U9G_ezoTZNKBNo1ix5/s320/Sean-Carroll-600x342.png" width="320" /></a></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I’m quite excited for physicist Sean Carroll’s new
book <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><a href="http://www.amazon.com/Big-Picture-Origins-Meaning-Universe/dp/0525954821/smcarroll-20">The Big Picture</a></i>. It seems like a
serious and erudite case for a comprehensive naturalistic worldview. In fact,
I’m quite fond of Carroll, I find him to be one of the most articulate,
intriguing, and respectable popular naturalists today. If more dialogue between
theism and atheism took place with the demeanor that Carroll carries himself
with, I truly believe that some progress would be made in these discussions.
Carroll is one whom all theists should listen to, even if they disagree with
him. </span></div>
<br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In any event, I was perusing his blog <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><a href="http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/">Preposterous Universe</a></i> the other day and
came across his post on “<a href="http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2011/01/17/dysteleological-physicalism/">dysteleological physicalism</a>.” Carroll’s defense of
this ontology is, first, predicated on the idea that it is the job of physics
to tell us what exists—you’ll remember Carroll echoing this sentiment in his
debate with Craig wherein he claimed that our metaphysics must follow our
physics—and thus everything that exists is physical; second, Carroll’s position
rests on the notion that things that exist have no objective purpose or goal,
and therefore have no teleology.</span></div>
<br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It’s no secret, among the common readers of this blog,
that I disagree with both of these sub-ontologies that make up Carroll’s brand
of physicalism. I think that the ontology of the universe is obviously <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">not</i> all that physics tells us, and I
believe that teleology is intrinsic to the universe in the form of final causality.
It is the latter belief that I plan to survey presently. </span></div>
<br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Carroll begins commenting on teleology with a very
pertinent question, and continues from there:</span></div>
<br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"></span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
If the world is made of things, why do they act the
way they do? A plausible answer to this question, elaborated by Aristotle and
part of many people’s intuitive picture of how things work, is that these
things want to be a certain way. they [sic] have a goal, or at least a natural
state of being. Water wants to run downhill; fire wants to rise to the sky.
Humans exist to be rational, or caring, or to glorify God; marriages are meant
to be between a man and a woman.</blockquote>
<br />
<br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"></span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
This teleological, goal-driven, view of the world is
reasonable on its face, but unsupported by science.</blockquote>
<br />
<br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The question of why things act the way they do should
be near the forefront of one’s ontology. While physics can say that X behaves
in such a way, it doesn’t (and cannot) answer the question of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">why</i> it behaves that way in the first
place. And so, to Aristotle, the notion of final causality was one concept that
aided in answering this question. He claimed that we see certain effects
uniformly follow from certain causes, under certain conditions, because the
cause was aimed at producing said effect. (Note that while some of Aristotle’s
examples that he utilized were physically wrong, this doesn’t negate the ontology
of the concepts.) </span></div>
<br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">However, Carroll remarks that this teleology is not
supported by science, not just in the sense that science makes no use of
teleology, but in the sense that science has actually “undermined” it. He goes
on to say the following: At a basic level, all any object ever does is obey
rules — the laws of physics. Thus, for Carroll, the “reason” that an object is in
state Y can be fully explained by the fact that the object was previously in
state X, and, by the laws of physics, state Y is a succession of state X. No
purpose, no goal, just physics.</span></div>
<br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I maintain that this is false, and that Carroll has
only side-stepped the issue by committing a category mistake. Nobody questions
that because of the laws of physics we can explain how state Y was obtained
from state X. That’s all well and good. The question is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">why</i> state Y always succeeds state X. <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Why</i> are certain effects generated from certain causes? <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Why</i> is there causal regularity at all? Carroll’s
attempt to run to the laws of physics for help doesn’t work here, for the laws
of physics only redescribe the behavior of matter, and the behavior of matter
is what we’re looking for explanation for in the first place! </span></div>
<br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">(As a side note, this is a problem I see committed in
education all the time, especially in math and science. A student asks <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">why</i> a certain property or rule holds—like,
for instance, why acceleration is the derivative of velocity—and instead of
answering the question the teacher just says, “because when we take the
derivative of velocity, we arrive at acceleration.” But this obviously is not an
answer to the “why” question. The teacher who does this is merely redescribing
the property, instead of illuminating why the property is even efficacious in
the first place. )</span></div>
<br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">So Carroll’s trust in the laws of physics to
relinquish teleology is misplaced. But it’s even worse than this: it’s false. For
as I’ve argued before, the laws of physics supervene on causally regulated
matter. That is to say, the laws of physics are contingent on uniformly
behaving matter, and thus cannot possibly be that which explains why it behaves
that way. So, what <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">can</i> explain this
behavior? Well, if causal regularity exists in nature—if A’s regularly produce
B’s, under certain conditions—then this can only be because A has an inherent
dispositional tendency to bring about B. For instance, an acorn yields an oak
tree, not because the laws of physics say it will, but because the acorn has an
intrinsic disposition in it as a substance that is directed towards the
generation of an oak tree. Recall that if this were <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">not</i> the case—that is, if substances did not have these dispositions—then
one effect would not follow more frequently from any substance. </span></div>
<br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This concept of a substance harboring a tendency
(sometimes called a “power”) to generate a specific effect is what is known
among Aristotelians as final causality. And yet many philosophers, with no Aristotelian
axe to grind, have returned to this ontology under the name of
Dispositionalism. Again, this ontology is seen as a necessary condition for
causal regularity, and is not at all ad hoc. (Notice as well that final
causality is not an attempt to replace the laws of physics, rather it is only
an explanation given at a deeper metaphysical level that explains why matter
can even behave regularly so as to even be describable by physical laws.)</span></div>
<br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Therefore, it seems that Carroll’s dysteleological
physicalism—at least the dysteleological part—is false. Carroll’s appeal to
laws of physics can only be valid if there is causal regularity, and causal
regularity is valid if and only if substances have final causality—that is, a
goal or end that each substance is disposed towards generating—which is
teleological. Carroll’s statement that “all any object ever does is obey rules”
can only be true if teleology is inherent in matter. Thus, Carroll’s position
actually supervenes on a teleological ontology and therefore cannot in any true
sense be dysteleological. </span></div>
</div>
</div>
Steven Jakehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04753917037685188540noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4866671088220439212.post-72333513967291285512016-02-24T11:37:00.001-08:002016-03-04T07:23:23.983-08:00In defense of Thomism: A reply to The Thinker (Part I)<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgzQ1N7k_cDLrPUwh5kUWq-ih1r3qRioZJ3bb5QVAkGIlLXEvgndogTzGHcc3ZpZVSNrRxbM1-UcBjUTZTU2ECGh82dWp-xseKdMgdB1y9uVPRE6jB9IjRRlR7hoH_1nGeZjAuD4-M7zfFP/s1600/St_Thomas_Aquinas.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="200" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgzQ1N7k_cDLrPUwh5kUWq-ih1r3qRioZJ3bb5QVAkGIlLXEvgndogTzGHcc3ZpZVSNrRxbM1-UcBjUTZTU2ECGh82dWp-xseKdMgdB1y9uVPRE6jB9IjRRlR7hoH_1nGeZjAuD4-M7zfFP/s200/St_Thomas_Aquinas.jpg" width="141" /></a></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">Over at <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><a href="http://www.atheismandthecity.com/">Atheism and the City</a></i>, blogger “The
Thinker” has, over the past few months, been reviewing, chapter by chapter (see
<a href="http://www.atheismandthecity.com/2014/11/an-atheist-reviews-last-superstition.html">here</a>), Philosopher Edward Feser’s <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><a href="http://www.amazon.com/dp/1587314525/?tag=mh0b-20&hvadid=7011615105&hvqmt=b&hvbmt=bb&hvdev=c&ref=pd_sl_6xp9kh0tz4_b">TheLast Superstition: A Refutation of the New Atheism</a>. </i>Feser’s book is a
defense of the Aristotelian-Thomist metaphysic, which, as Feser argues,
necessarily entails the existence of the God of classical theism, thereby
refuting naturalism and atheism. Obviously as a Thomist myself<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>it should come as no surprise to the readers
of this blog (all two of them) that I am sympathetic to Feser’s view and his
book—in fact it was his book <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Aquinas</i>
that first convinced me of Thomism—and therefore I felt the need to reply to
The Thinker’s review of said book. </span></div>
<br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">Before I
begin, though, let me articulate that I am glad that an atheist, and naturalist,
finally took the time to read through Feser’s book—which can be philosophically
heavy at times—and respond. Not that The Thinker is the first atheist to read
Feser’s book and respond, but most atheists are content with reading the “types”
of arguments in Feser’s book through straw-men and caricatures erected by the
likes of the new atheists, deluding themselves into believing that they’ve
understood and refuted said arguments. Contrary to the likes of these, The
Thinker tackles Feser’s book head-on and should be commended for that. </span></div>
<br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">In any
event, I will not be taking the review chapter by chapter as The Thinker does.
Rather, I will be tackling it subject by subject, highlighting what I believe
to be the most crucial aspects of the book, and evading the peripheral issues.
Also, as can be gleamed from the title, my review is split up into two
parts—the Part II dealing with the remaining chapters that The Thinker has,
hitherto, not finished reviewing. In any case, although the aim of this post is
to critique and answer The Thinker’s various objections to Feser’s book, I have
also used this post as cumulative defense of Thomism as such.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></div>
<br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">Let me
also warn the reader that this is an <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">extremely
long</i> post, and I promise that I tried not to belabor it. It was simply the
case that The Thinker posted many reviews which were very lengthy themselves,
and many of his points require a careful and rigorous navigation to be able to
adequately refute. I hope you’re up for the journey. </span></div>
<br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><u><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">Metaphysics</span></u></b></div>
<br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">Form and Essence</span></i></b></div>
<br />
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";"></span><br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">In
Thomism the (substantial) form or essence of a substance is the intrinsic
principle whereby a thing is what it is. To put it another way, when we ask
“what is X?” regarding a specific substance, we’re asking for its essence. That
is to say, we’re asking what is it about X that renders it X and not Y. </span></span></div>
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">In his
review The Thinker misunderstands this and claims that a thing’s form is, “the
shape of the material stuff that the object is made out of.” This is simply
incorrect. While the shape of a substance might be <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">part</i> of a thing’s form, it is not solely the determining factor of
said form. In any event, this was brought to The Thinker’s attention, and
instead of admitting a mistake on his part and altering his review, he just
asked how, then, form <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">should</i> be
defined—though he should be commended for attempting to gain clarity on his
misunderstanding. Now, while this might seem a peripheral issue, it demonstrates
that The Thinker doesn’t adequately understand the view he’s arguing against. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">Now, in
an ontology predicated on form of essence it is argued that substances that are
not identical can still have the same essence. For example, I have four dogs,
and though they each have an individual act of existence, they each share the
same essence, namely, that of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">dogness</i>.
However, The Thinker has a problem with this reasoning:</span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";"></span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
What is
a squirrel’s perfect essence? Does it depend on the species? Or geographic
region? Does the North American tree squirrel have a different “Form,” then
say, the flying squirrels of Asia? And does a squirrel’s perfect essence evolve
as squirrels were evolving and changing or does it suddenly come to be in one
squirrel generation? […] Animals are far too complex and irregular than
geometric shapes to be considered instantiations of “perfect” Forms and
essences.</blockquote>
</div>
</span><br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">The
Thinker’s first problem here is, again, one of poor comprehension. Feser
nowhere claims that essences are perfect; that is, he never claims that, for
instance, there is some “perfect” form of a squirrel or a dog. The Thinker
simply concocted this straw-man out of thin air. So these questions that he
raises in order to poke holes in Feser’s thesis are non-issues. On the
contrary, what Thomists <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">do</i> claim is
that a substance can measure up to or instantiate its essence in a perfect or
imperfect way. To quote Feser:</span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";"></span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Hence, a
squirrel who likes to scamper up trees and gather nuts for the winter (or
whatever) is going to be a more perfect approximation of the squirrel essence
than one which, through habituation or genetic defect prefers to eat toothpaste
spread on Ritz crackers and to lay out ‘spread eagle’ on the freeway.</blockquote>
<br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">So, to
reiterate, Feser is not claiming that there are perfect forms or essences.
Rather, he’s claiming that a substance can be a good approximation of this
essence or a bad approximation. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">That
being said, we can still address The Thinker’s questions here while bypassing
his misunderstanding. His objections seem to be asking a question of
demarcation—that is, he’s asking where the line is drawn that differentiates
the essence of animal or substance A from animal or substance B. The answer is
actually quite simple, animal A’s essence is different from animal B’s essence
when that which makes A in fact A is different from that which makes B in fact
B. The obvious follow up question is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">how</i>
one can actually determine when what makes A itself is different from what
makes B itself. This is a great question, but by asking this question we have
crossed the line into epistemology, and have left the domain of ontology,
wherein essence was originally being addressed. Thus, the person who
promulgates this question as an attack on Thomism has made a category error. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">Another
consideration of this point is that it is probably true that we might have
difficulty differentiating the essence of a tree squirrel from the essence of
flying squirrel—if there even is a difference in essence here. But this
difficulty only highlights a problem in our epistemology of identifying <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">what a thing’s essence actually is</i>. It
does not actually call into question that there are essences at all. The point
being that The Thinker’s objections here do not actually call the ontology of
form or essence into question. Rather, they only call into question our ability
to recognize differences in the forms of two closely related substances. Yet, this
is not something that Feser, or the Thomist, would necessarily disagree with. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">Thus, we
see that the A-T ontology of essences and forms remains unscathed by The
Thinker’s objections. Let us now move on to the foundation of Aristotle’s
ontology: act and potency. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">A</span></i></b><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">ct and Potency</span></i></b></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">The
distinction between actuality (the way a thing <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">actually </i>is) and potentiality (the way a thing potentially could
be) is foundational to an Aristotelian metaphysic. The Aristotelian-Thomist
argues that without this crucial distinction change of any kind would not be
metaphysically possible. It needs to be noted presently that The Thinker
doesn’t actually argue against this crucial act/potency distinction. Rather, he
argues against the apparent <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">consequences</i>
of admitting the reality of the act/potency distinction (i.e. determinism), but
he never argues against them per se. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">In fact,
The Thinker leaves much untouched in the Aristotelian philosophy of nature that
Feser promulgates. He doesn’t argue against formal, material, or efficient
causes. And, as I just said, he doesn’t argue against the act/potency
distinction. In reality, the main piece of Aristotelian ontology that The
Thinker <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">does</i> argue against is that of
final causality. This is important because an Aristotelian philosophy of nature
is the foundation that Feser’s arguments rest on, and yet The Thinker fails to
really argue against much of this philosophy—again with the exception of final
causality—and this renders The Thinker’s case severely weakened. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">In any
event, let us now turn to the issue that The Thinker <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">does</i> spend a fair amount of time addressing, namely that of final
causality. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<br /></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">Final causality</span></i></b></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">Final
causality is arguably the dominant concept in Feser’s book. A majority of
arguments and theses hang on the efficacy and reality of these causes, and thus
they are a crucial part of understanding Feser’s position. Now, the final cause
of a substance, as Aristotle articulates it, is the end or goal that it will
reliably generate. For example, an acorn will reliably generate an oak tree, given
certain favorable conditions. It will not generate a bicycle or a rock. Thus,
the oak is the final cause of the acorn—note that a substance can have multiple
final causes. Now, The Thinker does (attempt to) deal with final causality
in-depth, although unfortunately he misses the mark far more than he hits it.
Let’s start with his first criticisms:</span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";"></span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Suppose
I get into a car accident. What's its final cause? We could say that the rain
on the road and perhaps my mistake were the material and efficient causes that
made my car skid off the road, but how can anyone discern a final cause from
this? It's easy to find a final cause when speaking of man-made objects like
rubber balls, but it's sheer speculation to say that things like a car accident
happen for a purpose. It's our tendency to think that everything happens for a
reason that we attribute final causes to things (without even knowing their
technical terminology in the Aristotelian sense). And this opens up other
problems as well. If there is a final cause to my car accident that I'm not
aware of, in the sense that nature has conspired against me for some purpose,
how can I be said to be responsible in any way, if I am merely an actor in
nature's drama?</blockquote>
<br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">The
Thinker has already, again, demonstrated that he doesn’t adequately comprehend
the material he’s reviewing. Final causality, as Aristotle articulated it, is
not predicated of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">events</i>. That is, he
didn’t say that events in life, like car accidents, have an end-goal, or
purpose, in mind. Rather, Aristotle’s ontology of final causes was meant to
apply to <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">substances</i>. So The Thinker’s
comprehension here is simply confused, and since his argument is predicated on
such confusion, it can likewise be dismissed. (What makes this even worse for
The Thinker is that this objection was brought to his attention <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">months before</i> he even began his reviews,
and yet he still decided to promulgate this faulty argument based on his
inadequate comprehension.) </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">Moreover,
when this inadequate understanding was brought to The Thinker’s attention, yet
again, in the comments section of his Chapter 2 post, he did not admit fault
nor did he subsequently adjust his review so as to not argue against a caricature
of Feser’s position. Rather, he simply stated that he had <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">also</i> addressed final causality of substances. But The Thinker seems
oblivious to the fact that when you straw-man an individual’s position, this
fallacy is not swept under the rug simply because you <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">didn’t</i> straw-man it in another instance. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">In any
case, it gets worse for The Thinker, because he commits the same fallacy <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">again</i> in his review:</span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";"></span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
There is
no end goal in evolution. The process is haphazard, whereby successful
mutations result in traits that aid an organism in its environment, and lots
more mutations don't, which causes immense suffering and death. In the 3.8
billion year history of life on earth, there were for example, at least <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extinction_event" target="_blank"><span style="color: windowtext;">5 mass extinctions</span></a> where up to 95% of the
life on earth went extinct, and <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/09/opinion/sunday/prehistorys-brilliant-future.html?_r=0" target="_blank"><span style="color: windowtext;">over 99 percent</span></a> of
all species that have ever lived are now extinct. This doesn't seem very
teleological to me, and is exactly what we'd expect a purposeless process to
look like.</blockquote>
<br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">Again we
see here that The Thinker is applying final causality to a <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">process</i> such as evolution, when we’ve seen that it is meant to
apply to <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">substances</i>. (While there are
some Thomists who have disputed whether <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">some</i>
processes or events might be said to exhibit final causality, this is not a
part of what Feser is defending in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">TLS</i>.)
And what’s amusing about this is that <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">this</i>
is the section where The Thinker claims to finally be faithfully applying final
causality to substances and addressing Feser’s ontology, yet he simply reverts
back to processes and thus fails to engage the material honestly. So, we can
simply disregard The Thinker’s tangent here, since it, once again, caricatures
Feser’s position and commits the straw-man fallacy. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">Nevertheless,
The Thinker continues his confused tangent on final causes:</span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";"></span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
[Feser]
puts such confidence in Aristotle's metaphysics and assures us over and over
again that they cannot be refuted, but we fail to see Feser taking on any
strong arguments against them. We're simply just assured that those criticisms
don't work. […] Where’s the killer argument that’s suppose [sic] to prove final
causes exist? I don’t see one. </blockquote>
<br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">Once
again these criticisms only demonstrate that The Thinker hasn’t read the book
he’s reviewing closely enough. First, Feser <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">does</i>
deal with arguments against final causality. On page 180 Feser deals with the
criticism that final causality is circular, tautological and meaningless. Second,
Feser <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">does</i> provide a “killer”
argument in favor of final causality in light of the fact that efficient
causality—and also causal regularity—necessitates and is a sufficient condition
for final causality. That is to say, Feser makes the argument that if causal
regularity exists in nature, of which it surely does, then final causes cannot
be avoided. So The Thinker, to put it bluntly, simply doesn’t know what he’s
talking about. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">Unfortunately
The Thinker’s not finished attempting to lay the smackdown on final causality.
