Who created God?

My faith in the ability of those with non-theistic convictions to comprehend and accurately present the position they are opposed to (i.e. theism) is constantly eroded. The fact that such a judgment can be predicated even with regards to respected members of academia (see below) makes me wonder how much time skeptics actually spend researching the convictions they so militantly oppose. The reality that such blatant mischaracterizations are promulgated demonstrates that atheists (though not simply atheists) truly do not understand the position they claim is irrational; and if they do not understand the opposing position, then how can their rejection of said position be warranted?

The title of this post highlights a common objection, predicated on the above misunderstandings of atheists, brought forth when, usually, discussing the philosophical arguments (usually the Cosmological Argument) for God’s existence. After attempting to arrive at a deductive conclusion for God’s existence—the validity of this procedure must be discussed at a later time—the Christian interlocutor is, consistently, bombarded with this question of “who created God?” Not only is this a common objection with internet atheists, but it is an objection put forth by such well-known skeptics as Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, and (surprisingly) the great philosophers Bertrand Russell and David Hume—though, to be fair, Hume’s objection was more along the lines of “who designed the designer?” It would seem to be the case that such great minds as these would be able to present an objection free of elementary misunderstandings of the subject (God) under discussion--the very subject they claim is riddled with incoherency.

Yet the cogency of this question is tremendously wanting. For the question, as will be demonstrated presently, engages in blatant question-begging. Moreover, not only is it a bad objection to make, but it turns out that the objection is in itself incoherent.  Let’s take these assertions one at a time.

Supposed I ask you “what created my truck?”, “what created my computer?” or “what created the sun?”. All of these questions contain an implicit assumption, namely, that the subject in question was indeed created. Anyone making the inquiry “what created (x)?” is assuming the (x) in question has a cause of its existence. In contrast, if one harbored no such assumption of the contingency of the subject then the question would never be put forth. So, the one who asks “what created God” is already assuming the contingency and dependency of God on some ontologically prior entity. Such an assumption is blatant question-begging and is therefore fallacious.

Moreover, the question invites an even worse attack than above: the question is itself incoherent. For any person well-versed in the beliefs of classical theism—which obviously most atheists are not—knows that the very essence of God is existence itself. Hence, God’s very nature is existence and he, therefore, cannot fail to exist; thus, God who is existence itself and, therefore, a necessary being would by definition not require a cause. So the skeptic’s question amounts to nothing more than asking “who created the uncreated?” or “who caused the uncaused?” Surely these questions make no sense. This is tantamount to asking, “who has seen that which is not seeable?” or “who has knowledge of that which is unknowable?” These questions are all in the same boat: they are incoherent.

Now let me also articulate the fact that the above definition is not some arbitrary brute fact that the theist has attached to the concept of God in order to absolve said concept of any refutation—though no doubt most skeptics think this. This concept of God—that which is pure actuality, pure being (read: existence) and necessary—has been arrived at by logical deduction. Now if this logical deduction is invalid then the skeptic must demonstrate this by refuting one of the premises in said deduction. But it must be observed that the question “who created God?” does not attempt to do this. Rather, it is an incoherent question posed after the deduction has already arrived at a being that is necessary and, therefore, the question remains senseless.

My hope is that this incredibly empty and ridiculous argument will be disposed of by those who see themselves as the “champions of reason” (i.e. skeptics); but if the history of the philosophy of religion has taught us anything, it’s that this objection will, unfortunately, continue to be raised by the skeptic community.

 

Philosopher Keith Ward on biblical inspiration

"We can speak of the Bible as inspired, in that we can see God at work influencing and guiding the minds of biblical historians, lawyers, priests, poets and prophets, so as to lead them to a cumulative tradition of insights into the nature and purpose of God, the ultimate spiritual reality. For Christians who believe this, the Bible is not the words of God, somehow by-passing the minds of men and women and dictating words direct from the divine mind. It is a unique witness to the gradually percieved purposes of God, which culminate in the prophetic teaching and life of Jesus, seen by Christians as a decisive and normative disclosure of the nature and purposes of supreme spirit."

