Model-Dependent Realism: An untenable epistemology

All the metaphysical discussion as of late on this blog has left my mind racing on many things. Yet, one thing I felt in particular that needed to be tackled was the epistemological framework known as Model-Dependent Realism (henceforth MDR). This epistemology is a favorite of Mike D over at The-Aunicornist. Frankly, I get quite tired of having this idea thrown around when it is so blatantly ridiculous, and thus I felt the need to demonstrate such.

So, let us first expound this epistemology—only to be found promulgated in The Grand Design by Stephen Hawking, which should already make said epistemology suspect, since the book is, to be blunt, quite terrible. 

[O]ur brains interpret the input from our sensory organs by making a model of the world[…] If two such physical theories or models accurately predict the same events, one cannot be said to be more real than the other; rather we are free to use whichever model is most convenient.

 There is no picture-or theory-independent concept of reality. […] These mental concepts are the only reality we can know. […] [A] well-constructed model creates a reality of its own.

 It should be obvious upon first glance how extreme and ridiculous MDR is. It is an amalgam of previously known philosophical positions such as pragmatism, constructive empiricism, and some type of idealism—all, at least to me, untenable philosophies in themselves.

Nothing is “real”, except my theory

Probably one of the most extreme promulgations in MDR is that one’s “model” cannot be said to be more real than another’s. This is pure nonsense. First, let it be understood that MDR does not claim that if two theories can both accurately describe or predict the same observations, then we cannot, at the moment, determine which theory actually conforms to objective reality. No, MDR is claiming that neither theory conforms to reality more than the other—that is, neither theory is more real than the other.

To illustrate the depravity of such a position, let’s take two well-known models of reality: realism and solipsism. The realist states that an objective reality exists independent of observers, while the solipsist states that only his mind exists. Surely these models are mutually exclusive, and either one or the other has to be predicated of reality—that is, either only I exist, or a reality exists which I am a part of; there is no middle ground here. However, on MDR we cannot say that one is true while the other is false. Rather, neither is true. Yeah…this is the intelligence blooming from the mind of Hawking, and this is why Einstein said, “the man of science is a poor philosopher”.

That being said, MDR has much bigger problems than this. You see MDR, though denying the objective reality of theories, must uphold the reality of at least one theory to be valid. Remember the following foundational claim of MDR: There is no picture-or theory-independent concept of reality. Now, is this assertion true or false—that is, can it be predicated of reality, or not? If so, then MDR has just made an objective claim about the nature of reality, the very thing it claims cannot be done. If not, then MDR is false. Either way, MDR refutes itself.

Pragmatic, for whom?

Remember that MDR asserts that if two models of reality are equally on par at describing our observations, then we can use whichever model we find most valuable or convenient. This is pure pragmatism—and MDR, just like any philosophy founded on pragmatism, runs into problems because of this. First, if one can adopt any model based on its utility, then the validity of models is subject to the whims of individuals. For what’s pragmatic for me will not necessarily be pragmatic for you. But wait. I personally find it ridiculous, and therefore, not pragmatic, to hold to MDR; and my worldview, which excludes MDR, makes the same observations of reality as any other. So, since it is convenient for me to reject MDR, then, on MDR, I am free to do so and no one can claim that what I have done is invalid. Thus stated, MDR has led to the rejection of itself!

Second, MDR again pulls the rug out from underneath itself. Pragmatism is a theory of truth which explicitly rejects the correspondence theory of truth—i.e., a statement is true if it corresponds to reality. But, the only way to do this is to make an objective claim about reality—that is, truth as such is illusory. However, to make such an objective claim is to go against MDR—which rejects objective claims. MDR once again must do the very thing it claims cannot be done.

There are many more problems with MDR, but I do believe its untenability has hitherto been demonstrated. Advocates of MDR seem to make their case solely on the basis of how our sensory organs take in datum and relay it to our brain. This seems, to them, to demonstrate that only the appearance of reality is accessible to us, as opposed to reality in itself. But, notice that this is once again an objective claim regarding what really goes on when we abstract concepts from the observed. More importantly there are many epistemologies out there that take such cognitive facts into account while still proclaiming that reality in itself can be known. And who are model-dependent realists to say they’re wrong? They can’t, because their epistemology doesn’t allow them. On the contrary, it is much more convenient to affirm an epistemology that promulgates the reality of the observed, and therefore we see one more instance of MDR shooting itself in the foot. 