He has more sophisticated objections up his sleeve:</span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";"></span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Saying
that the moon revolving around the earth was its <i>purpose </i>—<i> </i>or
was what it was <i>for </i>—<i> </i>is to simply just take the
effect of a natural event and label that as its "goal." It's typical
ass-backwards type thinking. You can do that with anything that happens: I
farted as a result of eating Mexican food. Well then,<i> that was the
goal </i>of the Mexican food! See how that works? </blockquote>
<br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">Wow.
This is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">again</i> a straw-man of Feser’s
position—and a bad one at that—because The Thinker cannot seem to comprehend
that <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">final causality is not predicated of
events</i>. This is now the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">third</i>
time The Thinker has done this so far—again, what makes this even worse is that
The Thinker was warned about this mischaracterization of the Aristotelian
position <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">before</i> he even began writing
his review! </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">Sadly, The
Thinker actually continues along the same vein trying to debunk final causality
predicating his objections on more and more <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">events
</i>and<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> processes</i>—e.g., mutation,
events involving people and biological life, the universe moving toward a state
etc. At this point I’m finished highlighting each and every straw-man that he
commits over and over. There’s no need to beat a dead horse. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">In any
event, at some point The Thinker <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">finally</i>
tries to level an objection at final causality that doesn’t fall victim to
fallacy or straw-man:</span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";"></span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
All one
has to acknowledge is certain processes tend to lead to certain outcomes such
that saying "<i>A</i> reliably brings about <i>B</i>" is
perfectly compatible with unguided, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dysteleology" target="_blank"><span style="color: windowtext;">dysteleological</span></a> laws of physics. In
this sense, "final causes" are perfectly compatible with
naturalism. The world actually makes <i>more </i>sense this way. What
Feser is doing is typical religious teleological thinking by taking the effect
or result from some series of events or physical processes, and then asserting
that the result is what those events or processes were for, as opposed to them
just happening without any goal or ultimate purpose. </blockquote>
<br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">Note
that this objection is still technically not accurately representing Feser’s
position—The Thinker is still talking of ‘processes” and “purpose” here when,
again ad nauseum, these have absolutely nothing to do with final causality.
However, there seems to be <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">some</i>
nugget of an argument here that can be teased out and addressed. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">First,
The Thinker’s mention of “dysteleological laws” here is confused.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Feser would actually agree that the laws of
nature and physics are non-teleological, and he never claimed otherwise. What
Feser <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">has</i> claimed is that the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">substances</i> that the laws refer to <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">do</i> exhibit teleology. So the talk is not
about whether or not the laws of physics are teleological, of course they’re
not; laws are mere descriptions. The talk is about whether substances are
teleological, and so far The Thinker has not addressed this question <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">at all</i>. So, The Thinker’s misnomer of
“dysteleological laws” doesn’t even make sense, and even if it <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">did</i> make sense, it is completely
peripheral to Feser’s arguments. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">Second, The
Thinker is correct that final causality qua causality is not directly
incompatible with naturalism. One could be a naturalist and affirm the
existence of final causes, though they would run into a great difficulty
explaining why things have final causes in the first place—we’ll see why this
is the case when we survey Aquinas’ Fifth Way below. But observe that this is
still not an argument <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">against</i> final
causes. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">In this
section on final causality we’ve seen that, quite honestly, The Thinker simply
has little to no idea what he’s talking about. Every, yes <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">every</i>, objection he attempted to launch against Feser’s defense of
final causality caricatured and straw-manned his position. And seeing as how
final causality is probably the dominant concept in Feser’s book, you would
think that any review attempting to adequately deal with the theses in said
book would be able to at least accurately articulate this crucial concept.
Unfortunately, this is not the case for The Thinker, and one wonders why we should
subsequently survey <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">any</i> of his
remaining arguments when he’s already demonstrated that his comprehension of
the Aristotelian position is so poor. In any event, we will trudge on. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<br /></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><u><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">The existence of God</span></u></b></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">The analogy of
being and conceptions of God</span></i></b></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">Thomists
claim that because God must be metaphysically simple—that is, he is not
composed of parts either physically or metaphysically—then the characteristics
that we attribute to Him must, in God, be identical. However, since these
characteristics are not identical to us, then when we attribute them to God we
must be attributing them analogously. Note that we can’t just say that they <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">don’t</i> apply to God at all, even
analogously, since these characteristics are entailed and necessitated by
logical deduction—so the Thomist would claim. Now, here’s what The Thinker has
to say about this doctrine of analogy:</span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";"></span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
If the concepts we apply to god, like being
personal and having emotions, don't even make sense in an analogous way in
terms of how god <i>really is</i>, then the Thomistic concept of god is too
vague and mysterious to be taken seriously. […] The Thomist god is full of
mystery, and the analogies give us little to no clue as to what god <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">really</i> is. </blockquote>
<br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">This is
an extremely confused statement by The Thinker. First of all, the doctrine of
analogy is precisely predicated on the fact that we don’t know “how [G]od <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">really</i> is.” So of course we wouldn’t
expect an analogy of God to also be a univocal attribute of God, and thus we
wouldn’t expect it to tell us how God really is—<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">that’s the point of an analogy</i>! So The Thinker here is expecting
something from an analogy that he shouldn’t be expecting in the first place,
and is committing a category mistake in the process.</span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">Second, an
analogous attribution itself necessitates a vague (though not necessarily so
mysterious) application—again, that’s what an analogy <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">is</i>. But this should not at all present any problem for the
conception of God, unless one simply states that analogies are invalid forms of
attribution, which would be an extreme and, I maintain, an indefensible
position to espouse. So The Thinker simply doesn’t have a leg to stand on here.
His objection is only efficacious if we assume that predicating something by
analogy is wrong-headed, and he has demonstrated that this is the case. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">The Thinker
subsequently attempts to demonstrate the incoherency of the concept of God by
bringing up attributes like timelessness, personality, reason, will and
obligation, and wonders how these concepts can be predicated of God in a
consistent and coherent fashion. But again, the problem, with the supposed lack
of coherency of the amalgamation of these concepts, only arises if we try to
predicate these concepts <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">literally</i> or
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">univocally</i> to God. But since this is
not what the Thomist does, then The Thinker’s objections hold no weight. That
is, his objections are predicated on a position that Feser does not hold to,
and thus The Thinker is once again caricaturing Feser’s position. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">The
Thinker continues:</span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";"></span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
And
lastly, sustaining the universe “at every moment” sounds a lot like
occasionalism, which says that all events are taken to be caused directly by
god.</blockquote>
<br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">I
understand why Feser’s position might “sound” like <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/occasionalism/">occasionalism</a> to The
Thinker, but it’s not. By claiming that the universe is at every moment
sustained by God only means that God is the ultimate cause, not that God is the
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">immediate</i> cause of everything that
exists. This doesn’t mean that when one billiard ball seemingly knocks into
another billiard ball that God moved the first and, instead of the first
subsequently moving the second, God moved the second. Rather, it means that any
causal series will ultimately terminate in God as the first cause. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">In any
event, for occasionalists like Malebranche, there was no such thing as
causation in itself, since everything was really just the result of God as an
immediate tinkerer. For the occasionalist, God directly causes the first
billiard ball’s velocity and subsequently directly causes the second billiard
ball to accelerate when the two balls make contact, instead of the first
billiard ball really causing the motion of the second. Feser does not adhere to
this position. He regards substances in the universe as genuine causes who
derive their own causal power from the first cause, namely, God. So, The
Thinker is simply mistaken here in his attempt to attribute occasionalism to
Feser. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">The
Thinker continues his comments on our conceptualization of God:</span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">When
questioned, the Thomist will say that our finite minds can't fully grasp the
true wonder of god. This response makes me respect the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ignosticism"><span style="color: windowtext;">ignostics</span></a> who
hold that there are no coherent concepts of god to even believe in, and the
Thomist concept of god adds further mystery to the already incoherent concepts
of god. I see no reason to take the ontology of such a god seriously, <i>especially </i>given
the lackluster evidence for god.</span></blockquote>
</div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">The
problem here is that The Thinker has not actually demonstrated any incoherency
in the conception of God in the first place—since his attempted objections
ignored the doctrine of analogy. And unless, and until, he does so his
objections in this vain will continue to be vacuous and question-begging. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<br /></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">Aquinas’ First Way</span></i></b></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">In
Feser’s book he surveys Thomas Aquinas’ First Way (of proving God’s existence).
This proof begins by noting that evident to our senses is change, and by
“change” Aquinas simply means the actualization of a potential. It is then
argued that any actualizer <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">X </i>of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Y</i>’s current existence must also be
existent. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But we now need a concurrent
actualizer of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">X</i>, and so on and so
forth. However, argues Aquinas, and subsequently Feser, this chain of actualizers
(what Feser calls an essentially ordered series) cannot go on to infinity. Why
not? Because each member in this causal series has no actual power to continue
in existence on its own, but concurrently derives said power from each
preceding member. But the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">source</i> of
existence and actualization must be located <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">at
some point in this series</i>. Indeed, it must be located in the first member,
who cannot be a composite of actuality and potentiality, but must be <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">pure</i> actuality. And this first member is
what Aquinas calls God. (Note that this is an extremely summarized version of
the argument.) Let’s see what The Thinker had to say about this argument:</span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";"></span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Feser
reiterates the idea that essentially ordered causes are all simultaneous, which
I’ve argued is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">not</i> the case. […]This
all sets the stage for the argument itself, but without having established the
real ontology of simultaneous causes, which is crucial for making the actual
argument, I don't think Feser can establish it on good footing. He simply
hasn't given us a true example of simultaneous causes. </blockquote>
<br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">The
Thinker is confused about the priority of an essentially ordered series. While The
Thinker is correct that Feser does mention, in Aquinas’ example of the hand
that moves the stick which moves the stone, that the causes are simultaneous
with their effects, this is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">not</i> the
crucial aspect of the argument. Here it is, from Feser himself:</span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";"></span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
For
nothing in Aquinas’s argument rides on the question of whether the motion of a
stick and that of the stone it is pushing are strictly simultaneous, any more
than it rides on a hand’s really being a “first” or non-instrumental cause in
the relevant sense (which it obviously is not since the hand itself is moved by
the arm).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The example is intended merely
as an illustration to jog the reader’s understanding of abstract concepts like
instrumental causality and conserving causality.</blockquote>
<br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";"></span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
It is
worth emphasizing that it is precisely this instrumental nature of second
causes, the dependence of whatever causal power they have on the causal
activity of the first cause, that is the key to the notion of a causal series
per se.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That the members of such a
series exist simultaneously, and that the series does not regress to infinity,
are of secondary importance.</blockquote>
<br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">Thus,
Feser’s point in highlighting the importance of essentially ordered series is
that of instrumentality, and not simultaneity. And therefore The Thinker’s
claim that simultaneity is “crucial” for Feser’s argument is false—at least as
Feser himself has articulated his position. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">The
Thinker continues his objections by mentioning the philosophy of eternalism,
which is supposedly entailed by a block universe. The supposed problem that the
block universe creates is that the universe can now be eternal, with each
“moment” of time in said universe to be equally real. Thus, the universe is
eternal, which means it requires no cause, and since each moment is as existent
as the next, there is no motion and change, and therefore no need for a chain
of causality that leads to a first member. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">However,
these objections do not work. First, an eternal universe does not solve the
problem—in fact, Aquinas actually allowed for the possibility of an eternal
universe. The Thinker thinks this <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">is</i>
a problem because “[i]t’s logically impossible that an eternally existing
universe that never came into being <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">couldn’t</i>
have existed.” But this is pure question-begging on his part. While an
eternally existing universe cannot come into being in any temporal sense, this
does not entail that it is therefore necessary. Why not? Well, because duration
of existence does not alter the essence or nature of an existent, nor does it
alter whether something is a composite of act/potency. That is to say, a
thing’s nature does not all of a sudden become necessary simply because of how
long it exists, whether it be for a second, or for an eternity. Therefore, if
the reason for the universe’s existence is not contained within its
nature—which it isn’t—or if the universe is a composite of act and
potency—which it is—then the universe is contingent, and thus no matter how
long it exists, it remains contingent. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">Second,
even if the block universe <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">did</i> exist
and was a valid description of our own universe, this still does not make the
universe necessary. For while there would be no change in the universe, the
universe in itself would still not contain the reason for its own existence,
and therefore it would still be contingent. In fact, The Thinker makes my point
for me when he says that we can still imagine (read: conceive) of the block
universe not existing. For if we can conceive of the block universe not
existing then the explanation for said universe’s existence is not contained
within its nature, and thus the universe is not necessary. So, even a denial of
change in the universe altogether—which is extremely radical in itself—would
still not lead away from the need for a First Cause. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">The
Thinker continues:</span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";"></span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
A
static, eternal universe is, in some sense, the ultimate brute fact. And if you try to appeal to some sort of top-down, timeless "vertical cause" (whatever the hell that means) you make the universe as necessary because it could not have been any other way.</blockquote>
<br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">This is
more of the same. First, The Thinker needs to make an actual argument for the
reality of brute facts, which he has not done here, and thus he is only begging
the question. (I have argued here that brute facts are logically impossible.)
Second, the claim that by admitting a vertical cause (meaning non-temporal) of
the universe this entails that said universe is thereby necessary is simply
ridiculous and confused. There is no principle that if <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">X</i> is the non-temporal cause of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Y</i>,
then <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Y</i> is therefore necessary.
Perhaps the reason for this non-sequitur is that the block universe “could not
have been any other way.” But, again, this does not make the universe
necessary, since it remains true, on Thomism, that the essence of the universe is not
identical to its existence. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">The
Thinker continues with his next objection:</span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";"></span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Second, Feser
is trying to apply act and potency references on what happens in the universe,
to the universe, making what many atheists argue is the fallacy of composition.
We know that within the universe, things have to act on other things to make
them change into their potentials (that's why there cannot be free will), but
outside of time and space, such notions make no sense. </blockquote>
<br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">There
exist a couple of problems here. First, I haven’t read Feser’s book in a while,
but I don’t believe he actually applies the act/potency distinction to the
universe itself. His (Aquinas’) argument only plays off of the reality of an
essentially ordered series of causes. Therefore, I believe that The Thinker has
straw-manned Feser once again. But, just to be certain of this, here it is from
Feser himself: the argument [Aquinas’ First Way] does not rest on any premise
about the universe as a whole. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">Second,
even if Feser <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">did</i> apply the
act/potency distinction to the universe, it hasn’t actually been demonstrated
that this commits the fallacy of composition. For keep in mind that not <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">every</i> inference from a part to a whole
commits said fallacy. For example, if every fiber in a rug is wool, then it
does logically follow that the rug as a whole is wool. The point is that if
Feser simply reasoned from parts of the universe <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">to</i> the universe, this does not automatically commit him to the
fallacy of composition, rather, it needs to actually be demonstrated that the
fallacy was committed, and this The Thinker does not accomplish (see below). </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">Third,
The Thinker’s last point, about potentials being actualized only making sense
temporally, necessarily assumes an ontology of temporal causation. However, he
has not demonstrated that causality entails temporality, and I have argued that
it doesn’t. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">The
Thinker constructs his next objection which is a vestige of his previous
argument:</span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";"></span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Third, a
timeless, unchangeable being of pure act and no potential
"whatsoever" cannot become a physical being (as the Christian god
does) or a creator. Going from a potential creator to an actual creator
actualizes a potential; it requires change.</blockquote>
<br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">Again,
The Thinker is assuming an ontology of temporal causality which needs to be
demonstrated, and has not. There are many sorts of causal ontologies that are
not temporal: simultaneous causation, bottom-up causation, and top-down
causation. So The Thinker’s objection here is simply false, and even if it
wasn’t necessarily false, he hasn’t done the metaphysical legwork to even
attempt to prove it true. He has merely asserted his position.</span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">The Thinker’s
next objection ensues—I will quote him at length:</span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";"></span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Forth [sic],
the whole concept of something non-physical interacting with and having causal
impact on the physical is marred with conceptual and evidential difficulties.
Take for example the problems with dualistic interactionism, a theory of the
mind popular with many theists which says that the mind is non-physical has the
potential to interact with and cause the physical body to do things. How can
something with no size, shape, location, mass, motion or solidarity act on
bodies, or to put it in the current context, act on anything physical, but
especially without violating the conservation of energy and quantum field theory?
To quote from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy using the popular analogy
of the freight train used by Feser, ‘To suppose that non-physical minds can
move bodies is like supposing that imaginary locomotives can pull real
boxcars.’</blockquote>
<br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">This is
actually a decent objection, and one that I don’t believe has been addressed
enough. First, let me say that simply because we might have “difficulty”
understanding how the non-physical can interact with the physical, this alone
is not a knock-down argument against such an interaction. That is, there is no
inherent contradiction when speaking of something non-physical somehow being
causally related to something physical. So even if we heed The Thinker’s point
here it doesn’t give anything like a substantive argument <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">against</i> Feser’s thesis, especially since Feser’s argument is
deductive, and therefore if the premises are valid then the conclusion follows
necessarily. Thus, if Feser’s argument is valid, then his conclusion is not
called into question simply because we have trouble thinking about a specific
interaction. (Just like a mathematical proof which demonstrates that the sum of
natural numbers converges to a finite number cannot be invalidated simply
because we have difficulty understanding how this is possible—and there is such
a proof.)</span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">Second, such
a difficulty really only arises if one assumes a deterministic ontology of
causation, like that of one billiard ball knocking into another. For this
ontology does not exhaust the metaphysics of causation. There are (as I argued
above) many different types of causation: simultaneous causation, bottom-up
causation, top-down causation, formal causation, material causation etc. Now in
many of these types of causation there is no physical interaction between the
cause and effect. Therefore it seems that physical interaction is not a
necessary condition for causation in the first place, and thus The Thinker’s
objection here loses any force it may have had. (We see again how important an
ontology of causation is, and The Thinker’s failure to be rigorous and
exhaustive in this sense has led to a lot of his objections missing their
target completely.) </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">What
we’ve seen here from The Thinker in his challenges to Aquinas’ First Way is
more of the same. The Thinker at times misconstrues Feser’s actual arguments
and erects straw-men, begs the question in a myriad of ways, and fails to put
forward a competing metaphysic that would be necessary to dethrone Feser’s arguments.
His objections, then, do not seem efficacious. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">The
Thinker subsequently tackles Aquinas’ Second Way to prove God’s existence.
However, since many of the objections he espouses against this argument are
very similar, and can be answered in the same way, to Aquinas’ First Way, I
will skip it for the sake of (attempted) brevity. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<br /></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">Aquinas Fifth Way</span></i></b></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">Aquinas’
Fifth Way of proving God’s existence is based on the reality of final causes.