Taken from The Word of God?.

Science: it works, therefore it's true?

The god of atheism

While atheists count themselves as rational because, as they claim, they don’t believe anything that might be labeled superstitious or the product of wishful thinking, nevertheless they still offer their sacrifices upon the alter of their own omniscient and omnipotent god: science. Though I obviously mean the preceding comment to be taken hyperbolically, it is not all that far from reality. While science is not literally omniscient or omnipresent, many atheists hail it as if it were. For them science is the north star that leads us to a complete comprehension of reality. In fact, most atheists, who are naturalists, will go so far as to say that science is our only epistemological window into the nature of reality. That is to say, only things scientifically detectable and falsifiable can count as knowledge—though most who make this statement seem to be oblivious to the fact that it’s self-refuting, but let’s not bog them down with logic.

Yet, when asked to defend such a statement—which again, in principle, cannot be defended by science, on pain of contradiction—atheists tend to resort to a blatant non-sequitur: the scientific method is valid because it works.

In a well-known discussion between Stephen Law and Richard Dawkins at Oxford in 2013, Dawkins was asked a specific question. The questioner basically asked Dawkins how the scientific method can be our only epistemological method for gaining knowledge. Dawkins responded with the following (emphasis mine):

It [the scientific method] works. Planes fly, cars drive, computers compute. If you base medicine on science, you cure people. If you base the design of planes on science, they fly. If you base the design of rockets on science, they reach the moon. It works, bitches.

And laughter ensued from the audience, who was none the wiser regarding the fact that Dawkins had simply parroted a non-sequitur.

This answer given to validate the scientific method is the same answer that is given by a majority of the skeptic community. I have read such a statement numerous times at Debunking Christianity (which is hardly surprising coming from the source) and other such blogs. In a post in 2012 over at the A-Unicornist , author Mike D, while attempting to demonstrate the superiority of science as opposed to metaphysics, stated that, “Science wins because it works”—and it seems he merely copied this platitude from Stephen Hawking who, also, claimed that, “Science will win because it works.”

Pragmatism revived

Unfortunately, most who parrot this claim seem to be completely oblivious to fact that they’re taking a position regarding the metaphysical nature of truth[1]; and this position, which has been well-known and refuted for decades, is known as pragmatism. Pragmatism is, essentially, the view that a proposition, method, ideology etc. is valid if has practical benefits, or if it works satisfactorily. The mantra of pragmatism is almost identical to the skeptic’s mantra regarding science: it’s true because it works.

But is this correct? Is it true that something is valid simply because it results in practical and satisfactory benefits? Surely this is absurd.

In order to demonstrate the backwards thinking of pragmatists we must delve into the nature of truth. What is truth, or, rather, what does it mean for something (e.g., a statement or ideology) to be true?  Well, truth is simply a relation between a thing and reality. Something is true if it conforms to the nature of reality. For example, the statement “the cat is on the mat” is a true statement if and only if there is in fact, in reality, a cat on the mat. The statement would be rendered false if there was no such cat on the mat.

Now notice that the above definition of truth is not contingent on whether or not the specific something works.

Pragmatism is not pragmatic

More than that, I maintain that pragmatism can be shown to be definitively invalid.

Take a simple case of lying. Say that my calculus students—yes, I’m a math teacher—ask me whether or not the AP Calculus test that they take in April will be difficult. Let us say that the test is indeed very difficult, yet in order to endow my students with optimism I lie, and I say that the test is a piece of cake. Now let’s imagine that due to the optimism I have sparked in my students, they all gain motivation and pass the test with flying colors. Are we to now say that my lie to them—namely, that the test would be easy—is now true, simply because the lie worked? Of course not. The test was difficult, and their success has not changed that one bit.

Yet we can go further than this.

