A topic that has been heavily discussed between Mike D, over
at The Aunicornist, and I is the validity of utilizing metaphysics as an
inquiry into reality. Mike believes that metaphysics is a useless endeavor
which centers itself on superfluous concepts that are not necessary, and not
even accurate, for describing reality. In my eyes Mike presents some of the
best arguments against the use of metaphysics, though I do believe his
arguments fall short in the end. Nevertheless, Mike has just posted a new
article entitled The death of metaphysics,
and I therefore felt obligated to continue this dialogue, which is centered on
such a crucial topic, and point out the errors I believe Mike has made.
I will begin where Mike seems to make some strange
statements regarding his adherence to model-dependent realism:
[Model-dependent realism] essentially says that we do not
have unfettered access to ‘absolute truth’ or complete knowledge of what is
literally real. All we can do, then, is construct models with varying degrees
of predictive reliability. Fussing over what is real is meaningless[.]
First, let it be made clear that model-dependent realism is
itself a metaphysical position. That is, by claiming that we don’t have
unfettered access to absolute truth Mike is claiming something about the nature
of reality. So, Mike is utilizing metaphysics…to debunk metaphysics. Good luck with that.
Second, I doubt any metaphysician has ever claimed that we
can have complete knowledge of
reality; we are not omniscient, indeed. But, this doesn’t mean that we cannot
predicate things of reality with certainty—in fact, the laws of logic dictate
that we must, on pain of
contradiction. So surely we can know
things of reality, and therefore we can say some things are literally real. It is literally real
that reality exists (this is true even if Cartesian doubt is valid), that I
exist, or that I am experiencing certain cognitive datum. Now, these might seem
trivial propositions at best, but that’s not the point. They are only trivial
because they are axiomatic and self-justifying. Yet, it is these very types of
propositions that we can be absolutely certain conform to reality, and
therefore the claim that we cannot know things absolutely true about reality is
false.
Mike continues on his vindication of model-dependent
realism:
Often, what we think is real turns out to be something else.
Predictions often do not hold true; we’re subject to false memories and
cognitive biases; and our own cognitive models of reality often fail us. This
demonstrates that we do not have access to Absolute Truth, or complete
knowledge of what is literally real.
Mike’s argument here seems to lead to a completely different
conclusion. If we’re subject to invalid models of reality, then the only way we
could know this is if we can tell valid models of reality from invalid ones.
For example, the only way we can tell when something is an optical illusion is
if we know what that thing actually
looks like. Similarly, to differentiate true models from false models can only
happen if we can indeed arrive truth. Mike’s attempt to run away from (what he
calls) “Absolute Truth” only pulls the rug out from underneath him.
Moreover, remember that Mike here is still predicating this
epistemological framework of reality. That
is, he is saying that it is true that model-dependent realism is a correct
epistemological description of reality. Notice the problem?
Mike then articulates what he believes to be a key problem
with metaphysical inquiry:
The problem with this type of thought is that the very
semantic framework that is used to construct metaphysical propositions and
derive their conclusions are fully dependent on both our physical embodiment
and our empirical experience.
This statement puzzles me, because a majority of
metaphysical inquiry deals with contingent a posteriori inquiry; that is,
ontological truths which can only be predicated of our observed universe. Open
any metaphysics textbook and you’ll see that the breadth of topics covered are
topics that are only relevant to our observable reality. So, why is Mike
getting all worked up by the fact that metaphysics abstracts concepts from the
observed and uses them to describe the very same observable reality? The answer
is that Mike only gets worked up when these metaphysical inquiries are labeled
as “necessary” and are projected beyond the limits of our experience:
[I]t is meaningless to use words that describe
spatiotemporal relationships without the context of spatiotemporality[…] This
demonstrates that these sorts of metaphysical propositions are nonsensical.
First, it is not nonsensical. In fact, physicists do this
all the time. Physicists, in order to best make sense of certain states of the
universe, invoke such spatiotemporal language even where such language is out
of context. They constantly talk about what it would be like inside a black
hole, or what characterizes a singularity, or the weirdness of the quantum
world, even though the language employed doesn’t exactly get it right. But,
does anyone claim that what these physicists are saying is therefore
nonsensical and meaningless?
Second, and more importantly, most concepts utilized by
metaphysicians that are seen as necessary--and therefore must apply anywhere
and everywhere--are concepts that do not only
have their context in spatiotemporality. Take the crucial concept of identity.
Was this concept abstracted from experience? You betcha. But, can it only be
predicated of things measurable in space-time? Not at all. Identity is, and
must be, predicated of propositions, concepts, meanings, and mathematical
concepts, all of which are not
spatiotemporal.
Moreover, what’s important is not just that concepts like
identity can be applied anywhere—whether to things in space-time or not—but
that they must be applied everywhere on pain of contradiction. That is to
say, if one were to attempt to deny (anywhere) a necessary existent like
identity, they would defeat themselves logically. A perfect example of this is
the first law of logic. Try to deny such a law and you’ll find yourself
entangled in self-refutation. And this means that such a proposition cannot fail
to be predicated anywhere--for the same thing would happen. Thus stated, we see
that metaphysics can, and must, reach beyond the bounds of our experience.
Mike continues:
We can thus avoid the confusion of these metaphysical
propositions simply by pointing out that there is no reason to think that the
words used to construct such propositions are meaningful outside of the
empirical context from which their meaning is abstracted in the first place.
On the contrary, we have seen that metaphysical concepts and
propositions need not be projected “outside” the universe in order for them to be projected of things (e.g.
mathematical concepts and propositions) outside of the empirical. And with that in hand we have warrant for applying such
metaphysics outside the bounds of our immediate experience.
We inferred a number of things here: 1) One’s own attempt to
bury metaphysics necessitated the use of
metaphysics, thereby rendering such a position self-defeating; 2) Mike seems to
not understand that the type of metaphysics that he disdains so much does not
even constitute the majority of metaphysical focal points, which means that his
campaign against metaphysics is misdirected; and 3) metaphysics can and must,
contrary to Mike, be projected to realms beyond our observable experience.
So, the death of metaphysics? I think not. In the words of
the late E.J. Lowe: [Metaphysics] is one in which no rational being can avoid
engaging in at least some of the time. We are all metaphysicians whether we
like it or not.
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