Remember from above that a final cause of a substance is the end or goal that
it is has a tendency to generate. Now, a cause cannot actually <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">be</i> causally efficacious unless it
actually exists, and here we run into a problem. For how, then, can a final
cause actually be a cause if it doesn’t actually exist yet? For example, an
acorn has an oak as (one of) its final causes. But the oak doesn’t yet exist,
only the acorn. So how can the oak actually be a genuine cause if it doesn’t
exist? Well we actually <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">do</i> have
examples where a final cause doesn’t exist in a substance, but exists in an
intellect. An example that Feser gives is that of a builder. See, before a
builder builds a house, the form of the house is contained in his intellect. So
here the final cause does exist as a form in the intellect of a builder. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">But,
what about final causes that are not similar to artifacts like buildings, like
the oak we mentioned earlier? Well there are only a few possibilities: (1) it
might exist in the natural object itself; (2) it exists in a human intellect;
(3) it exists in an intellect outside the natural world altogether; (4) or
final causes don’t exist at all. We have already explained why (1) doesn’t
work—the form of the oak doesn’t already exist in the acorn. We know that (4)
cannot be true since causal regularity necessitates final causality (see
above). (2) cannot be true since we are not the ones that make acorns turn into
oaks. Therefore, (4) is our <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">only</i>
option, and thus we are led to an intellect which exists outside of the natural
order. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">Now the
Fifth Way obviously rests completely on the efficacy of final causality, and we
already saw above that The Thinker was completely confused when it came to the
nature of said causality and consistently committed straw-men. So we should
already expect that his objections will follow suit. And, unfortunately, he
doesn’t disappoint:</span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";"></span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
So here
Aristotle's notion of final causes plays a significant role in establishing the
case for the Fifth Way. But as I've argued in my review of the last chapter,
Feser has not plausibly established teleological final causes to exist. He
simply takes the latter effects of a series of natural events and determines
that to be the final cause. There's no rigorous proof that the earlier events
were "directed" towards their effects in the same sense we think of a
rubber ball being made for the purposes of being a child's toy. Things in
nature just happen, and whatever their effects, are their effects.</blockquote>
<br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">We saw
above that this is blatantly false. Feser does not simply arbitrarily label the
effect of an event (final causality is not presented as applying to events!)
the final cause. This is again a straw-man of the Aristotelian position. Feser
states that the final cause of a substance is the end or goal that it has an
inherent tendency to generate—and this is completely different than what The
Thinker has fallaciously attributed to him. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">Moreover,
The Thinker claims that final causality is superfluous, for effects can simply <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">be</i> with no rhyme or reason. But this
only begs the question against Feser, for he argues that final causality is a
necessary condition for efficient causality and therefore is also a necessary
condition for causal regularity. Thus, in order for The Thinker’s point to be
efficacious, he needs to demonstrate exactly <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">how</i> causal regularity can even be possible sans final causes. But
this is the very thing he cannot do since his claim is that he has no such
explanation, and needs not an explanation! Therefore The Thinker’s position
undermines itself. And consider all this on top of the fact that even if The
Thinker’s position were correct, he hasn’t even argued for it! He simply baldly
asserts that effects can <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">just be</i>, no
substantiation given.</span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">The
Thinker continues:</span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";"></span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Additionally,
from the Aristotelian perspective, how could we even distinguish a series of
events having a final cause versus a series of events that didn't? How is the
notion of final causes even falsifiable when a variation of final causes is
compatible with dysteleological naturalism [?]</blockquote>
<br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">(I’m
getting tired of acknowledging this, as I’m sure <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">you</i> are of reading it, but note again that The Thinker is applying
final causality to <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">events</i>, which is a
straw-man.) Now, here The Thinker seems to ask a decent question (minus the
straw-man) regarding how we could even distinguish substances which have final
causes from substances that do not—I use the word “seems” here because Feser
actually does answer this question, had The Thinker bothered to read a little
more closely. If a substance did not have a final cause then no effect would
obtain any more than another, and if this happened then there would be no
causal regularity—since causal regularity necessitates that effects regularly
and reliably obtain. Therefore if causal regularity exists, then final causes
exist, and if final causes did not exist, then causal regularity would not
exist. <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">That</i> is how we distinguish
between final causes obtaining and not obtaining—and it also demonstrates how
final causality is, in principle, falsifiable. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">The
Thinker then promulgates his next objection:</span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";"></span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
The
regularity Feser thinks implies the existence of god is better explained by the
laws of physics. It is the unbreakable laws of physics which determine the
moon's revolution around the sun (as well as the planet that struck earth over
4 billion years ago that resulted in our moon being formed).</blockquote>
<br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">There’s
a big problem with this objection. First, the laws of physics don’t determine
anything, and certainly don’t determine the behavior of any substance in the
natural world. The Thinker simply has his philosophy backwards. It is the
behavior of substances that determines the laws of physics, and not the other
way around, as The Thinker argues. The laws of physics merely describe the way
that matter already tends to behave, and a mere description of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">X</i> cannot itself determine the behavior
of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">X</i>, especially since a description
is not anything concrete or actual that can <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">determine</i>
anything. So The Thinker just doesn’t know what he’s talking about, and
certainly has his philosophy of science all mixed up. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">But, The
Thinker’s not finished, for he has another (poor) objection:</span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";"></span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
This is,
I think, what happens when you pile garbage on top of garbage. You start from
false premises, such as teleological final causes existing, and then from there
you find a problem and try to resolve it by imagining an intelligence guiding
it all, which as I've argued above is ludicrous. But Feser says it's
"conceptually impossible that there could be genuine final causation
without a sustaining intellect." (116) Well, the whole point, Mr. Feser,
is that there are no genuine final causes in nature in the Aristotelian sense.
There are simply things that happen by way of the laws of physics that we
pattern seeking primates interpret as final causes because we're prone to look
for intentionality and see purpose when there isn't any due to our evolutionary
past. There is no knock down argument that Feser gives against the possibility
of there not being dysteleological final causes or a sustaining intellect. He
just asserts that without god the universe would just fly apart as soon as god
ceased to exist.</blockquote>
<br />
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">Wow,
this is complete and total irony. The Thinker is accusing Feser’s arguments of
being the result of garbage piled upon more garbage when it in fact it is this
turn of phrase that so eloquently describes The Thinker’s own position, as well
as his review. He hasn’t understood the basic metaphysics underlying Feser’s
arguments and thus The Thinker’s arguments, which are predicated on this poor
comprehension, are simply <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">laughable</i>
because they’re not wrong, they’re <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">not
even</i> wrong. The Thinker’s not even having the same discussion with Feser,
because the former simply does not understand the foundation of the discussion
itself. So, garbage piled on top of garbage? Yes, this sounds about right. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">Second, recall
that The Thinker has given absolutely no substance to the claim that there are
no final causes in nature. Has he asserted this? Yes. But has he given any
substantive argument for this assertion that doesn’t beg the question or erect
a straw-man? No, he hasn’t. This claim, then, can simply be dismissed. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">Third,
The Thinker claims that there are no final causes, only “things that happen by
way of the laws of physics.” We saw above that this is false. Things don’t
happen <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">by</i> the laws of physics, the
laws of physics “happen” <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">because of</i>
the behavior of things. Laws of nature presuppose a nature that behaves, and
thus The Thinker again has his philosophy backwards. Moreover, if these “things
that happen” happen with regularity and reliability, as they surely do, then
this means that effects reliably obtain. Now if effects reliably obtain, then
substances have a tendency to generate those effects, and this means that these
substances have an inherent disposition towards those effects. And this, ladies
and gentlemen, means that substances have final causes. The Thinker can try all
he wants to deny them, but his arguments are vacuous, and only lead back to the
very thing he is trying to deny. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">Fourth,
we have seen that Feser <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">does</i> in fact
give a knock down argument in favor of final causality. That argument being
that since final causality is a necessary condition for causal regularity, then
in order for the latter to be efficacious, the former must be as well. (I
sincerely apologize for sounding like a broken record on the topic of final
causality. Unfortunately, this is what happens when a person does not adequately
comprehend a certain concept, and subsequently tries to level arguments against
their own constructed straw-man.)</span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">This
wraps up The Thinker’s attempted arguments against Aquinas’ Fifth Way. The
attentive reader may have noticed something quite peculiar, namely that The
Thinker didn’t even touch (let alone refute) Aquinas’ argument that final
causality necessitates an intellect that exists outside the natural world. That
is, The Thinker didn’t argue against the Fifth Way at all! Rather, The Thinker
simply launched more (and really the same) objections against the notion of
final causality, leaving the argument itself unscathed. Now obviously since the
Fifth Way rests on the efficacy of final causality, it is not illogical or
unreasonable to argue against said causality. However, The Thinker had already
devoted a section in his review to final causality and could have left his
criticisms of final causality in that section alone. The fact that he needed to
promulgate these objections <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">again</i>
without actually dealing with the meat of the argument demonstrates that The
Thinker <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">doesn’t actually have any
substantive arguments against Aquinas’ Fifth Way. </i>And, again, the arguments
that he did launch, against final causality, were wrought with the exact same
fallacies as his section on the same topic. The Thinker has an extremely poor
understanding regarding what Feser actually expounds about final causality, and
this leads to innumerable straw-men that get erected, as well as
question-begging here and there. And where The Thinker seemingly gives a
coherent objection, we instead find that this objection has already been
answered in the text by Feser himself. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif";">What
makes this even more amusing, especially given The Thinker’s protruding
arrogance throughout this review, are the questions he asks at the end of this
section of his review: “But can refuting Feser really be this easy? Am I
totally missing something here?” I’ll leave you, the reader, to answer The
Thinker’s questions for yourself. </span></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<br /></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<br /></div>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<br /></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
Steven Jakehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04753917037685188540noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4866671088220439212.post-72607182201905635212016-02-01T06:42:00.000-08:002016-02-01T09:59:00.305-08:00Atheists and the cosmological argument<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Arguments for God’s existence have been around at
least since the time of the Pre-Socratics, and these arguments have taken many
different forms. However, the argument that is usually seen as prima facie most
compelling—even if one is not persuaded by it—is that of the Cosmological
Argument (CA). Although this argument has taken many different forms, the
thrust of the argument basically rests on the premise that the natural world
participates, in some form or another, in a chain of contingency, and that this
chain must admit of a first member that is not itself contingent (i.e., the
First Cause, Unmoved Mover, Necessary Being etc.). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Throughout the ages, the CA has been promulgated by individuals
like Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Avicenna, Aquinas, Bonaventure, Leibniz,
Clarke, Pruss, Craig etc., and while all of these arguments differ in a myriad
of ways, they are all very similar in that they attempt to deduce a First Cause
which is responsible for causing (and upholding) the existence of the natural
world. Unfortunately, atheists today do not spend much time differentiating and
comprehending the subtleties and nuances of the different cosmological
arguments. Rather, a lot of them tend to believe that philosophers and skeptics
like David Hume, Bertrand Russell, and J. L. Mackie have refuted these
arguments and put them to bed long ago. The atheists subsequently claim that it’s
only the desperate theists grasping at straws, trying to justify their
delusional faith, who put forward these antiquated and failed arguments for
God’s existence. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">But is this really the case, though? Have atheists
past and present laid rest to the very argument innumerable theists have
promulgated time and time again throughout the ages? Have they simply been
beating a dead horse, the carcass of which theists try to continually
resurrect? I do not believe so, and I don’t say this because I happen to
personally find the CA to be persuasive. Instead, I assert that atheists have
actually demonstrated their track record for adequately comprehending the
arguments is extremely poor. Why do I claim this? Well because the objection against
the CA most promulgated by famous atheists over the years is the old adage
which states that “If everything needs a cause, then what caused God?” (The
point of this article is not to answer this confused objection, which I have
done <a href="http://christian-agnostic.blogspot.com/2014/01/who-created-god.html">here</a>.) However—and this is important here—no theist who has promulgated
the CA, or at least none listed above, has ever used the premise “everything
has a cause.” And yet this is literally the most common objection famous
atheists have paraded out as the be-all end-all of the CA discussion. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">In case you don’t believe me, or think I exaggerate
presently, here is a survey of a multitude of well-known atheists (old and new)
parroting this very (false) premise:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">[The CA] goes. ‘Everything that exists has a cause.
Therefore, the entirety of physical existence itself had to have had a cause.
Therefore, God exists.’ (Greta Christina)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">[T]he postulate of a designer or creator only raises
the unanswerable question of who designed the designer or created the creator.
(Christopher Hitchens)</span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Cosmological Argument[…]in its simplest form
states that since everything must have a cause the universe must have a
cause—namely, God[.] (Daniel Dennett)</span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">If everything must have a cause, then God must have a
cause. (Bertrand Russell)</span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Every existing thing has a cause, and every cause must
be caused by a prior cause, which in turn must be caused by a still prior
cause, and so on[.] (George Smith)</span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The argument runs more or less like this: everything that
exists has a cause; space and time exist; space and time must, therefore, have
been caused […] If God created the universe, what created God? (Sam Harris)</span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Whatever exists must have a cause or reason of its
existence[.] (David Hume)</span></blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The point, again, is that no version of the CA is
predicated on the premise that “everything has a cause.” Therefore, the very
question “if everything has a cause, then what caused God?” is itself a
caricature and straw-man of the theistic position. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">What’s even more telling about the above quotes is
that when discussing the CA in published literature—as a majority of these
individuals did—these atheists did not actually quote a single theist who had
actually defended said argument—and this is one reason why the straw-men abound.
You would think that when attacking position X, it would help to actually quote
those who have articulated X to their own satisfaction. And yet this is act of
charitability with regards to sophisticated dialogue is rarely done by the
atheist interlocutors. This, to me, is indicative of the fact that atheists probably
have not actually <i>read</i> much of the
literature of the opposition, which stems from, again, assuming that the
preceding atheists have already done all the metaphysical legwork required in
refuting these arguments—e.g., “Hume has already refuted argument X, so why
should I bother reading up on it?” Moreover—for those that actually own the
books of Russell, Dennett, Hitchens, Harris, and Hume quoted from above—you’ll
notice that many of these atheists only devote less than a page—some of them a
measly paragraph—to an attempted refutation of the CA. That is, the argument
many theists have devoted literally <i>thousands</i>
of pages to has been dismissed within literally a few dozen words. Is this
really intellectual sophistication on the part of the atheist movement? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Please note that I don’t claim <i>all</i> atheists have mischaracterized the CA, or failed to quote their
theistic counterpart, or devoted only a few paragraphs to attacking their
interlocutors. Rather, my charges here are only indicative of the intellectual
laziness that has plagued <i>many</i>, and
some of the most famous, atheists. And this is important to highlight because
it is these very atheists that have blazed the trails that have led to the New
Atheist movement. These are the same individuals that are publishing
best-selling books on the very topic of anti-theism, or have done so in the
past, and are highly regarded in the present atheist community—for reasons I don’t
understand. Yet, when it comes to actually engaging probably the most
well-known argument promulgated for theism, these very atheists have no idea
what the hell they’re talking about, and yet sit there and adamantly and
arrogantly label themselves the “freethinkers”—completely oblivious to their
ignorance. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">I think it’s best to sum up my point in the eloquent
words of W. Norris Clarke:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">[W]e are here in the
presence of a philosophical tradition that is truly in a self-repetitive rut, a
tradition that has long since ceased to look outside of itself to check with
reality and see whether the adversary it so triumphantly and effortlessly
demolishes really exists at all[… ][I]t would seem to be high time that those
who still follow this particular tradition of antitheistic argument should have
the grace and humility to acknowledge that their argument is dead, and let us
get on with more substantive problems with regard to philosophical argument for
and against the existence of God</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">.<o:p></o:p></span></blockquote>
Steven Jakehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04753917037685188540noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4866671088220439212.post-21125426721754525922016-01-14T12:48:00.000-08:002016-01-15T08:00:40.432-08:00Richard Carrier on the argument from contingency<!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<w:WordDocument>
<w:View>Normal</w:View>
<w:Zoom>0</w:Zoom>
<w:TrackMoves/>
<w:TrackFormatting/>
<w:PunctuationKerning/>
<w:ValidateAgainstSchemas/>
<w:SaveIfXMLInvalid>false</w:SaveIfXMLInvalid>
<w:IgnoreMixedContent>false</w:IgnoreMixedContent>
<w:AlwaysShowPlaceholderText>false</w:AlwaysShowPlaceholderText>
<w:DoNotPromoteQF/>
<w:LidThemeOther>EN-US</w:LidThemeOther>
<w:LidThemeAsian>X-NONE</w:LidThemeAsian>
<w:LidThemeComplexScript>X-NONE</w:LidThemeComplexScript>
<w:Compatibility>
<w:BreakWrappedTables/>
<w:SnapToGridInCell/>
<w:WrapTextWithPunct/>
<w:UseAsianBreakRules/>
<w:DontGrowAutofit/>
<w:SplitPgBreakAndParaMark/>
<w:EnableOpenTypeKerning/>
<w:DontFlipMirrorIndents/>
<w:OverrideTableStyleHps/>
</w:Compatibility>
<m:mathPr>
<m:mathFont m:val="Cambria Math"/>
<m:brkBin m:val="before"/>
<m:brkBinSub m:val="--"/>
<m:smallFrac m:val="off"/>
<m:dispDef/>
<m:lMargin m:val="0"/>
<m:rMargin m:val="0"/>
<m:defJc m:val="centerGroup"/>
<m:wrapIndent m:val="1440"/>
<m:intLim m:val="subSup"/>
<m:naryLim m:val="undOvr"/>
</m:mathPr></w:WordDocument>
</xml><![endif]--><br />
<!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<w:LatentStyles DefLockedState="false" DefUnhideWhenUsed="true"
DefSemiHidden="true" DefQFormat="false" DefPriority="99"
LatentStyleCount="267">
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="0" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Normal"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="heading 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 7"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 8"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 9"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 7"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 8"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="toc 9"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="35" QFormat="true" Name="caption"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="10" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Title"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="1" Name="Default Paragraph Font"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="11" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Subtitle"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="22" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Strong"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="20" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Emphasis"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="59" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Table Grid"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Placeholder Text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="1" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="No Spacing"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Revision"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="34" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="List Paragraph"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="29" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Quote"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="30" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Intense Quote"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Shading Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light List Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Light Grid Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Dark List Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful List Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="19" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Subtle Emphasis"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="21" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Intense Emphasis"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="31" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Subtle Reference"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="32" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Intense Reference"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="33" SemiHidden="false"
UnhideWhenUsed="false" QFormat="true" Name="Book Title"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="37" Name="Bibliography"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" QFormat="true" Name="TOC Heading"/>
</w:LatentStyles>
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 10]>
<style>
/* Style Definitions */
table.MsoNormalTable
{mso-style-name:"Table Normal";
mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0;
mso-tstyle-colband-size:0;
mso-style-noshow:yes;
mso-style-priority:99;
mso-style-parent:"";
mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt;
mso-para-margin-top:0in;
mso-para-margin-right:0in;
mso-para-margin-bottom:10.0pt;
mso-para-margin-left:0in;
line-height:115%;
mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
font-size:11.0pt;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri;
mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin;
mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri;
mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;}