Take Christian religion. Christian religion has (and continues to) brought about so much good: It brings peace, joy, comfort, love, hope, charity etc. In fact some would claim that it satisfies our deepest innate longings [2]. Yet, Christianity has also brought about horrendous evils: division, persecution, fear, hate etc. But this provides an insurmountable dilemma for pragmatism. For it seems that, on pragmatism, Christianity has (and does) brought about both practical and impractical consequences. And this means that Christianity is both true and false, or true to some and false to others, or true at some moments and false at others. Hopefully I need not point out how ridiculous this is.

The point is that the ones who profess that X is true because X works simply have their reasoning backwards. What they should be saying is that X works because X is true. That is, science works—planes fly, rockets reach their destination, computers compute etc.—because science is true (i.e. accurately reflects reality). If something accurately reflects reality then it makes perfect sense that it would yield practical benefits.

Now, this might seem like a preferred alternative for the skeptic; they might say, “Fine! Science works because it is true.” The problem is that this doesn’t answer the question that was originally posed in the first place: how is the scientific method justified? To say it works because it’s true doesn’t answer why it’s true in the first place! To answer this question one needs to yield to philosophy and metaphysics, which is the territory many atheists refuse to go.

 

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[1] I find it quite amusing that many “skeptics” who take this position seem to be completely ignorant regarding the nature of their conquest. They’re taking a stance regarding ontology, which is philosophy, while, usually, trying to argue for the supremacy of science. So, to uphold their messiah of science, they must yield the floor to philosophy, the very thing they hate to do and claim is useless.

[2] This point demonstrates that if one does intend to adhere to pragmatism, then they better be prepared to embrace the “truth” of Christianity (and all religions simultaneously), since, on pragmatism, truth is whatever brings about practical benefits, and surely Christianity has done so in the past and continues to.

Harry McCall's thesis on biblical forgery

Harry McCall is a former fundamentalist Christian turned atheist. He (surprisingly) is a member of the Society of Biblical Literature and received his B.A. in biblical literature. I first came across McCall over at John Loftus’ blog Debunking Christianity, and subsequently read his essay in the anthology Leaving the Fold.

In October 2012 McCall expounded a thesis of his, in a post at Debunking Christianity that he built up with much suspense, basically claiming that such a thesis would destroy the very historical foundation of Christianity. This thesis is not a scholarly consensus and has not been promulgated by any  major academic community. It is to McCall’s explanation of his thesis that we will first survey (I will quote McCall piecemeal):

[F]acts prove that the Old Testament is little more than a canonized group of forge [sic] books written at a time when Palestine was awash in religious turmoil and where long dead Biblical figures all seem to have written something ancient.

There is no Biblical manuscript (I repeat), not one single section of the Hebrew Bible (Old Testament) older than 250 BCE at the earliest!

My goal is to prove that there was no Biblical record until the middle of the Second Temple Period!

McCall is arguing that the Hebrew Bible, as it stands, had its genesis in the Second Temple Judaic period (515 BCE to 70 CE), because none of our manuscripts are earlier than this time, and therefore the whole Old testament is the result of countless forgeries which took place no earlier than 250 BCE (though I believe McCall has revised this thesis and has moved the date even later, to the second century).

This thesis is, to say the least, far-fetched and extreme. No consensus of scholars of antiquity, classics, aNE, nor OT/NT biblical studies holds to such a hypothesis. It is a fringe thesis, and should be treated with skepticism, seeing that the majority of scholars in the relevant fields have seen no warrant to promulgate such a hypothesis. I maintain that this thesis is the epitome of absurd and is predicated, simply, on sloppy scholarship, shoddy reasoning, double standards, special pleading and wishful thinking. In order to substantiate my above claim, we will examine three aspects of McCall’s thesis: 1) the fact that it is a non-sequitur; 2) the double standards and special pleading he employs; 3) the absolute ignorance McCall demonstrates regarding the biblical textual evidence. It is to these objections that we now turn.