The death of metaphysics? Part II

Mike D offered a thorough response to my last post regarding the validity of metaphysics. To reiterate from my last post, the denial of metaphysics is such an important and extreme position to take, that I feel obligated to continue this discussion to demonstrate why metaphysics 1) is extremely crucial to everyone’s worldview, and 2) cannot logically be denied, as Mike wants to.

Mike begins his post by agreeing that we are all metaphysicians, in the sense that we all ask ourselves fundamental questions like “what is existence?” or “what is the self?” etc. His problem is whether or not these metaphysical questions are even meaningful, or why they should be delegated to metaphysics and not science.

But, here’s the big problem for such a position: If one claims that metaphysics is simply vacuous speculation that can obtain no knowledge, and that it cannot answer any questions that science cannot, then this is itself a metaphysical assertion! Notice that this is not a claim that science can make, and neither is it a claim any other discipline except metaphysics can make. Such a position is asserting that a particular method is invalid for securing answers about the nature of reality, yet this position is itself promulgating that about the nature of reality, and therefore such a position is metaphysical.  It is simply not possible to deny the reality of metaphysics, for to do so one must engage in it.

Now, this was pointed out to Mike in my last post with regards to his model-dependent realism. I claimed that this was a metaphysical position. This was his response:

 MDR is a statement about our epistemological relationship to reality, not a statement about what reality is[.]

 Fair enough. But, this still doesn’t escape my point. For a claim about one’s epistemological relationship to reality is still metaphysical. In fact, epistemology is widely seen to be subsumed under the umbrella of metaphysics. Why? Because a claim about our relationship to attaining knowledge about reality is still a claim about the nature of reality, since we are a part of reality. Philosopher Peter Coffey articulates:

 The aim of all metaphysics is to arrive at a rational and systematic comprehension of reality[…]this understanding cannot be satisfactory without an investigation into the nature of ‘knowing’ itself.

 So, epistemology complements metaphysics, but it is not a substitute for it. Epistemology is metaphysics. But, let’s say I’m wrong. Is MDR free and clear from being a metaphysical position? No. Take these quotes on MDR from The Grand Design, the very book where MDR is promulgated:

 If there are two models that both agree with observation[…]then one cannot say that one is more real than another.

 [M]ental concepts are the only reality we can know.

 [I]t is pointless to ask whether a model is real, only whether it agrees with observation.

 These are very explicit metaphysical propositions on which MDR is predicated, and, therefore, an adherence to MDR necessitates an adherence to certain metaphysical propositions, which therefore necessitates the validity of metaphysical inquiry. Notice, also that MDR makes a very explicit claim regarding truth theories. On MDR, a model is “true” insofar as it pragmatically agrees with our experience. This is a very extreme claim regarding the nature of truth, and one’s view of the nature of truth is a metaphysical position.

Let us now turn to another major contention of Mike’s:

 The laws of logic are a semantic framework for developing a consistent ontology of observable phenomena. It is impossible to know, as human beings, what (if anything) exists ‘beyond our experience’[…] How can we possibly have cognitive access to anything ‘beyond our experience’—given that our ability to comprehend it would, in fact, make it part of our experience?

 First, I never said that we can know what exists beyond our experience. Rather, I said that we can know that certain metaphysical principles will apply beyond our experience—if there is such a thing. Therefore, I never claimed that we can have cognitive access to anything that is not observably accessable to us. To reiterate, I only claimed that due to the necessity of certain metaphysical concepts and propositions, those same concepts and propositions cannot fail to be predicated of anything that exists—whether that be in our observable universe or anywhere else. To this claim Mike said the following:

 [Y]ou’re making the assumption that words like “beyond” or “everywhere” can be (and are) meaningful without the empirical framework from which their meaning is abstracted.  My objection here is that you’ve provided no reason whatsoever why that assumption is justified.

 Mike is wrong here. I claimed that necessary concepts like identity, and essence and propositions like the laws of logic can, and must be, predicated of any existing thing—not words like beyond. And on the contrary, I did provide reasons why they must apply—they are necessary. But, Mike won’t accept this, so let me illustrate with something non-empirical and nonspatiotemporal. (Note: Mike accused me of begging the question here by claiming that nonspatiotemporal things exist—he must have thought I meant supernatural, of which I didn’t.)

Take the set (III) which represents the number “three”. This set is a mere abstraction, that is, it has been abstracted from experience. Now, does that mean that the set itself is spatiotemporal, since it was abstracted from something spatiotemporal? No, the set (III) is merely a concept or a representation. And just because this set is a representation does not mean we cannot predicate properties of it. So, take the concept of identity. Can identity be predicated of the set (III)—which is to ask, is (III) identical (III)? Why, yes it is, and that satisfies the first law of logic. We can also say that (III) cannot be both (III) and (II), but only (III), which satisfies the other two laws of logic. So, what does this prove? It proves that the laws of logic, which are metaphysical, can be predicated of nonspatiotemporal subjects. And if this can happen, then metaphysics is not delegated to only apply to spatiotemporal subjects.