</style>
<![endif]-->
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">I’ll be
blunt. I’m not a big fan of Richard Carrier. Read almost any reply from Carrier
responding to a critic of his work, and you’ll notice how arrogant,
condescending, and antagonistic he is with his interlocutors. It can be very
difficult at times, for me, to read through a polemic work of his without being
extremely put-off. (Just survey his articles wherein he claims that the late
Maurice Casey, Joseph Hoffman, Stephanie Fisher, and Robert Eisenman are all
literally <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">insane</i>.) However, while I
dislike him, I do find that many of his theses are well-thought out,
well-argued, and worth responding to—I think this specifically about his book <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Sense and Goodness without God</i><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>and what I’ve seen from his arguments for Jesus-mythicism
(though I haven’t yet read his <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">On the
Historicity of Jesus</i> yet). </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Now, the
other day I was writing an upcoming post regarding atheist responses (and
mischaracterizations) of the cosmological argument, and I realized that I had never
read what Carrier’s specific replies were regarding said argument. (I have
surveyed Carrier’s thoughts on God as an ultimate explanation <a href="http://christian-agnostic.blogspot.com/2015/07/richard-carrier-on-god-hypothesis.html">here</a>, but I had
never seen him directly address the cosmological argument.) I decided to look
up some of his responses, and one response I came across consisted of a handful
of Carrier’s supposed refutations of the argument from contingency (the
argument I find most persuasive, and have defended <a href="http://christian-agnostic.blogspot.com/2015/01/the-argument-from-contingency.html">here</a>) promulgated in a
rebuttal, which was part of a debate he engaged in with Tom Wanchick in 2006
(see <a href="http://infidels.org/library/modern/richard_carrier/carrier-wanchick/index.html">here</a>). I (obviously) found Carrier’s rebuttal to be inadequate—though to
be fair his opponent Wanchick formulated the argument poorly—and I will argue
presently that he failed to refute the argument from contingency, when the
concepts are formulated <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">properly</i>. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">So,
let’s dig in by surveying Carrier’s first objection:</span></div>
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">First,
Wanchick has not shown that the universe does not exist necessarily. Contrary
to what Wanchick falsely claims, scientists now agree that we cannot know
whether the whole of existence had a beginning, even if the observable part of
it did, nor do scientists agree that everything that exists (including all
space-time) will end, even if the present cosmos will.</span></div>
</blockquote>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">While
Wanchick might have attempted to ground his argument in a universe which had a
beginning, the argument from contingency need not assume such a thing. For the
claim “the universe does not exist necessarily” does not require a universe that
must have had a beginning. That is to say, the eternality or non-eternality of
the universe is completely peripheral. For the theist argues that even an
eternal universe can still be contingent. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">But how
can we actually establish whether the universe, or any other existing thing, is
contingent or necessary? Well if it is not of the nature of X to exist, then X
must derive its existence from something outside itself, and therefore it is
contingent. That is, if the nature or essence of X does not provide the reason
for its existence, then X is contingent. Another way to think about this is
that if I can contemplate the nature of X without simultaneously contemplating
its existence, then the reason for the existence of X is not contained within
its nature, and it is, again, contingent. (There are many other criteria that
can be applied: if something is ontologically composed of parts, or if it is a
composite of act/potency etc.) Therefore, we need only apply these criteria to
the universe to determine whether is satisfies said criteria. And indeed, what <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">does</i> happen when one applies this
standard? Well, the nature of the universe is that it is all space-time,
matter, and energy. But obviously, contemplating all space-time, matter and
energy does not clue us in regarding <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">why</i>
space-time, matter, and energy exist in the first place. That is to say,
contemplating the nature of the universe does not provide us with the reason
for why it exists at all—and it certainly doesn’t tell us why <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">this</i> universe exists and not another, or
why any universe exists instead of none at all. Therefore, the universe’s
nature does not contain the reason for its own existence, and thus it is, by
definition, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">contingent</i>. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">So while
Carrier might have been correct that his interlocutor did not demonstrate why
the universe is contingent, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">we</i> surely
have. And none of our arguments need rest on the premise that the universe had
a beginning, or will come to an end. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Carrier moves
to his second objection:</span></div>
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Second,
Wanchick has not shown that "every substance [including the universe] has
an explanation." Wanchick only offers as evidence our observations
regarding the effects of a universe. But he hasn't demonstrated that these
observations hold for a universe itself. The only way we can logically infer
that what is true of "the effects of a universe" is probably true of
the universe itself is if we assume the universe is an effect, since otherwise
we only have knowledge of effects, and whether the universe is an effect is precisely
the matter in dispute. Wanchick hasn't demonstrated that the universe is an
effect, and if the universe is not an effect, what we conclude about effects
within a universe will not necessarily apply to the universe.</span></div>
</blockquote>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Carrier’s
point here is spot on. However, it’s only adequate based on the fact that his
interlocutor is (again) doing a poor job promulgating the argument from
contingency. We can do better. For the way to demonstrate that the universe
necessitates an explanation is to demonstrate 1) that the universe does not
contain the reason for its own existence (which we have done); and 2) that the
existence of brute facts is impossible. For if one cannot logically rule out
brute facts, then it is always possible that the universe just exists with no
rhyme or reason, end of story. Luckily I’ve already argued that brute facts are
logically impossible (<a href="http://christian-agnostic.blogspot.com/2014/07/brute-facts-and-naturalism.html">here</a>), and therefore we’ve demonstrated that the universe
requires an explanation for its existence, contrary to Carrier. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Carrier
articulates his third objection:</span></div>
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Third,
Wanchick claims "only minds" can cause any time or location to exist,
but this cannot be true. It is logically impossible for a mind to think or act
without a time in which to think or act, and a mind that has no location exists
nowhere and what exists nowhere does not exist.[2] Therefore, he has offered no
logical explanation for space-time. Likewise, Wanchick claims "there was
no nature prior to the universe" as a reason to reject natural causes of
the universe. But if "the universe" includes time, then there can
never be a time when the universe didn't exist--even if the universe began--and
therefore it is logically impossible for anything to exist at any time
"before" the universe, whether a person or a thing. So if there was
no nature prior to the universe, there was no person, either.</span></div>
</blockquote>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Here
Carrier is implicitly begging the question. (Let us ignore the Scholastic
doctrine of analogy presently since Carrier was not debating a Thomist.) It is
not clear that one cannot act without time or space unless you a priori assume
metaphysical naturalism. That is, to act must be to be actual, or to exist, in
some way—you cannot act and <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">not</i> be
actual—and thus Carrier is essentially saying that there cannot be existents
without space-time—meaning there can be no existence outside of the natural
world—which begs the question in favor of naturalism. He does the same thing
with regards to time. I agree that it is nonsensical to say that anything
existed “before” there was time, but this only means that <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">temporal existence</i> is nonsensical “before” the universe. However,
we cannot assume that existing things can <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">only</i>
be temporal unless we assume naturalism beforehand—that is, unless we assume
that existents can only exist inside space-time and the natural world. Carrier
is simply begging all the questions he possibly can. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Carrier
moves to his last objection:</span></div>
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Finally,
it's not logically impossible that "it is in the nature of a universe to
exist," and if it's in the nature of this universe to exist, then the
existence of this universe is self-explanatory. Even if we accept that
"the explanation of the universe must be a metaphysically necessary,
uncaused being," which "metaphysically necessary, uncaused
being" would that be? Wanchick hasn't demonstrated that this
"being" can't be the universe (or some part of it), nor that it could
be a god.</span></div>
</blockquote>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">A few
responses. First, while it might not be logically impossible that it be of the
nature of the universe to exist—though I would challenge this as well <span style="font-size: small;">[1]</span>—this
tells us nothing about whether the actual universe is indeed necessary. And
reasoning this way, though I’m not claiming Carrier is, is exactly the fallacy
that the ontological argument commits. Second, if we accept a necessary being
as an explanation of the universe I don’t understand why Carrier thinks the
question “What necessary being would that be?” is efficacious. For if we arrive
at a necessary being we arrive at the ultimate explanation of everything. That
is, we arrive at the terminus of explanation itself in that which explains
itself as well as everything else. And unless Carrier thinks there can be more
than one of these necessary existents then I fail to see how his question makes
any sense, or has any force against his interlocutor’s argument. Moreover,
while Wanchick might not have successfully demonstrated that this necessary
being cannot be the universe (or part of it), we certainly have. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">So we
have surveyed Carrier’s arguments against (a specific formulation of) the
contingency argument. While some of Carrier’s objections pose a problem for his
interlocutor’s formulation of the argument, I think this is due to the lack of
said interlocutor’s ability to promulgate a more persuasive version of said
argument. For we have seen that Carrier’s objections really pose no problem
whatsoever when compared against a more rigorous formulation. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">_______________________________________</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">[1] While
we might be able to imagine a universe which is necessary I don’t see that we
can conceive of one. For by universe I, again, mean that which is all
matter-energy, and space-time. But to reiterate, contemplating all matter,
energy, and space-time cannot tell you why this matter, energy, and space-time
exists in the first place—for if it could then matter, energy and space-time
would be self-explanatory <i>already</i>,
and this current universe would be necessary, which we saw above it isn’t.</span></span></div>
<span style="font-size: small;">
</span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
Steven Jakehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04753917037685188540noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4866671088220439212.post-48599889878686213892016-01-11T20:12:00.000-08:002016-01-11T20:12:44.994-08:00Theoretical Physicist David Deutsch on the limitations of science<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgY_gvoWqqFf33GNV3oWmmFR-fVpZYgWNr3oSRdgSYnmdonNQEExSnjq2djLpAitMatgeiZNPdG-tGg6uYP8ifG1l3WnzmozFXpzefVVjNaCi89JK5jlQadaEwOYX6YmLjKUQaPngWDVy4I/s1600/images.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgY_gvoWqqFf33GNV3oWmmFR-fVpZYgWNr3oSRdgSYnmdonNQEExSnjq2djLpAitMatgeiZNPdG-tGg6uYP8ifG1l3WnzmozFXpzefVVjNaCi89JK5jlQadaEwOYX6YmLjKUQaPngWDVy4I/s1600/images.jpg" /></a></div>
One of the most important limits of science is that it isn't philosophy. [...] Scientism is the purported application of science to problems that are really philosophical. Such as the question of whether animals really feel pain or not. We can tell whether animal's nerves are excited and whether their brains react to that. But whether an animal feels pain in the sense that humans do, or merely react in the sense that a robot does, that is ultimately a matter of philosophy, because it's only philosophy that can determine the criterion for science to use when trying to distinguish between those cases. So that's a limit of science--trying to reach into philosophy is scientism. [...] I would say to [those who claim that the only good explanations are scientific explanations] that that theory is not part of science, and therfore it rules itself out.<br />
<br />
Taken from an interview with Robert Lawrence Kuhn.Steven Jakehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04753917037685188540noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4866671088220439212.post-91814785296690852312016-01-01T17:04:00.000-08:002016-01-04T10:23:49.735-08:00The rise of Aristotle<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg-fkR8Y3BvVKenge4qdqu4Nr_afK4Nwwv6aPCY5nP5JQoMTWZBnVm13x7Ggea7e76-jJCohWXxAbFfGjj9asaEiV3OT5msZ99EViESeNYZaCLdBm6uIbPshDcOBUJRlklTTjLikIcSj1d6/s1600/Sanzio_01_Plato_Aristotle.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="200" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg-fkR8Y3BvVKenge4qdqu4Nr_afK4Nwwv6aPCY5nP5JQoMTWZBnVm13x7Ggea7e76-jJCohWXxAbFfGjj9asaEiV3OT5msZ99EViESeNYZaCLdBm6uIbPshDcOBUJRlklTTjLikIcSj1d6/s200/Sanzio_01_Plato_Aristotle.jpg" width="152" /></a></div>
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">Many of
those with whom I encounter through comments on the internet usually turn their
nose up when confronted with the Aristotelian-Thomistic (Scholastic) philosophy
that I espouse. To them, Scholasticism is simply a relic of an antiquated and
outdated philosophy. It was what a group of people were forced to think about
the world before the advent of science, before we became “enlightened.” They
say that terms like actuality, potentiality, final causality, essence or form,
have long been relegated to the dustbin of failed and superfluous philosophies,
especially since science no longer has any use of them. As physicist Sean
Carroll has said, “This kind of Aristotelian analysis of causation was cutting
edge stuff 2,500 years ago. Today we know better.” Moreover, others also claim
that the only people who even resurrect these antiquated and esoteric ideas and
concepts are apologists, trying to mask their arguments in obscure and archaic
terminology so as to confuse their interlocutor—while simultaneously making
their philosophy seem sophisticated. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">I maintain
that all this is false. First, the individuals I know who are Thomists espouse
this philosophy precisely because they genuinely find it to be the only valid
metaphysic, and not because they simply want to prove God’s existence. I myself
was sincerely enamored with the Thomistic concepts that I read in Edward
Feser’s book <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Aquinas</i>, and found said concepts
and philosophy to be a convincing and necessary ontological description of
reality. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">Second,
and more importantly regarding this post, it is actually the case that
Scholastic philosophy is seeing a major revival as of late. Now this might not
seem like a big deal to the “skeptic” currently reading, since the number of
adherents of a position does nothing to entail the validity or efficacy of said
position—and I would agree. However, what’s interesting about this resurgence
is the fact that most of the individuals who are returning to the concepts
inherent in Scholasticism are not theists, and are not really in the Scholastic
“camp” at all. Rather, this revival is mostly led by philosophers of science
(yes, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">science</i>) who see that a return
to certain Aristotelian concepts is a necessary step towards a valid ontology. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">Let us
survey this resurgence. First, there are philosophers who claim that efficient
causality necessitates that objects must have intrinsic dispositional
properties—what they call “powers”—that are directed towards the generation of
certain effects. While they don’t refer to this as final causality, this is
essentially a return to that very notion. This has been promulgated by analytic
philosophers like John Heil, in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">From an
Ontological Point of View, </i>C. B Martin, in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">The Mind in Nature</i>, George Molnar, in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Powers: A Study in Metaphysics, </i>and Stephen Mumford, in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Getting Causes from Powers</i> and <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Dispositions. </i>Furthermore, biologist J.
Scott Turner, in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">The Tinkerer’s
Accomplice, </i>and philosophers of biology Marjorie Grene and Andre Ariew, in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">The Understanding of Nature,</i> argue for a
return to an Aristotelian notion of inherent teleology. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">Second,
essentialism—the belief that things have an inherent nature or essence that
accounts for them being what they are—has seen a revival among secular
philosophers as well. Philosopher of science Brian Ellis, in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">The Philosophy of Nature: A Guide to the New
Essentialism, </i>and philosopher of science Nancy Cartwright, in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Inference, Explanation, and Other Frustrations,</i>
put forward an Aristotelian essentialist interpretation of the results of the
hard sciences like chemistry and physics. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">Moreover,
in recent analytic philosophy there has been talk of what are called <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">categorical</i> and <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">dispositional </i>properties (see <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dispositions/">here</a>). As Edward Feser notes, these are really
just different names for act and potency. The categorical properties of a thing
being the properties that it actually instantiates—that is, the way it actually
is—and where dispositional properties of a thing are properties that will
manifest under certain conditions—that is, the way something can potentially
be. These properties are discussed at length by Ellis, Mumford<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">, </i>Martin, and Molnar, all mentioned
above, as well as analytic philosophers Galen Strawson and D.M. Armstrong, <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">Note again
that these philosophers are secular and are not Scholastics, Thomists, or even
Aristotelians. They are simply analytic philosophers who see that something
like an Aristotelian philosophy—though they use different jargon than
Aristotelians—of nature is a necessary framework for intelligibility of reality.
The claim, then, that Scholasticism is nothing but an outdated and antiquated
philosophy, mostly promulgated by apologists and charlatans, is blatantly
false. Aristotelianism is on the cusp of a resurgence, and the naysayers would
do well to sit up and take notice. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
Steven Jakehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04753917037685188540noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4866671088220439212.post-78284010551566694962015-12-10T13:36:00.000-08:002015-12-10T13:36:35.842-08:00(More) about me<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhNtdFv4y3KDphFPC0c9kVtc0ZR201HGun11truoOAEJOfpXkwNixdvmIlRypLGSWdU3XJBvhl_GacYOH1__n1OLj_r_PRi4QTaIh3da8A7DX4cV0ZSydum7k1Vb9mE_2g3Smdbl1mKP_nu/s1600/Steven2.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="256" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhNtdFv4y3KDphFPC0c9kVtc0ZR201HGun11truoOAEJOfpXkwNixdvmIlRypLGSWdU3XJBvhl_GacYOH1__n1OLj_r_PRi4QTaIh3da8A7DX4cV0ZSydum7k1Vb9mE_2g3Smdbl1mKP_nu/s320/Steven2.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
Up until this point I've kept my identity on this blog quite private. There was a reason behind this. The school that I used to teach at, up until this fall, was a heavily conservative Christian private school. They believed in a young earth, creationism, Jesus' divinity, Biblical inerrancy etc., and all sorts of things that I tend to question on this blog. So, I knew that if they ever came across this blog--and they did look online for their employees online activity--they would be taken aback and would most likely fire me--such is the heart of evangelical fundamentalists. So I kept my identity relatively obscure on this blog for that specific reason. However, I now work at a different school and no longer have this problem, so I felt the desire to illuminate more about my personal life, in case anybody cared.<br />
<br />
So, my name is Steven (obviously) and I'm twenty-five years old. I was born on July 22, 1990 and raised in El Paso, Texas, where I still currently reside. Despite the tone of my posts, I'm actually a very goofy and sarcastic individual who is almost never serious. I have been married for almost two years to the most gorgeous woman alive (who also has <a href="https://nowthesethreeremain.wordpress.com/">her own blog</a>), and I have a ten month old daughter named Norah Grace. I put a big emphasis on family and I make sure that that is always my number one priority. (I also have four dogs--I am a huge animal lover.) I graduated from the University of Texas at El Paso with a Bachelors of Science in Mathematics. I do plan to go back to school for a masters degree in philosophy, but that will have to wait. I have been teaching for three years and, to toot my own horn just a little bit, I am a damn good teacher.<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhNcpdG-nilxkzpEKoVx6CsF_xJCye9mPOJ4AigvjAd7y8tmPQ8ct-t4hxaTgSCDr7NRfEEYn3TMzjtS_8nNnRwlasrlUP-TIVNQhJueE9Vez0r0Oc42CS-PFZzoPAQ1S8CR0lEsXJDiPz1/s1600/Steven3.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhNcpdG-nilxkzpEKoVx6CsF_xJCye9mPOJ4AigvjAd7y8tmPQ8ct-t4hxaTgSCDr7NRfEEYn3TMzjtS_8nNnRwlasrlUP-TIVNQhJueE9Vez0r0Oc42CS-PFZzoPAQ1S8CR0lEsXJDiPz1/s320/Steven3.jpg" width="212" /></a></div>
<br />
<br />
I absolutely love football and am an avid Atlanta Falcons fan, which means I'm usually depressed during football season. I am obsessed with reading, though I rarely have time for it now since I'm a full-time dad. I also have become recently obsessed with chess, and I play online everyday--so if your interested in playing let me know!<br />
<br />
Well, I thought I had more to say but apparently not. If you have any questions feel free to ask!<br />
<div>
<br /></div>
Steven Jakehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04753917037685188540noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4866671088220439212.post-76095424837315499362015-11-30T07:42:00.000-08:002015-11-30T07:42:54.404-08:00Are space and time necessary?
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">The
other day I was commenting over at <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><a href="http://debunkingchristianity.blogspot.com/">DebunkingChristianity</a></i>—usually not a good idea—regarding whether or not the universe
could be said to be necessary. I got into a few decent discussions—which is
surprising given the venue--one of which was with the very courteous Nicholas
Covington, the author of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><a href="http://www.skepticink.com/humesapprentice/">Hume’s Apprentice</a>,
</i>over at<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> Skeptic Ink</i>. During the
discussion Nick brought up the possibility of not necessarily the universe per
se being necessary, but space and time being necessary. It turns out that Nick
has actually written up an article (<a href="http://www.skepticink.com/humesapprentice/2014/03/20/why-something-rather-than-nothing/">here</a>) defending this very thesis of his--in fact I
remember reading it last year. It’s an answer to the question “Why is there
something rather than nothing?” His answer is that the reason there is
something rather than nothing is because space and time themselves are necessary
and provide a necessary framework for existents. Needless to say, I don’t find
Nick’s arguments persuasive nor valid, hence this post. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">So,
let’s see where Nick goes wrong. He begins by attempting to narrow down the
definition of existence: <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"></span><blockquote class="tr_bq">
What is
the difference between the two [a sea monster and the sun] that makes one real
and the other imaginary? Well, the sun has detectable effects on ourselves and
other things, but a sea monster doesn’t. […] In order to interact with other
beings, or have effects on things, you must be within time. An effect takes
place at a certain point in time, and you can’t act at a certain point in time
if you aren’t within it. </blockquote>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">My
quibble here is with the talk of cause and effect necessitating temporality. I
agree that usually causality is temporal, in that a cause usually precedes its
effect in time. For example, I can hit my drink thereby knocking it over, and
obviously the act of hitting my drink came before the act of the drink falling
over. This is the common deterministic billiard ball type of causation. But,
this is not universally the case, and this does not exhaust all types of
causation, as I’ve argued in the past. There is such a thing as non-temporal
and <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">simultaneous</i> causation. For
example, if I hold my daughter, we have the cause of me holding my daughter,
and the effect of her being suspended five feet above the ground. Yet, these
are one and the same event, meaning the cause and effect happen simultaneously.