First, it should be obvious to any objective reader that McCall’s thesis, even if predicated on valid facts (which I believe it is), is a non-sequitur—that is, even if his facts are correct, the conclusion does not logically follow. It is certainly not reasonable to conclude that because the oldest manuscripts we have of a specific writing date to such and such a time, they could not have been written any earlier than said time. Notice that at this point we’re dealing with pure logical possibility. It is perfectly reasonable to infer—and in fact we’ll see below that this is done with most writings from antiquity—that the original manuscript of a writing can date to many years before the oldest surviving copy of said writing. The oldest surviving manuscript of a writing does not logically necessitate that said manuscript is the earliest copy of the writing. To claim otherwise is pure ignorance embedded in dogmatism.

Now if my above objection is true, then this means that McCall’s conclusion does not at all follow from the facts he has highlighted; and if McCall’s conclusion does not follow, then his thesis is unwarranted and fallacious. The only way for McCall to revive his thesis is to claim that it is plausible for an oldest existing manuscript to have its genesis in an earlier copy that is not currently possessed; but if McCall does this then his thesis loses all efficacy. McCall is stuck between a rock and a hard place.

Second, I maintain that McCall commits a major double standard with his thesis. To reiterate, McCall is claiming that since the oldest manuscripts we have of the Hebrew Bible are no older than 250 BCE, they could not—remember that if he admits they could then his thesis loses all plausibility—have been written any earlier. Yet, McCall only applies this standard to the Bible, and not to other writings of antiquity. But, most writings of antiquity run into the same problem that McCall is posing for the Bible, namely, late manuscripts.

Let us demonstrate with examples. Cornelius Tacitus (A.D. 56-120) was a Roman historian and senator. Tacitus is considered to be one of the greatest Roman historians of antiquity. So, one would think that Tacitus’ writings live off of an abundance of manuscripts that date back to his period, right? Wrong. Tacitus’ Annals originally contained at least sixteen volumes. Yet, only volumes 1-4 and 12-15 survive, and therefore we only have half of Tacitus’ original work. Not only that, but the oldest surviving manuscript of the Annals that exists dates to the ninth century! Therefore, by McCall’s own reasoning, it could not have been written any earlier, and was forged in Tacitus’ name.

These types of examples abound in the ancient world.  Suetonius (A.D. 69-140) was another Roman historian, and the earliest manuscripts we contain of his The Twelve Caesars date to the ninth century as well. Thucydides (460-400 B.C.E) was a Greek historian and his earliest fragments date to the 1^st Century A.D. Greek historian Herodotus (484-425 B.C.E) was labeled “The father of history” and is seen as, arguably, the greatest historian in antiquity. His masterpiece The Histories survives with the earliest fragments dating to the 2^nd Century A.D. This is only the tip of the iceberg. And all these great and well-known historians of antiquity are hundreds of years removed from the earliest existing manuscripts of their writings.

But remember that by McCall’s own reasoning, all these documents were forged! Here is a quote from McCall: To argue that the Bible was an ancient historical document that existed prior to this period, one MUST have textual support. Now let us take McCall’s same line of reasoning and apply it to the other historians of antiquity surveyed above:

To argue that [the writings of Tacitus, Suetonius, Thucydides and Herodotus were] ancient historical documents that existed prior to [their oldest existing manuscripts], one MUST have textual support.

Surely we can now see how ridiculous McCall’s thesis is. If McCall’s standard was employed with regards to all writings in antiquity, then we would have to conclude that all writings in antiquity were forged! That means Tacitus didn’t write the Annals and Herodotus didn’t write The Histories. Again, this is what we must infer if we are to follow McCall’s reasoning. Now, McCall has had this objection brought to his attention. This was his response:

Apples and oranges…Tacitus was not writing a divine history…he did not claim to have the one true history for over 4,000 years. He did not copy other works, then deny they existed and claim them exclusively as from his god/gods.