I know Mike will respond that the set (III) is not an actual existing “thing”, in that we cant go out and find the set (III) in the empirical world, and that it is only a representation of empirical things. There are two answers here: 1) even to claim such a thing defeats Mike’s overall position—the death of metaphysics—since such a claim is metaphysical, and 2) a representation or concept can and does still have properties. Take the concept of a unicorn as opposed to a phoenix. The only way to differentiate between these mythical creatures is for one concept to possess properties that the other doesn’t. (Whether these properties are manifest in the empirical is completely peripheral.) But, for anything to possess properties—even non-empirical things, as in this case—must mean the laws of logic apply. So, can metaphysics be launched beyond the realm of the observable? Yes, and therefore one has warrant for adhering to the necessity of metaphysics for anything that exists.

So, our position here is the same as last post. We have seen that metaphysics simply cannot be jettisoned, no matter how meaningless one thinks it is; it is impossible to do so. Second, we have seen that necessary metaphysical propositions are predicated of whatever, empirical or not. (But, even if only the former were warranted--which it is--this would eventually lead to the latter. For if metaphysics is a necessary endeavor, then we must recognize what metaphysics delegates as necessary. And this point alone makes Mike arguments--that metaphysical concepts cannot be applied outside the empirical--completely vacuous.) As philosophers say, metaphysics always buries its undertakers. 

Why something rather than nothing? Part I

I’m beginning a series of posts centered on the age old existential philosophical question of “Why something exists, as opposed to nothing at all?”  I intend to survey many (different) naturalistic answers to this question, and, since I’m obviously not a naturalist, demonstrate why I believe they fall short.

I have decided to begin with the answer that is most wrong-headed and nonsensical. Unfortunately, this is a common response among naturalists and scientists today, and has been promulgated, as of late, by some of the best known contemporary naturalists. Here is a sample of common answers that lie in the same vein:

“[Nothing] should perhaps be better termed as a ‘void,’ which is what you get when you apply quantum theory to space-time itself. It’s about as nothing as nothing can be. This void can be described mathematically. It has an explicit wave function. This void is the quantum gravity equivalent of the quantum vacuum in quantum field theory.”

"[E]mpty space, which for many people is a good first example of nothing, is actually unstable. Quantum mechanics will allow particles to suddenly pop out of nothing and it doesn't violate any laws of physics. Just the known laws of quantum mechanics and relativity can produce 400 billion galaxies each containing 100 billion stars and then beyond that it turns out when you apply quantum mechanics to gravity, space itself can arise from nothing, as can time. It seems impossible but it’s completely possible and what is amazing to me is to be asked what would be the characteristics of a universe that came from nothing by laws of physics. It would be precisely the characteristics of the universe we measure."

“Because there is a law such as gravity, the universe can and will create itself from nothing. Spontaneous creation is the reason there is something rather than nothing, why the universe exists, why we exist.”

 

These answers were promulgated by physicists Victor Stenger, Lawrence Krauss, and Stephen Hawking respectively, and they all suffer from the same problem: namely, what they’re describing is not nothing. Nothing is, simply, complete non-existence, that is, the absence of anything, at all. But, according to these scientists, “nothing” (pictured at left) is unstable, empty space, governed by the laws of gravity and quantum mechanics, and has a wave function. This definition seems to satisfy these physicists because “[i]t’s about as nothing as nothing can be.”

 However, we’re not looking for as close a definition of nothing that physics can provide, rather, we’re looking for absolute nothingness. The question is why something exists rather than nothing, not why something exists rather than empty space governed by the laws of physics.

 That being said, even if we granted them their definition, they have still failed to answer the question. For the laws of physics that they have appealed to—e.g. the laws of gravity, quantum mechanics, and relativity—do not, and cannot, explain the emergence of existence. Why? Because laws only describe the nature of what already exists. The law of gravity only describes how matter behaves at certain parts of the universe. Similarly, the laws of quantum mechanics only describe how sub-atomic particles behave. Notice that you must first have matter and sub-atomic particles in order for these laws to be binding. So, obviously, you must have something before physical laws can even begin to impart explanation.

 The physicists, then, have missed the mark. They cannot even use correct semantics involved in this discussion, and even if they did, their answers presuppose the very concept they’re attempting to account for.