I don’t hold my daughter and then she is subsequently being suspended, she is
being suspended <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">as long as</i> I am
holding her. The cause is simultaneous with the effect. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">There
are many more examples like this. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For
instance, a person shaping a clay pot. The pot is only shaped simultaneously as
the sculptor shapes it, not after. Or, the solidity of table. The effect of a
table being solid is achieved as long as the material constituents are arranged
in such a way as to be sufficient for that effect--the solidity is simultaneous
with that arrangement. Or, the swinging of a hammer. The hammer’s motion is
being caused by the swinging of the carpenter’s hand, and these two are
simultaneous. There is no shortage of examples of simultaneous causation. But,
what does this mean? Well, it means that, contrary to Nick’s claims above, a
cause and effect relationship does not necessitate time. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">But
wait. I know I can already picture a reader making the following point: while
the examples given demonstrate simultaneous causes and effects, the objects
used in said examples are still <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">in</i>
time. That is to say, the daughter, pot, carpenter, hammer etc. are all
temporal objects existing in time. This is correct, but does it really call my
point into question? No. For recall that Nick’s point was that in order for one
existent to interact or to have an effect on another existent, time is a
necessity—not that the existents themselves must be in time. But we’ve seen
that this is false. If simultaneous causation is a reality then it is at least
metaphysically possible for two existents to interact—i.e. one causing the
other—without such an interaction being temporally ordered and without the
existents to be in time itself. The point here is that causation qua causation <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">need not be temporal</i>. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Thus,
Nick’s attempt to help pin down the definition of existence by interaction is
moot so far. For if time is not a necessary condition for interaction, then one
cannot infer that all that can or could exist must be within space and time—since
Nick claims that interaction is fingerprint of existence. And therefore Nick
has no warrant for concluding that we can define existence as space and time. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">But
Nick’s not finished. After (erroneously) defining existence as space and time,
he continues:</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"></span><blockquote class="tr_bq">
Under
our working definition of existence, space and time do not exist, strictly
speaking. Space and time don’t have effects on things, space and time are a
framework in which effects, actions, and reactions reside. As such, it makes no
sense to ask whether the framework of existence exists. </blockquote>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">There
reside a few problems here. First, Nick has already made this inference off of
poor reasoning when he assumed that time is a necessary condition for causality
and interaction—and therefore for existing things. We saw that this was false. But
even aside from this, he seems oblivious to the question-begging nature of his
endeavor. For even if for the sake of argument we concede that Nick was correct
that space and time were necessary for actual existents, this doesn’t give us
any right to redefine existence as space and time itself. Let me put my point a
bit more analytically: Demonstrating that X is a necessary condition for Y does
not entail that Y is identical to X. That is to say, demonstrating that
space-time is a necessary condition for existing things—something that he
hasn’t even demonstrated but that we’re granting for argument’s sake—does not
entail that existence is therefore defined as space-time. This is simply a
non-sequitur. Nick has shown absolutely no good reason, then, for redefining
existence as space and time, and to do so is to engage in blatant
question-begging. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Second,
if space and time were necessary, then, by the definition of ontological
necessity, simply contemplating space and time would enlighten us to its
necessity. Why would this be? Because something which is necessary contains the
reason for its existence in its nature—that is to say, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">what</i> it is would be identical to the fact <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">that</i> it is. Thus, if something is necessary, then contemplating its
nature would be to simultaneously contemplate its existence. And a corollary of
this is that you could not fail to conceive this thing existing. But space-time
obviously does not satisfy this definition of necessity, since we can easily
conceive of space-time not existing at all, and therefore space-time is not
necessary. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, Nick thinks that he
can get around this by claiming that space-time does not “exist,” and instead
claims that space-time is a framework, and that therefore speaking of its existence
or non-existence is nonsensical. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">However,
this is might only be true <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">if</i> indeed
existence is to be defined as space-time. But we’ve seen no good reason to
think that we should redefine existence in such an idiosyncratic way. Yet, it
gets worse than this, because Nick is basically engaging in explicit
question-begging (again). He’s simply defined existence as X, and then claimed
that you cannot question the existence of X since X is, by definition, the
framework of existence—of which interaction is a corollary. But this is
extremely problematic. One cannot simply a priori redefine existence as X and
then claim that X is therefore necessary. In fact this is exactly what the
ontological argument for God attempts to do, and Nick’s argument is fallacious
for the same reasons—in fact we could call Nick’s argument the ontological
argument for naturalism. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">But it
gets <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">even worse</i> than this for Nick’s
thesis. For let’s grant for argument’s sake that Nick <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">was</i> correct in his arbitrary redefining of existence as space-time
and that space-time is indeed the framework for all existents. Is it still
true, as he stated above, that we cannot speak of this framework’s existence or
non-existence? No it’s not, because space-time, in order to be distinguishable
from literal non-being, must have certain properties and actualities. The fact
that it is a framework does not absolve it from harboring these things. For
example, in mathematics the set of integers is itself a framework that is completely
different in nature from its elements. But the set itself--again in order for
it to actually be <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">something</i> as
opposed to <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">nothing</i>—must have certain
distinguishing properties—e.g., it is infinite, and thus we see that a
framework can have properties. So space-time, though it might be a framework,
still is manifest in certain actualities and properties—and who would even
argue that space-time does not have properties? But why is this important? Well,
if space-time has certain properties—e.g., being <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">n-</i>dimensional—then it will <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">always</i>
be possible to conceive the absence or lack of these properties, and therefore
the lack of space-time itself. But this means that talk of the existence or
non-existence of space-time is not nonsensical. And more importantly it means
that, by the definition of necessary given above, space-time is not <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">necessary</i> and could metaphysically fail
to exist. And thus space-time <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">cannot</i>
be existence itself. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">In
conclusion we’ve seen that Nick’s bold thesis is extremely problematic. First,
it assumes a faulty view of causality. Second, it engages in question-begging
and non-sequiturs. And most importantly we’ve seen that even if we were to
grant his argument and erase all previous objections, his conclusion is still
not justified, and is false. It would seem that space-time, then, is not
necessary. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><o:p> </o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><o:p> </o:p></span></div>
</div>
Steven Jakehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04753917037685188540noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4866671088220439212.post-75137044694523828862015-11-06T14:33:00.000-08:002016-05-20T21:05:48.684-07:00Embodied realism revisited<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Mike D, over at the newly rejuvenated <i><a href="http://www.a-unicornist.com/">The A-unicornist</a></i>
has decided to engage my review--my original posts can be found here: Part <a href="http://christian-agnostic.blogspot.com/2015/03/embodied-realism-part-i-correspondence.html">I</a>, <a href="http://christian-agnostic.blogspot.com/2015/03/embodied-realism-part-ii-embodied-truth.html">II</a>, and <a href="http://christian-agnostic.blogspot.com/2015/04/embodied-realism-part-iii-is-this.html">III</a>--of the philosophy of embodied realism, as
promulgated in <i>Philosophy of the Flesh</i>, that I wrote about six months ago—I
guess better late than never. His three posts can be read <a href="http://www.a-unicornist.com/aunicornist/2015/8/27/jake-vs-lakoff-the-reckoning">here</a>, <a href="http://www.a-unicornist.com/aunicornist/2015/10/20/jake-vs-lakoff-the-reckoning-part-2-of-3">here</a>, and <a href="http://www.a-unicornist.com/aunicornist/2015/10/20/jake-vs-lakoff-the-reckoning-part-3-of-3">here</a>.
While I did plan on writing more reviews on embodied realism, I instead found
that the common readers of my blog were not really interested in the material,
and, moreover, after my last post—wherein I attempted to demonstrate that
embodied realism was self-refuting—I felt that I had adequately cracked the
foundation that embodied realism lays upon, and therefore not much more needed
to be said. But Mike D doesn’t agree (shocker!), hence his review, and thus I
feel the need to revisit this topic in order to dispel the fallacies in his
thinking and arguments. Sit back and enjoy, preferably with a cup of coffee. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><b><br /></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><b>Correspondence Theory of Truth</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">My first post on embodied realism was an attempted
defense of the correspondence theory of truth, in opposition to embodied
realism which claimed that such a philosophy is false because it ignores our
levels of embodiment and the corollaries therein. Those that read the post will
remember that I carefully made my point that all that is required for the
correspondence theory to be valid is for truth-bearers to correspond to
truth-makers. This is important, because Mike makes a mistake right off the bat
in his review by claiming, contrary to the very post he’s answering, that the
theory claims that the concepts in our minds correspond directly to real things
in the world.” Well, no, this is not what it says, or at least this is not how
I articulated my position for reasons that I specifically outlined in the first
post, based on the distinction between formal and virtual properties that adhere.
So Mike is already misstating my position.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Now, this idea of correspondence is a crucial reason
why the example of the reality of color is an example utilized by both Mike and
I. As was highlighted before, color does not exist without human embodiment—that
is without the subjectivity of the cognitive and visual human apparatus. But
this does not mean that the reality of color is not objective, that is, it
doesn’t mean that it can be said to <i>objectively obtain</i> in reality. As I said
before, there is a difference between objective truth, and truth obtaining
objectively. Color cannot obtain without an embodied observer, so it does not
obtain objectively, but this does not mean that color does not exist in
objective reality. To argue such is to engage in conflation. Now, Mike did
engage this point of mine, and found my definition of “objective” wanting:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">So what on Earth could Steven mean when he says that
he agrees with the authors that color does not inhere in the world objectively,
but then he says that it is objective "virtually"? Steven appears to
be operating on an idiosyncratic and, frankly, ambiguous definition of
"objective". Objectivity generally means that the truth of a
proposition is not dependent on any subject.</span></blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Here’s what I mean, and it reflects back to what I
said above. All that is required for a statement to be objectively true is for
a truth-bearer to correspond to a truth-maker. That’s it. It is the
<i>correspondence</i> that must be objective, and not the bearer or the maker. So, why
is this a problem for Mike? Well, the embodiment of man only renders the
truth-maker to be subjective, and not the correspondence itself. For instance,
if I say “The grass is green”, you have three parts related to the truth
of this statement. You have the truth-bearer in the statement itself, you have
the truth-maker realized in the color obtaining subjectively, and you have the
correspondence between the two. Notice that the correspondence is objective,
even though the truth-<i>maker</i> is subjective. Thus, the truth “The grass is green”
is still objectively true, even though we need to be embodied in order for
color to obtain. Embodiment, then, simply does nothing to call the objectivity
of truth into question here, and therefore Mike’s position here is false. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Mike then continues his point, predicated on the same
misunderstandings he expounded above:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It's quite clear that color, as well as conceptual
spaces like skies and gardens, cannot fit any common-usage definition of
objectivity. Steven seems to think (as would be the case in the correspondence
theory of truth) that embodiment serves to "obtain" objective truths.
But this overlooks the fact that our minds actually create and impose
conceptual structures onto the world. Colors, skies, and gardens are all examples
of things that do not exist in the classical sense of objectivity, but rather
are what Lakoff describes as "mutliplace interactional properties":
phenomena that only exist as an emergent function of our neurocircuitry
interacting with the world around us. </span></blockquote>
</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Again Mike is conflating objective truth with truth
obtaining objectively. Color obtains subjectively, but it is an objective truth
<i>that</i> it exists. To reiterate, the fact that our embodiment can create and
impose conceptual structures onto the world only affects the truth-maker, and
not the correspondence itself, and therefore this subjectivity does not affect
the objectivity of the correspondence itself.
Mike seems to have not caught it when I made this point in my original
post. Moreover, this all stems from his poor understanding of what the
correspondence theory actually means and how I originally articulated it—as we
saw above. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Mike then incorrectly sums up my position and draws
(also incorrect) conclusions from it:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Looking back, Steven's argument is just all over the
place. He defines a property inhering "virtually" in such a way that
is all but indistinguishable from Lakoff's position, and even concedes that
Scholastics like him do not think color exists objectively in the world, just
as Lakoff argues. Except then he says it does, if by "objective" we
mean "virtually objective", even though virtual inherence (as he's
defined it) directly conflicts with classical objectivity. As it stands,
Steven's objections so far are just a mess. </span></blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">First off, Mike incorrectly articulates my position by
claiming that I conceded that color does not exist objectively. I never said
that. I said that color does not <i>obtain</i> objectively, and this again
demonstrates that Mike has misunderstood my position. I believe that the statement
“color exists” is objectively true, and my only qualification is that the
nature of its obtainment is subjective. There is a difference between the two,
and unfortunately it has evaded Mike’s comprehension. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Second, Mike claims that virtual inherence conflicts
with classical objectivity. This is false once again. To reiterate again,
classical objectivity only requires a correspondence between a truth-bearer and
a truth-maker. And a property that inheres or obtains virtually does not call
this requirement into question. It only entails, as I said above, that the
truth-maker obtains subjectively, but this does not make the correspondence
itself subjective. So, contrary to Mike, no assaults have been committed
against classical objectivity, and correspondence theory remains intact. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">However, we’re not finished here, and we can see that
things are even worse for those who would attempt to dispel the correspondence
theory. For think about what one is saying when they say the correspondence
theory of truth is false—as Mike and Lakoff do. They are saying that the theory
fails to adequately represent the way reality operates—and this relies on the
very same theory of correspondence. Even the authors of <i>Philosophy of the Flesh</i>
do this! In order to make the case against correspondence theory they tried to
show that the levels of embodiment demonstrate that the correspondence of
correspondence theory is not a neat one-to-one relation as is supposed, and
therefore the theory is false. But by doing so the authors are utilizing the
very theory they’re attempting to disprove! That is, they’re arguing that
correspondence theory cannot be true, because it fails to accurately correspond
to the way reality actually operates. Thus, not only has Mike’s case not been
made, it’s not even possible to make it. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><b><br /></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><b>Levels of Embodiment</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Mike then (still in his first post) transitions to a
particular criticism I made, regarding the levels of embodiment. Let me
re-expound my argument presently, because it will be momentarily seen that Mike
completely misunderstands it. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="background-color: #660000; font-family: "times new roman" , serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgLsoXHCJeTlnR3u8SgJOEFWiFwOt0in6kvqshZUtRLM64gUEFM6vBnHG5-GzBno1wO4M494Y1NYUgqabN0h3WsoPwYVsfifx61rEsJE-LgR8BHqMuTUhNonsILd0VOSQMnJBRXq6JyZwGk/s1600/Obi-Wan-Kenobi.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="150" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgLsoXHCJeTlnR3u8SgJOEFWiFwOt0in6kvqshZUtRLM64gUEFM6vBnHG5-GzBno1wO4M494Y1NYUgqabN0h3WsoPwYVsfifx61rEsJE-LgR8BHqMuTUhNonsILd0VOSQMnJBRXq6JyZwGk/s200/Obi-Wan-Kenobi.jpg" width="200" /></a></div>
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Remember that the authors of <i>Philosophy of the Flesh</i>
claimed that there are three distinct levels of our embodiment: the neural,
phenomenological, and cognitive unconscious level. The authors then claimed
that there can be no truth statements that are “level-independent,” that truths
can only be stated at distinct levels and distinct vantage points and that one level cannot be erected
over and against another. (This position always reminds me of Obi Wan Kenobi in return of the Jedi stating "What I told you was true, from a certain point of view." Who knew Kenobi was an embodied realist?) Going back to our discussion on color, the authors
stated the following:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Both the phenomenology-first and science-first
strategies are inadequate in one way or other. If we take the
phenomenology-first strategy, we miss what we know scientifically is true about
color. We get the scientific metaphysics of color wrong. Our “truth conditions”
do not reflect what we know to be true. If we take the science-first strategy,
we do violence to the normal meaning of the word and to what ordinary people
mean by “truth.”</span></blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The authors are saying here that, with regard to
color, we cannot simply erect the neural level of embodiment as the
end-all-be-all of the color discussion by saying that, scientifically, color
does not exist—because then we do damage to the phenomenological level wherein
color indeed seems to exist. But neither can we erect the phenomenological
level over above the other levels because then we do damage to what science
actually tells us about the physics of color. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Here’s where my point came in. My point was that
sometimes we <i>have</i> to erect one level above another, and that many times doing
damage to one level of embodiment is allowed and is <i>necessary</i>—at least, if we
want our predications to be coherent. A prime example that I highlighted in my
post, is cases where we know, through science, that our immediate qualia—a part
of our phenomenological level--is wrong, or deceiving. And here we should be
able to truly say that our phenomenological level is <i>wrong</i> and inaccurate, and
the only way we know this is through science. And therefore in these cases a
“science-first” strategy is logical and necessary. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Now, here’s what Mike had to say regarding this point,
and it’s not even in the ballpark of answering or contending with my point:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The authors are not asserting that the correspondence
theory of truth assumes the phenomenological level to be true all the time —
indeed as Steven notes, the authors point out that the correspondence theory
fails to even acknowledge these different (and sometimes conflicting) levels of
truth, and that is the central issue. </span></blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Mike is quite confused here. First, I’m attacking the
position of embodied realism, as stated by the authors. So my point had nothing
to do with claiming that the authors were “asserting that the correspondence
theory of truth assumes the phenomenological level to be true all the time.”
Again, my point was <i>not</i> predicated on the authors taking this position.
Furthermore, correspondence theory was momentarily irrelevant to my point, so Mike’s
mention of it is misplaced and confused.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The point that Mike missed was that, contrary to the
author’s point above, our levels of embodiment can in fact be erected over one
another and do damage to each other. The example I utilized to make my point was
that of hallucinations. Why? Because on the phenomenological level, a
hallucination is in fact experienced. It does constitute valid qualia. And
therefore, on embodied realism, a hallucination is seen as “true” on that
level. But scientifically and neurologically, we know that the object of the
hallucination does not actually exist in objective reality. So, should we just
sit on our hands and claim that a hallucination is “real” from the
phenomenological level, but false from the neural level, because God forbid we
let one of these levels make the decision for us? Of course not. A
hallucination is simply a false perception, and that’s it. Science wins here.
And therefore there is one level, in this instance, that is erected above the
“truth” of another and subsequently renders it false. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">But, Mike’s not having it:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The authors do not at any point either state or imply
the ridiculous assertion that all phenomenological claims must be taken at face
value (Steven said, "just because we perceive something does not mean it
is there”, with which the authors would of course concur). And importantly, the
authors do not assert that different levels of embodiment are equally true at
all times. </span></blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Whoa there. First, I never claimed that the authors
stated such. Mike has once again misunderstood my point. My point was not
predicated on the proposition that all phenomenological claims must be taken at
face value, or that the levels of embodiment are equally true at all times.
Remember that the authors claimed that embodied realism requires us to jettison
the belief that we can formulate a unique and complete description, on one
level of embodiment, of a particular state of affairs. Therefore, my point, to
reiterate it ad nauseum, is that in the case of hallucinations we can, and
must, formulate a unique and complete description of the event based primarily
on neuroscience and psychology, which necessarily does damage to the “truth” of
the phenomenological level, and this contradicts the author’s claim that this
should not be done. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">But wait, Mike’s not done:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">When one level of embodiment produces stable truths
that contradict unstable truths of another, the level of embodiment producing
stable truths is privileged. That is why we're skeptical of hallucinations of
dead relatives: we know from neuroscience that people in certain conditions
experience a wide variety of hallucinations that may or may not include
deceased relatives. The results from neuroscience are replicable, stable
truths; visitations from dead relatives are not. When multiple levels of
embodiment produce stable truths — as in our study of the mind through
neurobiology, neurocomputation, and cognition — they create an overlapping and
complimentary understanding — the kind that allows to us to learn that the
correspondence theory of truth is, in fact, wrong.</span></blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Big problems here. Mike is doing exactly what the
authors say cannot be done, and is actually agreeing with <i>me</i> in the process.
That is, Mike here is arguing for a science-first strategy and is arguing for
the momentarily privileged status of the “truth” of the neural level, and is
thereby doing damage to the “truth” of the phenomenological level. The results
from neuroscience, while they might indeed be stable truths, are being erected
as the end-all-be-all of the discussion, and are seen as giving us a complete
description of the state of affairs of hallucination. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">But Mike is even more confused than his oblivious
agreement with my stance would indicate.