 McCall is claiming that the Hebrew Bible cannot be evaluated with the same standards as Tacitus, Herodotus et al. because the Hebrew Bible claims divine inspiration, whereas the former does not. Yet McCall is simply employing a red herring. Whether a text claims divine inspiration for itself does not necessitate how we should critically evaluate it. What’s amusing is that this is the very thing Christian apologists do with regards to biblical criticism—they engage in special pleading by asserting that the Bible should not be subject to the same standards of criticism as other writings, because the Bible is divinely inspired. McCall is, also, doing nothing more than engaging in special pleading. Just because the Bible claims inspiration for itself does not mean we treat it any different than any other historical document from antiquity. If the Bible claims to be giving us history, which it does claim throughout, then we need to subject it to the same criticism that we subject Tacitus’ Annals to, for example.  

McCall is simply attempting to get away with being overly critical with the biblical text. But, it wont work. Either his standard—that a writing cannot be older than its oldest manuscript—is employed across the board, and therefore most writings from antiquity are forged; or McCall must continue to revert to special pleading, and therefore his thesis is founded on a fallacy; or McCall will have to give up his ridiculous thesis, and therefore his thesis is discarded as invalid.

Third, let us look at a biblical example that seems to run counter to McCall’s hypothesis. Let’s begin with the nature of the Book of Isaiah. The Book of Isaiah is considered by the consensus of scholars to have been written by three authors: “First Isaiah” who wrote chapters 1-39, “Deutero-Isaiah” who wrote chapters 40-55, and “Third Isaiah” who wrote 56-66. Now, scholars believe that these chapters were written, for the most part, centuries apart from one another. Yet, on McCall’s thesis we have to believe that all these chapters were written sometime around the Second Temple Period. You see, the earliest copy of Isaiah we possess, known as the Great Isaiah Scroll, dates to around 100 BCE, and therefore it couldn’t have been written any earlier, according to McCall anyway. But, this presents a problem. Isaiah 52, written by Deutero-Isaiah, makes a peculiar statement that makes sense only if promulgated around the end of the exile. Here’s Isaiah 52:1 (emphasis added): Awake, awake; put on thy strength, O Zion; put on thy beautiful garments, O Jerusalem, the holy city: for henceforth there shall be no more come into thee the uncircumcised and the unclean. In this chapter the Israelites have just returned from exile, and Deutero-Isaiah is trying to prophesy to the people that they have paid their dues, that Jerusalem has returned into their hands, and that things will stay that way. Now, this is to be expected from a group of Jews who believe that they were sent into exile because of their sinfulness and that they have since paid the price and can now enjoy their beloved promise land.

But why, you might ask, does this prophecy only make sense if professed around the time the Israelites escaped exile? It’s simple: the prophecy failed. In case one didn’t know, Jerusalem has had many the uncircumcised and the unclean set up shop there. Antiochus Epiphanes pillaged Jerusalem in 167 BCE (which helped lead to the Maccabean revolt), and many such destructions and foreign invasions took place soon after. So, obviously, the verse in Isaiah was written before all of this happened, otherwise we’re meant to believe that Deutero-Isaiah deliberately wrote a false prophecy—which goes against common sense, and the nature of Second Temple Jewish literature.

Yet, if we accept McCall’s thesis then examples (and there are many more) like these become inexplicable. If Deutero-Isaiah wrote in Second Temple Judaism, then why would he construct a prophecy he knew was false and was being falsified at that very time? Let it be known that Second Temple Judaic forgeries were constructed to attach validity to their writings and, many times, promulgated prophecies after the fact—that is, after they had already happened so that they would be seen as valid. So, why would Deutero-Isaiah do the complete opposite and attach obvious invalidity to his writings? Such questions seem to have no reasonable answer on McCall’s thesis.

Conclusion

I maintain that we have seen absolutely no reason to (and every reason against) adopt McCall’s outrageous hypothesis. He claims that we need textual proof to overturn his thesis, yet we only need show that his thesis is fallacious, employs double standards and special pleading, and goes against the evidence we do possess. And this has been done. Is the Hebrew Bible a forged document of the Second Temple period? We have seen no cogent reason to think so.