He claims that his argument works because in this instance you have
“multiple levels” that produce stable truths, as opposed to just one level
being erected over another. But this is blatantly false according to the levels
promulgated by the authors of <i>Philosophy of the Flesh</i> that Mike reveres. The
examples of disciplines that converge on these stable truths that Mike
lists—e.g., neurocomputation, neurobiology etc.—are all subsumed under <i>one</i>
level of embodiment, namely that of the neural level—again, according to
Lakoff. So contrary to Mike, if these stable truths—which are subsumed under
the neural level--can indeed call the phenomenological view into question, then
you have the epitome of one level gaining a privileged status above the
others—the very thing Lakoff said couldn’t and shouldn’t be done. So either Mike
is right and his beloved Lakoff is wrong, or Lakoff is right and Mike
obliviously agrees with me. Either way it’s a lose-lose for Mike. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">So did Mike really demonstrate that my criticism of
the levels of embodiment was wanting? Hardly. He only demonstrated that he has
trouble comprehending both my position and Lakoff’s. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><b>Embodied Truth</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">My second post dealt with the theory of truth put
forward by Lakoff in the form of embodied truth. I began the post highlighting
a remark the authors made on how we conceptualize truth, and Mike had a
visceral reaction to it:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Steven is already so far off the mark here that I'm
just gobsmacked. The authors are not claiming there are no objective truths, or
that truths do not exist independently of us. They are certainly not arguing
that something is, for example, "true for me" in the form of pure
subjectivism. Rather, they're talking about how human beings conceptualize
truth, and how shared truths become stable truths. </span></blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Is Mike right here? Actually I believe he is
(partially), and I do believe that I misread or misunderstood what the authors
were getting at. I conflated the psychology of how we conceptualize truth with
embodied truth as a philosophical theory of truth. So Mike is correct in
highlighting this mistake of mine. Fair enough. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">However, if the whole notion of embodied truth is not
a theory of truth per se, then how, on embodied realism do we actually ground
truth? Well, remember that due to the different levels of embodiment, we can
have distinct truths at different levels, but we can have no neutral viewpoint
apart from these levels from which to make objective predications? But then,
how do we arrive at truth? That is, how can we say X is the case, or is not the
case? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Here’s where Mike and embodied realism misstep. I
claimed in my original post that a theory of truth is not amendable to
scientific results like that of embodied cognition. Why not, you ask? Because
one first needs a theory of truth before one can engage in science. Science
presupposes truth, not the other way around. Here’s how Mike responded when
this was brought up:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">But of course, the authors discuss at length the
assumptions underpinning scientific realism to which they adhere. The results
of embodied cognition do not, as Steven asserts, constitute an a priori theory
of truth, but rather illuminate how human minds conceptualize, understand, and
share truths. The authors state, "A person takes a sentence as 'true' of a
situation if what he or she understands the sentence to be expressing accords
with what he or she understand the situation to be."</span></blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Let the reader understand that Mike completely
side-stepped the issue. I don’t recall any instance where I asserted that
embodied cognition constitutes an a priori theory of truth—I don’t recall it
because it never happened. However, this isn’t even the issue. The issue is
that embodied cognition simply does not have the power to make any such comment
on what truth is, or is not, since it presupposes truth in the first place. If
B relies on A, then no corollary of B can call A into question. And this is the
issue to which Mike is completely silent on. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Embodied realism has not, then, called correspondence
theory into question (as we saw above) and it has given us no other theory to
put in its place. How then can embodied realism call competing philosophical
theories false? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><b>Metaphysical realism</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">My last post on embodied realism dealt with its
relinquishing of metaphysical realism, and why I believe this to be not only
false, but self-refuting. For example, the authors claim that “[Embodied
realism] denies that we can have objective and absolute knowledge of the
world-in-itself… [and] denies on empirical grounds, that there exists one and
only one correct description of the world[.] (p. 96) My claim was that this position
can only be taken seriously if it is being objectively predicated of
reality-in-itself. That is to say, this position is effectively saying that
reality is such that X is the case—that is, that we cannot know
reality-in-itself. But, this obviously entails that we know something about how
reality objectively operates, otherwise the position is <i>literally</i> false. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">But Mike is prepared to answer this claim:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">When the authors say that there is no "purely
objective" understanding of reality, they mean "objective" in
the unembodied sense of classical scientific realism: the idea that our mind
directly grasps objective truths, and that things like concepts, abstractions,
metaphors, and logic are part of the rational structure of reality. The
authors' thesis is that those phenomena are emergent properties of the embodied
mind, so that while indeed we can safely and reasonably assume that we can
attain knowledge of an objective external reality, we cannot do so in a manner
that is itself untethered from the cognitive framework through which we
necessarily view the world.</span></blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The problem here is that Mike’s qualifications of the
author’s position do not actually rescue said position from incoherency. First,
I was already aware of the author’s belief in attaining knowledge through
“stable truths”. By “stable truths” the authors simply mean repeatable and
reliable patterns. The problem is that this claim still undermines their
position. Consider this question: Is the statement “stable truths can attain
knowledge” itself a stable truth? I don’t see how, since this is not a
proposition that is susceptible to the type of scientific investigation that
yields repeatable and reliable patterns. And this is because one must first
have a priori knowledge <i>before</i> one even engages in science, and therefore
before one begins the search for stable truths. Therefore, knowledge is already
presupposed by the search for stable truths and thus the latter cannot be
defined in terms of the former. (We’ll get more into this below when we speak of
metaphysical assumptions.)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">But it’s even worse than this for the embodied
realist. For how do Mike and the authors know stable truths can and do in fact
attain the status of knowledge of reality? <i>They already need beliefs about the
nature of reality in order to predicate this statement</i>. Since we are part of
reality, we need to already believe things about the nature of reality in order
to state our epistemic relationship to it.
And Mike can’t turn back to stable truths to ground this belief, since
he would be arguing in a circle. Mike is stuck between a rock and a hard place.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif;"> </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif;">Thus we see
that no matter how the embodied realist wants to jettison metaphysical realism,
he will always return to it.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><b><br /></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><b>Metaphysical assumptions</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Next Mike asks what I think is a very important and
pertinent question:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The real conundrum is this: can cognitive science
really say anything about how we fundamentally conceptualize reality, since
science itself requires us to make philosophical assumptions?</span></blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">He continues down the line:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It seems reasonable to conclude from his objections
that Steven believes empirically-informed philosophical insights to be
self-defeating — since those empirical results themselves rely on some set of
philosophical assumptions in the first place. But as the authors have argued,
only a minimal set of methodological assumptions is necessary for scientific
inquiry to proceed. From those basic assumptions, we can gain insight into how
our minds construct and interpret data, and we only need to make a very minimal
few assumptions along the way. </span></blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">A couple of things here. First, I in no way believe
that empirically-informed philosophical insights are self-defeating. I only
call empirically-informed insights self-defeating when they result in a
reductio ad absurdum. That is to say, I find philosophical positions based on
science to be self-refuting when they attempt to call into question the first
principles that are necessary for knowledge and the intelligibility of the
world, which is what science is predicated on in the first place. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">And what exactly are these first principles, or
assumptions, that are necessary for scientific inquiry? Well Mike, following
Lakoff, lists the following:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">• Objective
reality exists, and we can have stable knowledge of it<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">• Other
minds like our own exist<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">• These
minds can be studied empirically<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">• The
empirical results of those studies can be generalized to all human minds<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">While I (for the most part, and tentatively) agree
with the assumptions listed here, they are by no means exhaustive. Before we do
science there are still many more principles that need to be proposed. We need
to assume that there exists causal regularity and uniformity in nature. We need
to assume the validity of induction. We need to assume that things are
intelligible in themselves. We need to assume the laws of logic. We need to
assume a theory of truth. We need to assume, not that we can have stable
knowledge of reality, but that we can predicate things of reality that
accurately correspond to the way reality actually is.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Now why is the listing of all these assumptions
important? Well, because if science presupposes these propositions, then no
corollary of science can ever call these into question. You simply cannot pull
the rug out from underneath yourself, and this is what Mike fails to
comprehend, as is evident by these statements of his:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">If we accept these assumptions — as most all of us do
— then the philosophical implications of convergent empirical evidence across
multiple scientific disciples cannot be ignored. When convergent scientific
evidence informs us that most of our reasoning is unconscious and metaphorical,
or that cognitive metaphors are crucially tied to our embodiment, we have to
acknowledge that these results undermine classical conceptualizations of
metaphor, reasoning, and indeed truth itself.</span></blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">This is simply false. The philosophical implications
of “convergent” empirical evidence can indeed be, and must be, ignored when
they call into question the principles that science itself rests on. As I
reiterated above, if B presupposes A then no corollary of B can ever call A
into question. This is a logical necessity. And this is why Mike’s position,
that of embodied realism, continually refutes itself, because it keeps trying
to bite the hand that feeds it. You simply cannot kick out the foundation your
position is resting upon and expect it to remain intact and coherent. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">If you’ve made it this far I congratulate you. (To be
honest, I barely made it this far.) We’ve witnessed a lot of things in this
post. First, we’ve seen that Mike was quick to point out my supposed poor
understanding of embodied realism, when in fact a lot of the time he could
barely rearticulate my own criticisms, or his answers sidestepped them so far
that they became irrelevant and peripheral to the discussion at hand. Second,
we saw that Mike could not slay the correspondence theory of truth as he wanted
to; neither could embodied realism replace it with any coherent theory of its
own; neither could embodied realism’s levels of embodiment put the
correspondence theory into question at all. Third, we saw that Mike’s attempt
to save embodied realism’s “realism” through the use of “stable truths” did not
work, and could not work even in principle. Lastly, we saw that the results of
embodied cognition do not have the power to call our most basic metaphysical
principles into question, and that when embodied realism attempts to utilize
these results to call said principles into question, it ends in
self-refutation.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "times new roman" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">So that’s it. I have nothing more to say. Embodied
realism is false and self-refuting, and despite Mike’s efforts, it cannot be
rescued from the depths of incoherency.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
Steven Jakehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04753917037685188540noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4866671088220439212.post-36944164635337292092015-10-13T14:33:00.000-07:002015-10-13T14:33:35.475-07:00How to (really) think about metaphysics<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Today I was visiting some of the blogs I frequent and
I stopped by the blog <i><a href="http://www.atheismandthecity.com/">Atheism and the City</a></i>, authored by a frequent commenter at my blog who goes by the name “The
Thinker”. He has just posted <a href="http://www.atheismandthecity.com/2015/10/an-atheist-reviews-last-superstition.html">a review</a> of
Chapter 3 of Edward Feser’s book <i>The Last
Superstition. </i>There is much to quibble with in Thinker’s post, but I’ll
save an attempted refutation of his arguments for another day. My main focus
here is regarding his comments on metaphysics and scientism. I’ve gone on ad nauseum on this blog about the
importance of metaphysics, and the falsity and self-refutation of scientism
(see <a href="http://christian-agnostic.blogspot.com/2014/08/death-to-metaphysics.html">here</a>), but Thinker presents
a different spin on this issue—a view he calls “weak scientism”—and therefore I
felt the need to point out its falsity, thereby tossing it in the trash-bin
with the other failed metaphysical frameworks. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Thinker begins to articulate his thoughts on weak
scientism:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"> I hold to what is sometimes called "weak
scientism." Unlike strong scientism, which says that "the
characteristic inductive methods of the natural sciences are the <i>only
source</i> of genuine factual knowledge and, in particular, that they
alone can yield true knowledge about man and society," weak scientism says
that the natural sciences are given a privileged status over metaphysics and
logic and all other methods of derived knowledge, but it stops short of saying
that science and logic are the "only" ways of yielding true
knowledge.</span></blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">It’s hard to say exactly what Thinker means by the
natural sciences entertaining a “privileged status” over metaphysics and logic.
Perhaps he means that the natural sciences are more genuine and pure methods
for attaining knowledge of reality. It is certainly true that the natural
sciences have illumined the majority of beliefs and knowledge that we have
about how the natural world behaves. But does this give one warrant to claim
that science therefore entertains a privileged status for gaining knowledge
about reality, over and above metaphysics? I don’t see how. For, as I’ve argued
before, science tells us <i>how</i> the
world behaves, but it does not, and cannot, tell us <i>why</i>—only metaphysics can hope to do this. Science might be able to
tell us about the four forces of nature, for example, but it cannot tell us why
those forces obtain at all as opposed to others. So I fail to see how science
should be given a privileged status regarding methods of inquiry above methods
like metaphysics. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">The Thinker continues:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Furthermore, I apply this privileged status of science
mostly when entertaining questions regarding ontology, such as the fundamental
nature of reality—for which science is our most reliable epistemology,
contrary to what Feser says.</span></blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">So now Thinker says that science seems to be our most
reliable guide for answering questions regarding the fundamental nature of
reality. Again, this presents a couple problems. First, science by itself does
not have the tools to comment on the fundamental nature of reality. This might
seem like an arrogant statement against science, but it’s the truth. Scientific
law only describes what already exists and how it behaves. But simply
describing what already exists is purely abstract, in that it doesn’t actually
enlighten us to the intrinsic nature of what it’s describing. So science simply
doesn’t cut deep enough to penetrate the fundamental nature of reality.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Second, the natural sciences necessarily describe only
the <i>natural world</i>. Therefore, <i>if</i> there were other aspects of reality,
science could not enlighten us one way or another regarding their behavior. In
fact, even if there exists no supernatural aspects of reality, science could
likewise not comment on its <i>non</i>-behavior.
The point is that science is completely silent on the question of what
comprises the set of reality and being. To construct my point in another
fashion, the description of a set of elements is not sufficient to conclude
that only the set exists. Something else would be needed to ground this
proposition, and it couldn’t be a mere description of a set’s behavior. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Let’s move on:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">No logician could ever derive the physics of quantum
mechanics from the laws of logic, or from metaphysics. Only empirical evidence
could enlighten us to such phenomena, and the universe is ultimately quantum
mechanical in nature.</span></blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Thinker continues to make the similar mistakes here.
First, I agree that science, and only science, enlightens us to the physics of
quantum mechanics and general relativity etc. But nobody ever said that
metaphysics was the method of inquiry that should have done this. You see,
science uncovers the physical contingencies of the universe that can be
repeated and predicted using abstract mathematical equations—equations that
could have been different. But, metaphysics enlightens us to the <i>necessities</i> of the universe, and
anything that could or would exist. It tells us the ontology of causality,
identity, first principles, time and free will etc. So, to once again engage in
chest-thumping on behalf of science because of its discoveries of the physical contingencies
of the world is simply misplaced here, since metaphysics wasn’t attempting to
do this in the first place. It’s like a basketball player praising his dunking
ability, while playing soccer. Metaphysics tells us the fundamental nature of
reality, and science tells us how this reality <i>happens</i> to behave. The latter is not equivalent to the former. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US;">Second, Thinker shoots himself in the foot here with
his last statement about the universe being quantum mechanical in nature. How
does he know the universe is entirely quantum mechanical in nature? Well quantum
mechanics cannot tell him this, since, to reiterate, QM is only a description
of sub-atomically existing matter. How does he know this description constitutes
the fundamental nature of reality? Even if he has an answer to this question,
it will not be given to him by QM. He will have to have some other fulcrum to
lay this proposition upon. And this goes for any set of natural sciences you
want to erect as the end-all be-all description of reality. A description of a
set simply will not be sufficient for concluding that only what’s in the set is
what exists, or that the set does not have an aspect of its nature not captured
by the original description. The Thinker’s attempt, then, to ground weak
scientism seems to have failed. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
Steven Jakehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04753917037685188540noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4866671088220439212.post-34987159932079267682015-10-07T13:00:00.000-07:002015-10-07T13:00:13.258-07:00The Apocalyptic Jesus (Part II): The imminent kingdom of God<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">Let us
continue with our series which attempts to highlight the imminent eschatology
of Jesus (part I <a href="http://christian-agnostic.blogspot.com/2015/08/the-apocalyptic-jesus-part-i.html">here</a>), an eschatology we would label as apocalyptic. In the
previous post I highlighted how important it is to interpret the ministry of
Jesus against the backdrop of the worldview of second temple Judaism, and how
this worldview shaped and catalyzed the apocalyptic framework. This will be
important to keep at the forefront as we, in this post, delve into another
focal point of Jesus ministry: the Kingdom of God.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">To those
familiar with the New Testament it should come as no surprise to hear that
Jesus’ ministry was organized around and predicated on the Kingdom of God.
Jesus spoke of this Kingdom probably more often than he spoke of anything else.
In fact, in the book of Matthew alone the phrase “kingdom of God” (or kingdom
of Heaven) is used thirty-seven times, while it is used thirty-two times in
Luke’s Gospel! In the Lord’s Prayer Jesus famously asked for “Thy Kingdom
come.” Scholar Craig Keener notes that “virtually every stratum of Gospel
tradition testifies that Jesus regularly announced the kingdom, there should be
no doubt that this was a characteristic emphasis of Jesus teaching.” In the
same vein, secular historian Michael
Grant claims the following in his book <i>Jesus</i>:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">[E]very
thought and saying of Jesus was directed and subordinated to one single thing
[…] the realization of the Kingdom of God
upon the earth[…] This one phrase sums up his whole ministry and his
whole life’s work. (p. 10-11)</span></blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">So it’s
clear then, Jesus’ ministry was about one general focal point: the kingdom of
God. But what exactly was meant by this phrase? Was it metaphorical or literal?
Christians these days interpret the phrase “kingdom of God” as meaning a
Christian lifestyle of love, or some interpret it as world evangelization. But
in order to find out what <i>Jesus</i> meant
by the phrase we need to understand how it was used in second temple Judaism. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">In <i>The Historical Jesus of the Gospels </i>Craig<i> </i>Keener claims that in Jesus’ time the
phrase “kingdom” signified the concept of “rule”, “reign”, or “authority” (p.
196). Again, Michael Grant, in agreement
with Keener, claims that “the Hebrew term [kingdom] refers not so much to a
realm as to the dynamic kingly rule and sovereign action of God.” (p. 15) So,
the kingdom of God seems to represent God’s sovereign rule and reign. To quote
Keener again, “When Jewish people prayed for God’s kingdom to ‘come,’ they
weren’t simply invoking God’s mystical presence among them for the present
time; they were praying for God’s future reign to come.” (p. 198) <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">Moreover,
we can survey Jewish texts in the second temple Judaic period and see how they used
the phrase “kingdom of God.” The Kaddish prayer states the following: “May he
establish his kingdom in your lifetime and in your days, and in the lifetime of
the whole house of Israel, speedily and at a near time.” In the <i>Testament of Moses</i> 10:1 it says that “[God’s]
kingdom shall appear throughout his creation, and Satan shall be no more[.]”
And from the Dead Sea Scrolls 4Q246 it states the following: “His kingdom will
be an everlasting kingdom and all his ways in truth. He will judge the earth in
truth and all will make peace. The sword will cease from the earth and all
provinces will worship him[.]” These uses of kingdom surely seem to imply the
reign, rule and authority of God. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj58RZdbG4zujQxmmN3JeDvXZxqlckePsAzF3whuuoqexNMSlo1fBiVFzvmBoSc-bBvES2_4mCGEXR-ku4qWfa9zzT77KKzPgJ-hvMUU1kSfgCbksRXDr0r9_DGejZoWocRknZmvWCdPefJ/s1600/jesus-returns-at-the-battle-of-armageddon-200.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="200" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj58RZdbG4zujQxmmN3JeDvXZxqlckePsAzF3whuuoqexNMSlo1fBiVFzvmBoSc-bBvES2_4mCGEXR-ku4qWfa9zzT77KKzPgJ-hvMUU1kSfgCbksRXDr0r9_DGejZoWocRknZmvWCdPefJ/s200/jesus-returns-at-the-battle-of-armageddon-200.jpg" width="121" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">Thus,
the phrase “kingdom of God” seems most plausibly to be conceived as the
restoration of God’s rule and authority as seen through the Davidic Kingdom,
brought about by divine intervention ( see part I). Again, this is what was expected by most Jews
and it makes perfect sense to interpret Jesus’ use of the phrase “kingdom” in
this vein—any other interpretation only strains credulity and is anachronistic.
For, as the Jews believed, God’s
authority obviously was not being exercised in second temple Judaism since the
Jews were still being oppressed. But, His rule was soon to come, and his
Kingdom would be established once and for all. At least this is what Jesus and
many Jews believed. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">This
brings us to Jesus actual statements about the kingdom, and exactly how close he
believed God’s rule was to being realized:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">The
kingdom of God has come near you. Luke 10:9</span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">Truly I
tell you, there are some standing here who will not taste death until they see
that the kingdom of God has come in power. Mark 9:1</span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">The time
is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God has come near; repent and believe in the
good news. Mark 1:15 </span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">You must
be ready, for the Son of Man is coming at an unexpected hour. Luke 12:40</span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">Truly I
tell you, this generation will not pass away until all these things have taken
place. Mark 13:30</span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">And will
God not grant justice to his chosen ones who cry to him day and night? Will he
delay long in helping them? I tell you, he will quickly grant justice to them.
Luke 18:7-8</span></blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">Obviously
this is the tip of the iceberg. Anyone who’s ever cracked open the New
Testament will see phrases of this kind peppered throughout. The point is that
Jesus believed God’s intervention, which aimed at establishing his kingdom once
and for all was right around the corner. So close in fact that his disciples
wouldn’t even die before it happened. So close that Jesus’ own ministry was the
first fruits of the ushering of this kingdom. This is apocalypticism, plain and
simple. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">But this
line of thought can be taken even further, and can illuminate further elements
of Jesus’ ministry. Think of some of Jesus’ extreme commands in the vein of asceticism:
Taking no thought or concern for subsequent days. To make
oneself a eunuch for the kingdom’s sake. A lack of concern for material things,
including personal possessions and even shelter. Jesus’ willingness to die etc.
(This asceticism is also illuminated in Paul when he told the churches not to
marry.) It should be obvious from reading the Gospels that Jesus kept a general
distance from the way normal society took its course. He simply didn’t care
about what most Jews and Romans cared about. And why should he have, since he
believed the world was about to end due to God’s intervention. Why care about
possessions if they won’t be important any longer? Why care about what’s going
to happen tomorrow, since tomorrow might not come at all? Why care about your
family or marrying a woman if such things won’t matter when God intervenes?
This point is driven home in Karl Frank’s book <i>With Greater Liberty</i> when he states that “the conviction that the
end of the world was near always fostered asceticism.” (p. 30) It should be
obvious that this ascetic outlook fits like a glove with an apocalyptic
worldview, and therefore gives us more reason to regard Jesus as an apocalyptic
prophet. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Times, Times New Roman, serif;">Thus, we
see that Jesus’ ministry rested on the fulcrum of the kingdom of God. Yet we’ve
seen that in second temple Judaism the kingdom of God represented God’s
eventual intervention which would establish once and for all his sovereign
authority. And we’ve seen that Jesus made statements that explicitly state that
this intervention was right around the corner and would happen within the
lifetime of his disciples. Lastly, we saw that Jesus’ indifference to the
common matters of the world makes perfect sense under the condition that Jesus
believed the world would be ending soon. Everywhere we turn, the apocalyptic
framework makes perfect sense when predicated of Jesus’ ministry. </span><span style="font-family: Times New Roman, serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
Steven Jakehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04753917037685188540noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4866671088220439212.post-13455216253693416242015-08-31T11:34:00.000-07:002015-08-31T11:34:50.473-07:00Why science cannot (ever) explain the existence of the universe
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Can the
universe account for its own existence? Can we find, within physics and cosmology,
the reason for why physical reality exists at all? Cosmologists and physicists are
hopeful that finding an answer to these questions is at least possible and
maybe even plausible. For the cosmologist’s job is to search out the origin of
the universe—or find out if it had an origin at all—to find out why it exists
in the first place, and why and how it came to exist in its current state. Now
cosmology has come a long way in the last century and it continues to advance
in leaps and bounds. But despite the advancements of physics, I maintain that
physicists will never in principle be able to explain the existence of physical
reality. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">I
realize that in promulgation of this statement I am shouldering a great burden
of proof, and that such a statement can even come across as arrogant. However,
please note that it is borne out of careful logical study of the philosophy of
science, and not from a petulant view of science or scientists. In fact, I have
found that it is “skeptics” who arrogantly fail to recognize the explanatory
limits of science, and by doing so would only take my aforementioned statement
as arrogant because their vision is dogmatically colored by the lens of positivism.
However, since this is not the time to get into the hypocritical creeds of the
freethought community, let us return to the thesis at hand: science cannot
explain why the universe exists. (Note that by “universe” I include any
possible meta-universe or multiverse.) <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Now,
what gives me the right to assert such a blanket statement like this?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Well, the nature of scientific inquiry itself
does. You see, as I’ve pointed out before, science operates on inductive
conditional statements like “if p, then q”. This is why scientists can run an
experiment a finite amount of times and then generalize a conditional statement
as a law. (Note again that such an exercise would be moot unless we took things
to have shared essences.) And this takes us to the nature of scientific laws
themselves. Scientific laws are mere descriptions of the way things tend to
behave given certain ideal conditions. These laws are not prescriptive, in that
they don’t <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">inform</i> substances on how
to behave. Rather, substances behave the way they do and our formulated laws
are informed by such behavior. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">The
pivotal point here is that scientific laws are ontologically dependent on
existence, not the other way around. That is to say, scientific laws don’t
obtain unless you first have something which actually exists and behaves in
some way. That’s why the conditional statements of scientific law start with
“if p,” meaning “if some state of actual affairs obtains in reality”.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Now, what exactly does this have to do with
science explaining the existence of the universe? Well, if existence logically
precedes scientific law, then the latter cannot itself ever explain the former.
That is to say, scientific law first needs <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">something
already in existence</i> to describe the behavior of—it doesn’t describe
non-existence—therefore science is reliant upon existence, and thus existence
will always be a higher member in an explanatory chain. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>But in order for science to explain the
universe it would itself need to be the higher member in an explanatory chain,
and since this is logically impossible then it follows necessarily that science
cannot in principle explain the existence of the universe. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">There’s
another point to be made here, however. It should also be noted that science
cannot even account for its own laws. That is, science itself cannot determine
why the laws are the way they are as opposed to being another way. Here’s why.
Either (i) the reason scientific laws are the way they are is to be illumined
by another scientific law, or (ii) the reason scientific laws are the way they
are is to be illumined by an explanation <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">not</i>
susceptible to scientific description. (i) is not a viable option because
explaining scientific law by another scientific law just pushes the question
back a step and doesn’t answer anything. Moreover, the question was to explain
the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">set</i> of scientific laws, and this
cannot be done by another scientific law not in the set since the set already
contains all scientific laws. Thus, option (i) isn’t even possible. (This is
why arriving at a scientific Theory of Everything is not possible as well.) If
one chooses (ii) then we arrive at an explanation not susceptible to science,
which only proves my point, namely, that scientific law cannot explain itself. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Implications for naturalism<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Now all
these points actually have important implications for naturalism as well. For most
ontological naturalists naturalism seems to imply physicalism—note that I’m not
claiming that naturalism necessarily entails physicalism, only that most
naturalists are physicalists. The reason for this is that if all that exists is
the natural world and the natural world contains all matter, energy, space and
time, then all that exists in the natural world is physical—or it at least
supervenes on the physical—and therefore all that exists is physical. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">But this
means that physics itself should be able, in principle, to arrive at a theory
of everything and thereby explain the existence of the physical world. But we’ve
just seen above that this is what physics and science cannot, in principle, do.
And thus physicalism and naturalism are false—again, based on those who would
derive physicalism from naturalism. David Bentley Hart articulates the point
numerous times in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">The Experience of God</i>:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"></span><blockquote class="tr_bq">
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Physical
reality cannot account for its own existence for the simple reason that
nature—the physical—is that which by definition already exists; existence, even
taken as a simple brute fact to which no metaphysical theory is attached, lies
logically beyond the system of causes that nature comprises; it is, quite
literally, “hyperphysical,” or, shifting into Latin, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">super naturam</i>. This means not only that at some point nature
requires or admits of a supernatural explanation (which it does), but also that
at no point is anything purely, self-sufficiently natural in the first place.
(p. 96)</blockquote>
</blockquote>
<o:p></o:p><br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">To drive
the point home one last time, physics and science are at a loss to explain
exactly why the physical world is the way it is, and why it exists in the first
place. Science is explanatorily inert here. And this should <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">not</i> be the case if physicalism were true.
Thus, because of the nature of the universe and the explanatory limits of
physics, physicalism is false. What implications should this entail for
naturalism? I’ll let the reader decide for themselves. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><o:p> </o:p></span></div>
Steven Jakehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04753917037685188540noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4866671088220439212.post-80865746300788410662015-08-17T13:04:00.001-07:002015-08-17T13:04:35.520-07:00The Apocalyptic Jesus (Part I): Apocalypticism and John the Baptist<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj68AiT1Y-0okwTNhkHjnojfpumCLIS1bDu3Tbb5MCLyc6L602GVRe-NEKDHyqRKKwQbSOyVlq_RgkVO-MhYycVnzMlMwwe_k4C7KYtKe_NM8PQkXNLrL9sOiBPT2SA4Ri-wLTzQzNlVHZK/s1600/Jesus.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="200" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj68AiT1Y-0okwTNhkHjnojfpumCLIS1bDu3Tbb5MCLyc6L602GVRe-NEKDHyqRKKwQbSOyVlq_RgkVO-MhYycVnzMlMwwe_k4C7KYtKe_NM8PQkXNLrL9sOiBPT2SA4Ri-wLTzQzNlVHZK/s200/Jesus.jpg" width="133" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">I
realize that this current series of articles is going to turn off some of my
Christian readers—hopefully only momentarily. I understand that. The idea that
I’m entertaining and arguing for is completely contrary to any form of orthodox
Christianity, and it will be seen as heretical and blasphemous. I understand
that as well. But before you dismiss what I’m about to argue, please understand
that I once felt the same way. The idea that Jesus (wrongly) expected the world
to end in his own lifetime is something that I would have scoffed at only about
four years ago. But after reading the scholarly arguments put forward for the
apocalyptic Jesus thesis, and after a hard road of trying to convince myself
otherwise, this viewpoint just seemed to be <i>the
most logical explanation of Jesus’ ministry that I had ever come across. </i>I
didn’t want this view to be true, I really didn’t. But at the end of the day I
had to follow the evidence where it led; and it is this evidence that I will
attempt to put forward over the next few articles. I admonish you, the reader,
not to let your preconceptions rule your judgment of the evidence—though I know
that this is almost impossible. Please try to be as objective as possible and
read with an open mind. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">_________________________________________________________________________________<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Apocalypticism<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">It
should go without saying that a historical figure’s life, words, and deeds
should be studied and judged within the larger context of their immediate
culture. Jesus is no different. Jesus lived in the time of second temple Judaism
(515 BC-70AD) and during the latter part of this time period a certain
worldview was rampant and ubiquitous among the Jews—namely, that of <i>apocalypticism</i>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Apocalypticism
is an eschatology (i.e. set of beliefs about the end of the world) wherein the
end of history is brought about by divine intervention and is thought to be
happening very soon. It is this belief that became the primary worldview of second
temple Jews for a few reasons. You see, starting in the eighth century B.C.,
the promised land of the Israelites was constantly under attack from foreign
powers. The most important of these attacks took place in 586 B.C. and
subsequently led to the exile of the Israelites from the southern kingdom and
their subsequent oppression by the Babylonians. This exile was interpreted by
the prophets as punishment from God for Israel’s lack of faithfulness and sin. So
the prophets promised that if Israel got their act together and sincerely
repented of their unfaithfulness, then God would restore them their land and
would reestablish them among the nations. But unfortunately the land was never
restored back to their control and their land was continually dominated by more
and more increasingly powerful nations, despite the fact that Israel had indeed
repented of their unfaithfulness—this happened for a couple centuries. So if
Israel, God’s chosen people, had done what God wanted, then why wasn’t he
fighting for them any longer? Why was <i>he</i>
now the one no longer being faithful? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">This is
exactly what Israel was asking itself, and out of these questions
apocalypticism was generated. For it was then thought that Israel was no longer
being punished by God for being unfaithful, rather Israel was being punished by
God’s <i>enemies </i>(both spiritual and
physical) for being faithful! Thus, the Israelites were suffering <i>for</i> their faith, instead of suffering
for lacking it, as had previously taken place. Moreover, Jews were beginning to
stand up to their oppressors, and consequently were being martyred left and
right for their faith; thus cognitive dissonance caused the Jews to cook up an
afterlife and a day of final judgment, in which the faithful would be
vindicated, and the enemies of God who were oppressing his chosen people would
finally get what they had coming to them—since God obviously wasn’t doing this
currently. This day of God’s intervention, restoration, and subsequent judgment
was seen to be more and more imminent, because it was thought that God surely
would not let his children suffer needlessly. Hence, it was seen by a majority
of Jews in second temple Judaism that God’s cosmic intervention was right around
the corner, and any day now the messiah would come and drop the curtain on this
inversion of world powers.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">We see
these pronouncements of apocalypticism in the Assumption of Moses, 1 Enoch, the
Book of Daniel, Isaiah 24-27, Zechariah 9-14, 4<sup>th</sup> Ezra, the
Apocalypse of Abraham, 2<sup>nd</sup> Baruch, the Dead Sea Scrolls, and in the
Essene movement. The point is that second temple Judaism was soaked in an
apocalyptic worldview, and it is in this context that the ministry of Jesus
must be interpreted—to claim the opposite is anachronistic. To quote critical
NT scholar Dale Allison from the book <i>The
Apocalyptic Jesus</i>: [T]o propose that Jesus thought the end to be near is
just to say that he believed what many others in his time and place believed.
(p. 23)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">The
question then is, Did Jesus really believe the end was near? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><br /></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Those that came before and after<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">One way
to best understand Jesus’ ministry is to survey the ministry which was the
genesis for his own, as well as surveying the ministry that was generated from
his. Let us begin with the former. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">It is no
secret that Jesus was baptized by John the Baptist. For Jesus to submit himself
to be baptized by John, he obviously had some theological and doctrinal
continuity with him and his ministry. As
Scholar Craig Keener notes in <i>The
Historical Jesus of the Gospels</i>, the “baptism indicates, at the least, that
Jesus knew and accepted John’s message[…] Jesus’ message stood in continuity
with John’s[.]” (p. 176) Not only this, but Jesus explicitly praised and
endorsed the Baptist himself. He stated that John was “more than a prophet”
(Matthew 11:9) and that “among those born of women there has not risen one
greater than he.” (Matthew 11:11) Therefore, it seems clear that Jesus thought
very highly of John, and, since John preceded him, Jesus believed his ministry
to be a continuation of John’s. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">But what
exactly did John the Baptist preach? Well John was quite clear that Israel
needed to turn to God and repent, but why? Well, John asked “Who warned you to
flee from the wrath to come?” and stated that “the ax is laid to the root of
the trees.” (Luke 3: 7 and 9) That is to say, John expected God to intervene
soon—the ax is laid to the root of the trees—and therefore repentance was necessary
if one wanted to be on God’s side when he intervened. Again, Keener states that
“John was a wilderness prophet proclaiming impending judgment.” (p. 167)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Moreover,
the fact that John was a prophet living in the wilderness should not be
overlooked. You see, many Jews expected Israel’s restoration to occur in the
wilderness—partly because of verses like Hosea 2:14-23—and the prophets seem to
have insinuated that a new exodus would take place there. The Qumran community
was an apocalyptic movement and they lived exclusively in the wilderness for
the same reasons—though it is not thought that John was part of the Qumrans. Thus,
a ministry in the wilderness, as John had, seems to have clear apocalyptic
implications. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">So, it
seems that Jesus had continuity with John’s ministry, and his ministry seems to
have had an apocalyptic element to it. And thus it makes even more sense to
view Jesus as an apocalypticist due to his theological predecessor John the
Baptist. But what about Jesus’ immediate followers and successors? Did they
show any signs of imminent eschatological expectations? You bet they did. Let
us survey just a few verses to demonstrate this:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Besides
this, you know what time it is, how it is now the moment for you to wake from
sleep. For salvation is nearer to us now than when we became believers. (Romans
13:11)</span></blockquote>
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">In a
very little while, the one who is coming will come and will not delay. (Hebrews
10:37)</span></blockquote>
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">You must
also be patient. Strengthen your hearts, for the coming of the Lord is near.
(James 5:8)</span></blockquote>
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">The one
who testifies to these things says, ‘Surely I am coming soon.’ (Revelation
22:20)</span></blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">It
should be quite apparent from these verses that the earliest followers of the
Jesus movement expected their salvation and vindication—which included the
return of Jesus—to manifest very soon. At any moment Jesus would be riding on
the clouds to usher in that very thing. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">So where
did this belief come from? Because this belief was not some peripheral doctrine
of Jesus’ immediate followers. It seems
to be a ubiquitous eschatology that permeates the deepest desires of the Jesus
movement. If Jesus did not believe that
the end was near, then why did his posthumous ministry hold to such a belief?
How do we explain the ubiquity of apocalypticism in Jesus’ followers? Is it
really just plausible to say that Jesus’ followers just all happened to form
this mistaken belief independently of one another? Or is it not more plausible
that the ubiquity of their belief had its genesis in the teachings and beliefs
of him whom they called their Lord? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Now when
you pair this with the eschatology of John the Baptist then our thesis becomes
even more compelling. For if the Jesus movement branched out from an
apocalyticist movement, and if the successors of the Jesus movement maintained
apocalypticist beliefs, then it really only makes sense that Jesus himself was
also an apocalyticist. The denial of this claim is simply implausible. For then
one would have to address why Jesus endorsed John’s ministry, yet had a
completely different eschatology—even though his eschatology <i>seems</i> to be apocalyptic, a point we’ll
argue for in the next few articles—and why Jesus’ followers jettisoned (their
master) Jesus’ eschatology in favor of an apocalyptic one. This latter thesis
is too ad hoc and it violates the principle of parsimony. It seems that
simplicity prevails here, and it seems most plausible that Jesus, like those
immediately before and after him, was an apocalypticist. To quote Dale Allison:
“[T]o reconstruct a Jesus who did not have
strong eschatological or apocalyptic orientation entails discontinuity […]
with the movement out of which he came as well as with the movement that came
out of him. Isn’t presumption against this?” (p. 21)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
Steven Jakehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04753917037685188540noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4866671088220439212.post-14773665077301339692015-07-21T08:55:00.000-07:002015-07-21T08:55:39.495-07:00Richard Carrier on the God hypothesis<!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:OfficeDocumentSettings>
<o:AllowPNG/>
</o:OfficeDocumentSettings>
</xml><![endif]--><br />
<!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<w:WordDocument>
<w:View>Normal</w:View>
<w:Zoom>0</w:Zoom>
<w:TrackMoves/>
<w:TrackFormatting/>
<w:PunctuationKerning/>
<w:ValidateAgainstSchemas/>
<w:SaveIfXMLInvalid>false</w:SaveIfXMLInvalid>
<w:IgnoreMixedContent>false</w:IgnoreMixedContent>
<w:AlwaysShowPlaceholderText>false</w:AlwaysShowPlaceholderText>
<w:DoNotPromoteQF/>
<w:LidThemeOther>EN-US</w:LidThemeOther>
<w:LidThemeAsian>X-NONE</w:LidThemeAsian>
<w:LidThemeComplexScript>X-NONE</w:LidThemeComplexScript>
<w:Compatibility>
<w:BreakWrappedTables/>
<w:SnapToGridInCell/>
<w:WrapTextWithPunct/>
<w:UseAsianBreakRules/>
<w:DontGrowAutofit/>
<w:SplitPgBreakAndParaMark/>
<w:EnableOpenTypeKerning/>
<w:DontFlipMirrorIndents/>
<w:OverrideTableStyleHps/>
</w:Compatibility>
<m:mathPr>
<m:mathFont m:val="Cambria Math"/>
<m:brkBin m:val="before"/>
<m:brkBinSub m:val="--"/>
<m:smallFrac m:val="off"/>
<m:dispDef/>
<m:lMargin m:val="0"/>
<m:rMargin m:val="0"/>
<m:defJc m:val="centerGroup"/>
<m:wrapIndent m:val="1440"/>
<m:intLim m:val="subSup"/>
<m:naryLim m:val="undOvr"/>
</m:mathPr></w:WordDocument>
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<w:LatentStyles DefLockedState="false" DefUnhideWhenUsed="false"
DefSemiHidden="false" DefQFormat="false" DefPriority="99"
LatentStyleCount="371">
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="0" QFormat="true" Name="Normal"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" QFormat="true" Name="heading 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="heading 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="heading 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="heading 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="heading 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="heading 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="heading 7"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="heading 8"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="9" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="heading 9"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index 7"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index 8"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index 9"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="toc 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="toc 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="toc 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="toc 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="toc 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="toc 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="toc 7"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="toc 8"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="toc 9"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Normal Indent"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="footnote text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="annotation text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="header"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="footer"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="index heading"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="35" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="caption"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="table of figures"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="envelope address"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="envelope return"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="footnote reference"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="annotation reference"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="line number"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="page number"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="endnote reference"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="endnote text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="table of authorities"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="macro"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="toa heading"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Bullet"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Number"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Bullet 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Bullet 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Bullet 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Bullet 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Number 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Number 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Number 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Number 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="10" QFormat="true" Name="Title"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Closing"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Signature"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="1" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="Default Paragraph Font"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Body Text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Body Text Indent"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Continue"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Continue 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Continue 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Continue 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="List Continue 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Message Header"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="11" QFormat="true" Name="Subtitle"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Salutation"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Date"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Body Text First Indent"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Body Text First Indent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Note Heading"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Body Text 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Body Text 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Body Text Indent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Body Text Indent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Block Text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Hyperlink"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="FollowedHyperlink"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="22" QFormat="true" Name="Strong"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="20" QFormat="true" Name="Emphasis"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Document Map"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Plain Text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="E-mail Signature"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Top of Form"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Bottom of Form"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Normal (Web)"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Acronym"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Address"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Cite"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Code"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Definition"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Keyboard"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Preformatted"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Sample"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Typewriter"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="HTML Variable"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Normal Table"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="annotation subject"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="No List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Outline List 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Outline List 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Outline List 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Simple 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Simple 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Simple 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Classic 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Classic 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Classic 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Classic 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Colorful 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Colorful 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Colorful 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Columns 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Columns 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Columns 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Columns 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Columns 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Grid 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Grid 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Grid 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Grid 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Grid 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Grid 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Grid 7"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Grid 8"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table List 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table List 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table List 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table List 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table List 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table List 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table List 7"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table List 8"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table 3D effects 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table 3D effects 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table 3D effects 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Contemporary"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Elegant"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Professional"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Subtle 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Subtle 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Web 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Web 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Web 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Balloon Text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" Name="Table Grid"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" UnhideWhenUsed="true"
Name="Table Theme"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" Name="Placeholder Text"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="1" QFormat="true" Name="No Spacing"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" Name="Light Shading"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" Name="Light List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" Name="Light Grid"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" Name="Medium Shading 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" Name="Medium Shading 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" Name="Medium List 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" Name="Medium List 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" Name="Medium Grid 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" Name="Medium Grid 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" Name="Medium Grid 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" Name="Dark List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" Name="Colorful Shading"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" Name="Colorful List"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" Name="Colorful Grid"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" Name="Light Shading Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" Name="Light List Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" Name="Light Grid Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" SemiHidden="true" Name="Revision"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="34" QFormat="true"
Name="List Paragraph"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="29" QFormat="true" Name="Quote"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="30" QFormat="true"
Name="Intense Quote"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" Name="Dark List Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" Name="Colorful List Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" Name="Light Shading Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" Name="Light List Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" Name="Light Grid Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" Name="Dark List Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" Name="Colorful List Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" Name="Light Shading Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" Name="Light List Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" Name="Light Grid Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" Name="Dark List Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" Name="Colorful List Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" Name="Light Shading Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" Name="Light List Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" Name="Light Grid Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" Name="Dark List Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" Name="Colorful List Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" Name="Light Shading Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" Name="Light List Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" Name="Light Grid Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" Name="Dark List Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" Name="Colorful List Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="60" Name="Light Shading Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="61" Name="Light List Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="62" Name="Light Grid Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="63" Name="Medium Shading 1 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="64" Name="Medium Shading 2 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="65" Name="Medium List 1 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="66" Name="Medium List 2 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="67" Name="Medium Grid 1 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="68" Name="Medium Grid 2 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="69" Name="Medium Grid 3 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="70" Name="Dark List Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="71" Name="Colorful Shading Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="72" Name="Colorful List Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="73" Name="Colorful Grid Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="19" QFormat="true"
Name="Subtle Emphasis"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="21" QFormat="true"
Name="Intense Emphasis"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="31" QFormat="true"
Name="Subtle Reference"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="32" QFormat="true"
Name="Intense Reference"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="33" QFormat="true" Name="Book Title"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="37" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" Name="Bibliography"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="39" SemiHidden="true"
UnhideWhenUsed="true" QFormat="true" Name="TOC Heading"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="41" Name="Plain Table 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="42" Name="Plain Table 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="43" Name="Plain Table 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="44" Name="Plain Table 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="45" Name="Plain Table 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="40" Name="Grid Table Light"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46" Name="Grid Table 1 Light"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="Grid Table 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="Grid Table 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="Grid Table 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="Grid Table 5 Dark"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51" Name="Grid Table 6 Colorful"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52" Name="Grid Table 7 Colorful"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="Grid Table 1 Light Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="Grid Table 2 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="Grid Table 3 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="Grid Table 4 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="Grid Table 5 Dark Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="Grid Table 6 Colorful Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="Grid Table 7 Colorful Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="Grid Table 1 Light Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="Grid Table 2 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="Grid Table 3 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="Grid Table 4 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="Grid Table 5 Dark Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="Grid Table 6 Colorful Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="Grid Table 7 Colorful Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="Grid Table 1 Light Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="Grid Table 2 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="Grid Table 3 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="Grid Table 4 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="Grid Table 5 Dark Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="Grid Table 6 Colorful Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="Grid Table 7 Colorful Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="Grid Table 1 Light Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="Grid Table 2 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="Grid Table 3 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="Grid Table 4 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="Grid Table 5 Dark Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="Grid Table 6 Colorful Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="Grid Table 7 Colorful Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="Grid Table 1 Light Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="Grid Table 2 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="Grid Table 3 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="Grid Table 4 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="Grid Table 5 Dark Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="Grid Table 6 Colorful Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="Grid Table 7 Colorful Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="Grid Table 1 Light Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="Grid Table 2 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="Grid Table 3 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="Grid Table 4 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="Grid Table 5 Dark Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="Grid Table 6 Colorful Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="Grid Table 7 Colorful Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46" Name="List Table 1 Light"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="List Table 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="List Table 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="List Table 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="List Table 5 Dark"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51" Name="List Table 6 Colorful"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52" Name="List Table 7 Colorful"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="List Table 1 Light Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="List Table 2 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="List Table 3 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="List Table 4 Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="List Table 5 Dark Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="List Table 6 Colorful Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="List Table 7 Colorful Accent 1"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="List Table 1 Light Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="List Table 2 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="List Table 3 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="List Table 4 Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="List Table 5 Dark Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="List Table 6 Colorful Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="List Table 7 Colorful Accent 2"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="List Table 1 Light Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="List Table 2 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="List Table 3 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="List Table 4 Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="List Table 5 Dark Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="List Table 6 Colorful Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="List Table 7 Colorful Accent 3"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="List Table 1 Light Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="List Table 2 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="List Table 3 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="List Table 4 Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="List Table 5 Dark Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="List Table 6 Colorful Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="List Table 7 Colorful Accent 4"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="List Table 1 Light Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="List Table 2 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="List Table 3 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="List Table 4 Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="List Table 5 Dark Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="List Table 6 Colorful Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="List Table 7 Colorful Accent 5"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="46"
Name="List Table 1 Light Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="47" Name="List Table 2 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="48" Name="List Table 3 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="49" Name="List Table 4 Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="50" Name="List Table 5 Dark Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="51"
Name="List Table 6 Colorful Accent 6"/>
<w:LsdException Locked="false" Priority="52"
Name="List Table 7 Colorful Accent 6"/>
</w:LatentStyles>
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 10]>
<style>
/* Style Definitions */
table.MsoNormalTable
{mso-style-name:"Table Normal";
mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0;
mso-tstyle-colband-size:0;
mso-style-noshow:yes;
mso-style-priority:99;
mso-style-parent:"";
mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt;
mso-para-margin-top:0in;
mso-para-margin-right:0in;
mso-para-margin-bottom:8.0pt;
mso-para-margin-left:0in;
line-height:107%;
mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
font-size:11.0pt;
font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;
mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri;
mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin;
mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri;
mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;}
</style>
<![endif]-->
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiR48a9fajcJwjqcNNZPQaJ_MEPNd6hjDxDLDHgoItJTIlhCxI-vP_cGI9KP7iFyyYPASZktHeQy1zosLOIeI9V43ZuTqh8au13e25xl7FC0lN2Uf6_g3kao8E3FhW_kSGdWTKiH0MPQ-q3/s1600/Sense%252Band%252BGoodness%252BWithout%252BGod.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiR48a9fajcJwjqcNNZPQaJ_MEPNd6hjDxDLDHgoItJTIlhCxI-vP_cGI9KP7iFyyYPASZktHeQy1zosLOIeI9V43ZuTqh8au13e25xl7FC0lN2Uf6_g3kao8E3FhW_kSGdWTKiH0MPQ-q3/s320/Sense%252Band%252BGoodness%252BWithout%252BGod.jpg" width="212" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">Richard
Carrier’s book <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Sense-Goodness-Without-God-Metaphysical/dp/1420802933/ref=sr_1_5?ie=UTF8&qid=1437493825&sr=8-5&keywords=richard+carrier"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Sense and Goodness without God</i></a> is one of the best defenses of metaphysical naturalism that I have
read. He is very well-read, especially when it comes to philosophy and science,
and even though I don’t agree with many of his conclusions, one can infer that
his position, as he presents it, is warranted. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">That being
said, there are a few places in Carrier’s book where he surveys the
justification for belief in God, and (shockingly!) finds said justification
wanting. Obviously since I’m a theist I vehemently disagree with Carrier, and
(also shockingly) I found his reasoning to be a bit sloppy and confused. As
such, this post is my attempt to demonstrate where exactly Carrier goes wrong,
and why what he says actually points towards God, instead of away from him. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">First,
Carrier considers the idea that God could be an explanation for the universe.
He claims that this explanation isn’t a “good one,” and articulates a few
points attempting to demonstrate such:</span></div>
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">[T]he idea
that there was a God around before there was a universe—in other words the idea
that something existed when there was no place for it to exist, that something
acted when there was no time in which it could act—does not make much sense[.]
(p. 72)</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
</blockquote>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">A few
problems here. First, remember that God is claimed to be provable via logical
deduction, and thus if this is indeed true (see e.g. the <a href="http://christian-agnostic.blogspot.co.uk/2015/01/the-argument-from-contingency.html">argument from contingency</a>) then the existence of God is logically necessary., and therefore
quibbling about how hard it is to fathom such an existence would be irrelevant.
Let me demonstrate this with an example—from math! A math professor once showed
me a proof that attempted to demonstrate that the sum of all positive integers
equaled one-half. Hopefully it’s obvious that this conclusion seems absolutely
absurd, since common sense clearly dictates that the sum of positive integers
would converge to infinity.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Yet the fact
that this proof infers something that is hard to fathom does not itself refute
the proof. The proof still stands, and the only way I can refute such an
inference is to find a mistake in the proof itself. Similarly, even if we
couldn’t explain logically how God exists outside of space, time, and physical
existence, this wouldn’t call the conclusion of such proofs into question, and
thus it wouldn’t call God’s existence into question. Of course, remember that
God’s existence would first need to be demonstrated in order for my answer here
to be valid. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">Moreover,
classical theists have always posited what is known as the Doctrine of Analogy,
which states that attributes predicated of God can only be attributed
analogously, instead of literally. So when we say that God acts or thinks, for
example, we don’t mean these words in the same way—nor in a completely
different way—that we predicate them of ourselves or of natural things. Thus,
Carrier’s claim that predications of God make no sense is only a problem if we
are thinking strictly univocally. Now, this isn’t an <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">ad</i> <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">hoc</i> attempt to avoid the
implications that Carrier has postulated. That is, the Doctrine of Analogy
wasn’t formulated specifically to answer objections like those of Carrier.
Rather, this doctrine is seen as a direct entailment of the doctrine of divine
simplicity. Because if God cannot be composed of parts—as the doctrine of
divine simplicity states--then there can be no parts in God that are
distinguishable from each other. Thus since our predications of God <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">are</i> in fact distinguishable, then this
must only be because our predications are analogous and not literal. So, when
seen in light of these two points, Carrier’s problem here loses efficacy. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">Carrier
continues his explanation for why the “God hypothesis” does not constitute a
good explanation:</span></div>
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">And even
if we can come up with an intelligible theory of creation, it still isn’t the
best logical inference to make. Can we infer from what we see as a completely
natural universe that a sentient Creator is behind it? Not really. Given the
lack of any clear evidence for a god, and the fact that everything we have seen
happen, which was not caused by humans, has been caused by immutable natural
elements and forces, we should sooner infer the opposite: that immutable
natural elements and forces are behind it all[…]Since we can explain everything
by appealing to only those things and their properties, then (all else being
equal) such an explanation is the most plausible one around—leaving no need and
no sound reason to go beyond them and invent all manner of unproven entities,
like gods and spirits and miraculous powers. Hence, even if the ‘god
hypothesis’ were plausible, it would not by any means be the most plausible.
(p. 72)</span></div>
</blockquote>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">Again, we
run into some complications. Carrier is viewing the “God hypothesis” through
the lens of abductive reasoning here. That is, he’s comparing theism with other
explanations (e.g., naturalism) and attempting to determine which provides the
best explanation for the evidence we observe. “So what’s the problem?” you
might ask. For isn’t reasoning to the best explanation a <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">good</i> thing? Indeed it is, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">depending
on what’s attempting to be inferred</i>. If you’re attempting to determine what
a fossil is doing in the Cretaceous period, then abduction is perfect. But if
you attempting to infer that the square root of negative two is an irrational
number, then deduction, and not abduction, is your best tool. You see, if
theists used abduction to try to reason to God—think of William Paley—then I
would agree with Carrier’s claims. For Occam’s razor would entail that the God
hypothesis multiplies entities extraneously and makes too many unnecessary assumptions.
However, classical theism makes no use of abductive reasoning—and shouldn’t--but
rather makes use of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">deductive</i>
reasoning. Deductive reasoning doesn’t use inference to the best explanation.
Rather, deduction attempts to prove that something is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">necessarily</i> the case. You see, classical theists didn’t argue that
God is the most plausible explanation for the universe, rather they argued that
God is a necessary condition for the existence of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">anything at all</i>. And abductive reasoning cannot ground such a
claim, but only deductive reasoning. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">So
Carrier’s claim that God would not be a good hypothesis is only efficacious if
we follow him in using abductive reasoning to determine the ontological
foundation of reality. But this is neither necessary nor logical. For if we can
utilize logical deduction to infer what the ontological foundation of reality
must be, then punting to abduction is superfluous here. The conclusions of
deduction, if true, are <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">necessarily</i>
true, and thus Carrier’s talk of best explanations is simply a category mistake
regarding how the existence of God is usually arrived at. All this is to say
that theists are playing chess while Carrier is playing checkers. If he wants
to attack theism, then he needs to attack theists on the actual grounds that
they utilize to make their arguments, otherwise he’s attacking a strawman. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">Carrier
then moves from talk of God as an explanation, to explaining God himself:</span></div>
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">If
everything must have an explanation, then you do not really get anywhere by
explaining the universe by proposing a god. For then that god needs an
explanation. Why does a god exist at all? Why that particular god and not some
other? And where did this god come from? […] So either there is an eternal
string of endless explanations, in which case there is no “ultimate”
explanation because the explanations never end (and so the universe remains
ultimately unexplained), or else there is something that has no explanation,
something that just “is,” what we would call a “brute fact.” There are no other
possibilities. (p. 73)</span></div>
</blockquote>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">On the
contrary, there is another possibility--something can be <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">self-explanatory</i>. Remember that classical theists believe,
deductively, that God is a necessary being. The very nature of a necessary
being is that its essence <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">just is</i>
existence. That is to say, a necessary existent cannot possibly fail to exist. Therefore,
when we ask “Why does the necessary being exist?” we’re really asking “Why does
that which must exist, exist?” And such a question is self-evident and
therefore self-explanatory—it answers itself. So, there is a false dichotomy
here that Carrier is presenting between infinite explanatory regress and brute
facts—<a href="http://christian-agnostic.blogspot.co.uk/2014/07/brute-facts-and-naturalism.html">which are impossible</a>. An explanatory chain <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">can</i> end in something which is self-evident and explains itself—in fact
this is done in mathematics! Now, Carrier (sort of) anticipates this answer:</span></div>
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;"> Thus, the
question for us really is: Where do we stop [the explanatory chain]? What is
the one, ultimate “brute fact” that needs no explanation? Certainly, most
people say this is God, that God is self-explanatory, having no origin, that
God exists necessarily as the one brute fact. But that requires resting on a
huge number of assumptions. Why not just stop with what we actually <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">know</i>—the natural world? Certainly this
is just as viable. After all, if god needs no explanation, then why does nature
need one? (p. 73)</span></div>
</blockquote>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">Many
problems here. First, Carrier is conflating a brute fact with that which is
self-explanatory. A brute fact is something which admits of no explanation, at
all, while something self-explanatory explains itself, and thus <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">does in fact</i> have an explanation--this
explanation is simply contained within the existent’s own nature. So when
theists say that God is self-explanatory, they are <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">not</i> claiming that God is therefore a brute fact. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">So, Carrier
is confused by claiming that extending our existential understanding to include
God violates Occam’s razor due to the fact that we could just as easily stop at
another brute fact that requires less assumptions, namely the universe. Since
God would not be a brute fact, then Carrier’s appeal to parsimony here is
misplaced. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">Second,
there is a perfectly logical reason why we can stop the explanatory chain at
God but not at the universe, as Carrier wants. For remember that something is
contingent if we can conceive of it failing to exist—that is, if it’s nature
does not contain the reason for its existence. Because if Y is part of the
nature of X, then you cannot have X fail to be Y. The contrapositive is that if
X <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">can</i> fail to be Y, then Y is not
part of the nature of X. Thus, if we can conceive of something failing to
exist, then existence cannot be part of the nature of that thing. And it should
be obvious that the universe—including a multiverse—satisfies the definition of
contingency. That is to say, we can easily conceive of the universe failing to
exist in its current state, or at all, and thus the universe is indeed
contingent. But this entails that the universe does require an explanation,
since to be contingent is to be <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">contingent
upon</i> something else. We see then that the universe cannot be a brute fact—especially
since they’re impossible—and therefore we cannot possibly stop at the universe
in an explanatory chain. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">Carrier
still tries to avoid this conclusion and claims that “The multiverse explains
everything that exists,” but we’ve seen that this is false. For the multiverse
does not explain itself, nor does it explain why anything at all exists in the
first place. For this we need a necessary existent, and the universe is not it,
since it satisfies the definition of contingency. Carrier again anticipates
this objection:</span></div>
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">Of course
one could ask why the multiverse exists at all, and why it has the exact
properties it does. But as we’ve already shown <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">something</i> must exist without any explanation at all, so it may as
well be the multiverse. (p. 82)</span></div>
</blockquote>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">On the
contrary, we’ve seen that an explanatory chain need not—and cannot possibly—end
in an unexplained brute fact. It can, and must, end in that which explains
itself and which exists necessarily. And unfortunately for Carrier this cannot
be the multiverse, for it is contingent and therefore necessarily entails an
explanation outside of itself. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif;">So Carrier
did not accomplish his goal in this part of his book. He did not show how God
is an unnecessary and extraneous hypothesis. His thesis rested on surveying the
wrong type of reasoning method when put forward by those attempting to prove God’s
existence. Then his thesis rested on conflations regarding the nature of explanatory
chains and how these relate to the ontological foundation of reality. So while
I admire Carrier’s attempt to vindicate naturalism in a systematic nature, I believe
he ultimately fails. </span></div>
Steven Jakehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04753917037685188540noreply@blogger.com0